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Abstract 
Several commentators on psychotherapy have suggested that certain features of 
contemporary society are creating additional psychological problems for people. They 
argue that traditional individualistic approaches to psychotherapy cannot account 
theoretically for the social dysfunctions which could be responsible for psychological 
problems. The focus of such dysfunctions are de-ethicalised human relations either 
due to social institutional constraints (forms of macro-conduct) or the uncoupling of 
micro-conduct (person to person activities) from macro-conduct. I examine recent 
approaches to psychotherapy to find out whether they consider contemporary features 
of social existence in their accounts. 
' 
My aim is to provide an account of psychotherapy which considers personal and 
social existence co-relative to each other. Only by theoretically establishing such a 
relation can there be an adequate analysis of persons interacting with each other or 
their social practices. I propose three modalities, personhood, micro-conduct and 
macro-conduct for my account of psychotherapy. Each of these can influence the 
other. 
My approach to psychotherapy as social critique is organised around the principle of 
social and moral values which includes both persons as evaluators and the values 
pertaining to social practices in the social environment. I contend that such eval~ators 
are moral agents with both species-related and individual attributes of intentions and 
powers and also what I term, knowledge-ability. I suggest that the process of 
evaluation is a skilled process involving feedback between persons and their practices 
as a result of which persons can regulate and modify their social practices. This 
skilled process establishes also the regulatory methodological features of 
psychotherapy practice which can give rise to psychotherapeutic betterment. 
I have achieved an account of social psychotherapy that is relational and 
developmental and in this respect allows for psychotherapeutic betterment. The 
account which I offer is not a normative account but is one which is available for 
empirical enquiry. 
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1 Introduction and Background. 
I have spent approximately 20 years in the profession of psychotherapy. Further, the 
' institution in which I worked after training was interested in staff and professional 
development. As a result, over the years I went to a good many courses and 
workshops on approaches to psychotherapy. At that time, some new approaches to 
psychotherapy were beginning to splinter from the main traditional ones. For 
example, one ofthese new approaches was Assagioli's Psychosynthesis (1971) which 
fused aspects of Freudian psychoanalysis with a modified version of existentialism. 
For Freud the psychological constructs of destructive and irrational instincts or drives, 
which conflicted with the superego and rational ego were held in check by an 
integrated homeostatic system.1 This form of integration was superseded in 
psychosynthesis by the construct of an energy force whose function was the opposite. 
The drives, in this case, were liberalising and energising and culminated in what was 
termed a spiritual harmonic integration. May (1972) in his existential approach to 
psychotherapy proffered certain goals of self-actualising processes which lead to 
heightened levels of awareness. These higher levels were considered to be important 
·in their own right. Such accounts had part of their origins in Maslow's (1954,1968) 
concept of a hierarchical pyramid of needs. The base levels of these needs were 
physiological and early and later social ~urturing needs.2 However these lower levels 
of needs were not considered to be as important in the later humanistic accounts of 
' 
psychotherapy. This meant that the acculturation processes and social contexts of 
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persons in psychotherapy were not represented in their accounts of psychotherapy. All 
of these accounts were illustrative of what was named the human potential movement 
which is still thriving and diversifying without necessarily being grouped nowadays 
around that particular title.(Shaffer, 1978) The first point I want to make is that there 
seemed to be so many differing approaches to psychotherapy available. But few, if 
any, had much theoretical grounding or offered their approaches for scientific scrutiny 
and validation. Those who made claims to scientific rigour, like Assagioli with regard 
to psychosynthesis, did not empirically pursue the claims that they had made for their 
approach. The second point has to do with more orthodox approaches to 
psychotherapy. 
I taught for 8 years on a Postgraduate Guidance and Counselling course, 
mainly for teachers. The approaches to psychotherapy which the course offered were 
traditional accounts of psychotherapy such as the two main variants of behaviourism 
and traditional humanistic versions of psychotherapy. The course included 
counselling psychology theory, educational theory, sociology and practical 
workshops. It had a practical focus and the graduate teachers had to consider and 
decide on their own approach to counselling to be applied within "educational and 
guidance" contexts. Also within the course was a unit on guidance issues dealing with 
what was then termed "problem children". This was backed up by field visits to 
institutions in which adolescents with social and psychological predicaments either 
resided or were educated or both. One specific institution had legal restraining orders 
to prevent certain of its clientele leaving the institution at will. That meant that a good 
part of its clientele were what was considered by the institution as a psychologically 
disturbed group of the population. The personnel involved in supervising the 
adolescents had to alternate between the role of custodians and surrogate parents. 
The psychotherapeutic treatments on offer included both humanistic and 
behavioural approaches to psychotherapy. There are two dimensions to behaviouristic 
approaches. Firstly, there are the psychological principles on which accounts of 
psychotherapy are grounded. These have to do with general principles of learning and 
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the behaviourist 's belief that irrational or maladjusted behaviour is learned and 
maintained and that different and appropriate learning approaches to the events in 
people's lives would overcome their psychological problems. Then, secondly, there 
are the regulated behavioural technologies used in psychotherapy. Operant 
conditioning is the approach most commonly used in institutional settings. 3 The 
focus is not simply on learned behaviour but has to do with the conditioning involved 
in the learning and maintenance of behaviour. Behaviour is under the control of the 
environment and what happens is contingent on environmental factors. If these 
environmental factors remain unaltered the environment will continue to have 
consequences for the person and reinforce the behaviour and in the case of persons 
who arrive at therapy the environment is considered to have been a negative 
reinforcer. Operant behaviour is behaviour that "operates" on the environment to 
produce change in it .(Skinner 1953) The humanistic approaches were based on the 
work of Rogers (1973), supplemented by Perls. (1969) Their notion of human nature 
implied that persons were rational, altruistic and purposeful. For Rogers, persons' 
experiences originate from the external world. They are organised around and evolve 
into a form of self- structure consisting of positive or negative psychological self-
concepts, depending on their experiences over time being either good or not. Rogers' 
account of psychotherapy was an enhancement ofpositive self- concepts and involves 
the belief that such enhancements promoted rational, altruistic and purposeful 
conduct. The accounts of psychotherapy that were available for the psychotherapeutic 
treatment of the psychologically disturbed adolescents were the same ones that were 
being offered to teachers in their mainstream guidance role. But where the teachers 
chose one or the other as a background for their guidance programmes, the residential 
personnel approached their task within the frameworks of two incompatible views of 
human nature and two incommensurate explanations of human conduct. 
Other problems in relation to a theoretical grounding for an account of 
psychotherapy were equally demanding of clarification. The early influences and 
social constraints on those adolescents in residential care or on pupils requiring 
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counselling and guidance were made theoretically irrelevant. Welfare officers, social 
workers and school officers who made out assessments and reports of the person's 
home background and their conduct in residential care did this in relation to their 
social studies training and their professional social-work remit. But in order for them 
to make a contribution to and assessment of the psychotherapeutic features of their 
clientele's difficulties, they had to opt out of a social work framework into a 
psychological framework. This meant theoretically, if not practically, ignoring the 
social assessments and reports that would have been relevant and useful in the 
explanation of the psychological difficulties and the promotion of the psychological 
welfare of the person. 
Overall, it has occasioned an incommensurate split, between personal being 
and social being. When case conferences were called beyond the confines of the 
residential institution, where the issue was the psychological state of the person in 
therapy the anomalies widened. The rationale of these case conferences was their 
multi-perspectiveness. The multi-faceted nature of the problems of the person-in-care 
with legal and a host of other social parameters and contexts denied the privileging of 
an approach involving a psychology of the individual. None of the traditional 
accounts of psychotherapy or those which resulted from attempts at integrating the 
notion of mind/self and behaviour, such as cognitive-behaviourism (or forms of 
existentiaJism coupled to psychoanalysis) was adequate either on their own merits or 
their integrated versions. (Smail, 1978) 
For me, a different way of thinking about approaches to psychotherapy came 
about via the male/female structuring of the student population in the polytechnic in 
which I worked. It helped me to gain insight into, and also gave me a means of 
approaching the central problem inherent in accounts of psychotherapy. In 
polytechnics at that time, a gender split occurred between males (especially overseas 
males) doing engineering courses, and British women doing social science courses. 
More and more frequently the women on these courses specialised in the counselling 
option of their course and many specialised further in aspects of the discourse of 
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psychotherapy in postgraduate studies and in professional work. So my third point 
under consideration occurred through the realisation that the women who had first-
hand knowledge of counselling approaches, in the main, seldom conceptualised 
themselves and their psychological problems in terms of individualistic accounts of 
psychotherapy. Rather, when they discussed areas of their existence in relation to 
their psychological states, their discussions were always politically and morally 
contextualised. What came significantly out of the therapeutic discussions was the 
matter of the moral abuse experienced by them in the past and its sustaining features 
in the present. 
However, as the acute features of their anxiety states diminished, the moral 
context of the psychological dilemmas of the persons in therapy became more 
pronounced. They themselves made it a central issue of their psychological 
difficulties. More especially, as matters were psychologically improving, the majority 
of these women returned to a political milieu that had previously directed their beliefs 
and interests. There was a definite move away from their own per~onal dilemmas into 
a way of life that incorporated moral indignation and the taking of moral stances over 
civic and other public issues. Focusing on moral issues, the evaluation and ongoing 
selection of the most worthwhile or appropriate moral exemplar for the occasion and 
situation, and the taking of moral stands were central factors in my contribution to 
their psychotherapeutic betterment. 
Parallel to this was the matter of those overseas students doing engineering 
courses who also came to therapeutic sessions. Few were acquainted with Rogerian or 
any other Western counselling approach. In contrast to a vast majority of lay people 
now seeking psychotherapeutic help, they were similar to the women doing 
counselling options in so far as they ,also,did not contextualise their problem in 
individualistic psychological terms. Rather, their psychological problems were 
located within a mix of family pressures; pressure from their educational and 
technical government departments; from constraining norms and politics of their own 
culture; and from the racial ascendancy of competing cultures in their home countries. 
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Their problems also involved the norms of U.K. culture and the effect of open or 
closeted racial attacks on them in the U.K. 
The complex social origins of these persons' psychological traumas were not 
covered by the theoretical substance of the contemporary discourse of psychotherapy. 
Rather, various individualistic accounts of psychotherapy were, in fact, theoretically 
designed to exclude the origins of their psychological problems which were the result 
of government and economic policies as well as of certain forms of religious 
practices. 
Finally there was another group of students who came to psychotherapy who 
made me look again at approaches to psychotherapy. These were mature male 
students from a catchment area of the North-East. They had been made redundant 
from work due to the break-up of the mining and shipyard industries. As there was no 
alternative work, some entered education. But in their particular cases what was 
happening when they entered higher education was that their new educational social 
structures, had become uncoupled or separated from the micro structures of family 
and mates. The last vestiges of the idea of a "neighbourhood environment" (that 
combined micro- and macro-practices), where men worked and socialised and which 
gave them their point of reference as men to other men and to women was being 
eroded. Again these students on entering college did not have the prevalent lay 
persons' acquaintance with contemporary individualistic accounts of psychotherapy. 
They, themselves, understood their psychotherapeutic problems either in terms of 
their being victims of economic and social forces or as a result of flaws in their 
character both seemingly beyond their control. It would have trivialised their 
psychological difficulties to consider them as involving only their own individual 
feelings or their own irrational thoughts, which is pretty much now how standard 
approaches to psychotherapy would have viewed such matters. 
However, there was a paradox in relation to the mature woman from the same 
catchment area. Prior to coming to college, certain of these women were involved 
firstly in the miner's strike and then in collective units organised to prevent the 
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closure of the mines. They had joined or formed themselves into collective groups for 
the administration of strike funds and other resources. But these collective groups in 
time drew upon the repertoires of other forms of women's groups, one of whose 
central features involved self-help. This in turn meant that what happened in these 
women's groups had more to do with the discourse of individualistic accounts of 
psychotherapy such as Rainwater's (1989) Self-Therapy: A Guide to Becoming Your 
Own Therapist. This resulted in the solidarity of the collective forces and the 
embracing of the political powers to which they had recently subscribed being made 
residual to their newly found goals in education. There was an abandonment of 
interest in what was happening jointly to themselves and their families in relation to 
the macro- social and economic practices of their existence. What followed from 
these newly formed women's groups was that the women were defining themselves 
reflexively in terms of their "selves" and reconstituting Rainwater's dictum to be your 
own therapist. They followed this through to the letter by taking up careers in 
counselling or psychotherapy. But there the only resources available to them and their 
future clients were again individualistic accounts of therapy; so that the whole social 
milieux- home, education and career- were "self circulating" and reinforcing each 
other in terms of a "private individual self'. Overall it would have been impossible to 
ignore the role that the social context played in any of these examples of persons in 
therapy. Rather, it highlighted the relevance of and necessity for an account of 
psychotherapy having a universal framework which recognised and included both 
persons and their ongoing social contexts and the relation of one to the another. 
Moreover, unlike individualistic accounts of psychotherapy, which this social account 
is meant to counter, there is no such phenomenon as private morality or individual 
politics. 
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2 A Relational and Developmental Social Account of Psychotherapy 
My account of psychotherapy is organised around the social and moral contexts of the 
person in therapy. However, instead of one duality covering persons and their social 
contexts, I propose two dualities: one covering the relation of person or agent to their 
micro-activities with colleagues and intimates; and one to do with persons or agents 
in relation to their institutional macro-practices of work or non-work, education, 
family and its domestic organisation. The common factor to each is the notion of 
personhood or agency. I also examine the relationship between micro- and macro-
practices and the constraints of the latter upon the former as well as the lifting out or 
disembedding of micro-conduct from institutional macro-practices. I illustrate 
contemporary social constraints and social transitions in the case-studies of persons 
who come to therapy. The two dualities neither privilege persons nor their social 
contexts, but are utilised interdependently in the unit of analysis. I argue that it is 
through such an ongoing intrinsic relation that personal and social development can 
occur including the means for psychotherapeutic progress or betterment. 
The background resources to develop such a relational account have come 
initially from Gibson's central statement that, 
the words animal and environment make an inseparable pair. Each term implies the 
other. No animal could exist without an environment surrounding it. Equally ... an 
environment implies an animal (or at least an organism) to be surrounded. 
(Gibson, 1986:8)4 
I have extended this statement into an appropriate framework for a social account of 
psychotherapy through the use ofthe work of Reed (1989) and Heft (1989), who have 
both emphasised the concept of intentionality. A central feature of the notion of 
intentionality is that it allows not for the notion of choice, but the choosing of 
alternatives. The notion of alteration is a key concept in the promotion of 
psychotherapeutic betterment and arises from the intentional selection of more 
appropriate practices by the person in therapy. Heft and Reed both argue that 
intention is situated in respect of two facts: one to do with the social environment; 
and the other to do with personhood. Again one co-implies the other. In my account 
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the person purposefully and continuously selects moral exemplars from the social 
environment as he or she interacts with it, thereby eliminating other less worthwhile 
exemplars. I also suggest that moral exemplars act as guides for moral conduct. Each 
person, in turn, intentionally specifies the behavioural contexts for the other in a 
dynamic progression. It is a case of two independent beings dialectically related 
through their activity and each providing the constraints of that activity for the other. 
The metaphor of the dance which Still and Good (1992) have offered is apt: one 
person's conduct dialectically regulating his own and the other's. The unit of analysis 
is both relational and developmental and it cannot be broken down to an individual 
person's behaviour or discrete episodes relating to interactions between persons. 
However, I have extended Still and Good's dialectical approach to one which 
is more politicised by using Giddens' concept of the dialectic of control. Persons in 
therapy are more often than not embedded within asymmetrical power relations. 
Persons in therapy have to find the means to act otherwise and to make a difference to 
their social activities and practices. Giddens comments, 
The two-way character of the distributive aspect of power (power as control); how 
the less powerful manage resources in such a way as to exert control over the more 
powerful in established power relations. (Giddens,1984: 374) 
The notion of asymmetrical power relations and the means of overcoming them is 
brought more into the sphere of psychotherapy by Smail who suggests that, 
The extent to which a person can influence present circumstances will depend on 
the availability to him/her of material powers and resources, including embodied 
personal assets. (Smail, 1993:230) 
But for an account of psychotherapy as social critique the notion of values and 
the critical evaluation of values must be central. I have drawn upon three social 
theorists to achieve the way I want the notion of values and evaluation to be 
considered. These are Gibson (1966,1986), Manicas (1990) and Brown (1990). The 
pivotal key is Gibson's concept of affordances and the affinities the term affordances 
has with those of the notion of values. In discussing the concept of 
affordances, Gibson states, 
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I have coined this word as a substitute for values, a term which carries an old 
burden of philosophical meaning. I mean simply what things furnish, for good or ill. 
(Gibson, 1966:285) 
Affordances are neither subjective nor objective. Rather they are equally a fact 
of the environment and a fact of the person or organism. They cut across the 
dichotomy of subject and object, since one co-implies the other. Affordances are 
properties of a value-rich environment taken with reference to humans and animals 
who live in it. Affordances are not objects or properties of objects, as such, but what 
objects can offer or afford in terms of values or use-values, information and 
opportunities. Gibson's concept of affordances, though, has to do with his theory of 
direct perception and the concept of affordances meshes the notion of perception with 
the notion of in variances. 5 
Gibson's establishment of a psychological theory which considers both man 
and his environment with the one co-implying the other, however, gives me a way of 
considering an account of psychotherapy as social critique centred on social values. 
I propose that the notion of values must be considered as also having both 
subjective features and objective features, the one co-implying the other. Values 
pertain to social practices (the social environment) but they also have to be evaluated 
and put up for debate, and this requires an evaluator. I obtain the latter from Manicas' 
social theorising. Manicas, following on from Gibson, comments that humans have 
"discriminative and comparative capacities, the basis of judging, predicating or 
subsuming". (Manicas ,1990:35) 
Such discriminating and differentiating or evaluating propensities are features 
of persons' cognitive processes. But what must also be considered is what is being 
evaluated.( I suggest that values have not to do with intuitive processes, per se, but 
they co-imply what is being evaluated. Nor are they to be considered as values which 
can be appealed to as universal standards across time and place). The key point is that 
values pertain to social practices (that others have access to) but they require the 
notion of cognitive evaluators. In addition although values pertain to social practices, 
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they are not encapsulated by them. Values are use-values and they offer up 
opportunities best suited for a moral existence. One starts this evaluation by selecting 
the most worthwhile and competent moral exemplar from the social practices on offer 
and this can be put up for debate with others. 
But Brown (1990) has also suggested that judging or evaluating is a skillthat 
requires training, previous experience, and an appeal to others with regard to both the 
judging process (coaches/therapists) and what is being judged (referees/social 
scientists). Such skill is a practice involving the person and their activity, and the 
value picked out in the affordances of such activities. I term this skill ethical 
knowhow. This knowhow is tantamount to picking out the correct notes of a musical 
phraseology while composing. It is also a corrigible process and perhaps would need 
further refining and critical reviewing by the composer and other musicians. There 
could always, hopefully, be a better or more appropriate exemplar brought about 
through the aptness and modification of the previous selection. Skills, moreover, are 
essentially regulatory and constraining propensities involving a feedback process 
between the person and the practice involved. The feedback process involves the 
evaluator who is evaluating along with what is being evaluated and a recognition that 
one influences the other in a goal -directed progression. The idea of values is part of a 
relational configuration of persons skilfully discriminating among the values 
pertaining to social practices to obtain the most apt moral exemplar and subjecting it 
to evaluation. 
Through the notion of values, I have outlined a particular relational and 
developmental account of psychotherapy which provides the regulated and 
progressive procedures for psychotherapeutic betterment. 
Indeed, all of the terms I have used converge into the configuration of a 
relational and developmental account of persons in therapy. In order to establish this 
configuration, I have drawn upon certain social theorists, social philosophers,and 
practitioners and commentators on psychotherapy. My primary resources have been 
Bauman (1990,1991), H. Brown (1990), Deleuze and Guattari (1990), Heft (1989 ), 
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Giddens (1984,1991), Gibson (1966,1986), Good and Still (1992), Harre (1983,1990), 
Jensen (1990), Reed (1989), and Smail (1987,1993). My secondary resources (which 
are equally important in supplying what was lacking in my account) have been Archer 
(1986), Baier (1985), Crook, (1991), Hampshire (1979), Ingleby, (1981), Mcintyre 
(1992), and Nagel (1979). None ofthese social theorists and commentators on social 
theory has provided me with an overall theory but they have allowed me to develop 
an integrative account of psychotherapy that is social, moral and political and one 
which is essentially both relational and developmental. 
3 The Autobiographical Agent 
There has been a traditional view in philosophy, psychology and psychotherapy that 
there must be an idea of a universal unifying centre of being who is the author or 
subject of his or her beliefs and practices. This being has a core centre which unites 
his or her experiences throughout life in what is termed transcendental apperception. 
(Husser!, 1973) This involves universal mental acts that constitute consciousness. 
Harre (1983) has recognised that there has to be a place for a core being that has 
awareness, unifies experiences and controls action but argues that this must firstly 
presuppose a social being. Human existence is on two planes, a primary social plane, 
and a secondary plane to do with the particularity of the person. One requires the 
former to establish the particularity of the person. 
For an account of psychotherapy as social critique, I suggest the idea of an 
active cognitive being who is the author of his or her existence in so far as he or she is 
intentionally directing action, is able to continuously recollect a chronicle of events 
that have occurred to him or her, and can carry out moral projects. In other words,-
an-active- being- in- social- history capable of interacting with others in certain ways 
and enacting certain modes of social conduct. This has resonances with Harre's 
concept of autobiography in which existence is not just a chronicled narrative of 
events. For the notion of autobiography also implies having a growing grasp of 
capabilities and potentials. Jensen has extended Harre's concept of autobiography to 
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what he has termed a moral self-in-activities whose particularity is obtained in the 
take up of his or her social activities and the realisation of a better way of life through 
certain ofthem. (Jensen, 1990:261) 
Conceptualising the notion of autobiography in terms of an active moral 
being, acting within social contexts provides the setting for an account of 
psychotherapy as social critique. However, I believe the notion of autobiography 
requires one further dimension which will emphasise the self in history with a 
present, past and future. My argument for this starts with the notion of "identity as A" 
but also implying "other than A" (or "different from A"). This would imply the law of 
contradiction entailed within the proposition "if A, then not A". But the idea of 
"identity" and "difference" implies not just an "identity" but an "identity" as 
ongoingly.other or different from what went before. Difference implies "other than" 
but also to "defer". For example, the child will develop into the man or woman and 
will be other than a child and has discontinuous moments within an underlying 
formative continuity. It is the inclusion of the second moment within the first that 
gives an accurate understanding of the first. "Every moment of becoming is 
simultaneously co-extensive with a successive moment of becoming". (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1990) He or she has autobiographical continuity which allows for something 
beyond itself and other than it is and which could, perhaps, be "better" than it is. For 
example there are the discontinuous "moments" within the continuity involving 
different physical and social transitional activities: entering into early education and 
not being at home all day which feeds into other transitional aspects of existence; the 
physical and social transition associated with puberty; and then marriage or living 
with a partner. In addition, this ongoing continuity is not confined to individual selves 
but refers to one's social existence in relation to others e.g. peers discussing their 
sexuality at puberty with others. Some aspects of this discontinuity are part of the 
evolving social maturation that occurs with physical maturation but one cannot allow 
social existence to just happen. For significant areas of life have to develop through 
being intentionally transformed. A theory of psychotherapy needs the appropriate 
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form of selfhood-autobiography - personhood and one also needs the notion of 
"difference" as "other than." For it is the latter concept that allows for possibility and 
change.(May, 1993) 
However, modem social philosophers and commentators on psychotherapy 
such as Rorty (1989) and Deleuze and Guattari (1990) counter the notion of identity 
as a universal self or person being the author of his or her existence. They offer, 
instead, what has been called the contingent subject. Deleuze and Guattari's notion of 
the contingent self occurs through the juncture of two happenings, with the 
happenings themselves being arbitrary. There is no predictability that the same two 
happenings will occur again. There is a latent determinism involved in such theories, 
for persons are determined by chance without recourse to their knowledge or 
competences. I argue that these proposals are detrimental to the grounding of an 
approach to psychotherapy. This is due to the fact that persons in therapy, in the first 
instance, are psychologically confused and are already upset about the arbitrariness of 
the happenings to them and the lack of control they have in warding them off. 
Offering conditions and possibilities of no stable future and one in which persons 
have no control over their existence will not enhance their psychological betterment. 
I offer in my account of psychotherapy on the one hand the means to prevent 
persons being considered only as ahistoric beings, expressed in the central notion of 
the unifying of experience by selves or where persons are considered in terms of 
stable identities. Such a perspective does not allow for the notion of possibilities or 
change necessary for psychotherapeutic betterment. On the other hand my account 
prevents persons being considered as nothing but the self as process or flux as in 
Maslow's (1968) notion of self-actualisation processes; the reflexive processes of 
Rainwater's ( 1989) notion of self; and the notion of desire as flux considered by 
Deleuze and Guattari. (1990). 7 
My account of psychotherapy can be considered a continuist theory because of 
certain of its proposals. The idea of the Harrean self is embedded in the theoretical 
tradition of the notion of core selves organising their experiences, having a point of 
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view, and monitoring their actions. But my account also incorporates notions of the 
discontinuist theorists in which selves are viewed as the products of history. What 
integrates both notions of the "self'is the trajectory of the self in terms of my idea of 
autobiography with its past, present and future continuities in time, which can 
underwrite its social and historical dicontinuities.e.g. displaced political refugees with 
their psychological vulnerabilities, who in certain respects are the products of history. 
4 Chapters 
In chapter 2 I counter certain classical accounts of psychotherapy, namely mainstream 
behaviouristic, cognitive and humanistic ones. Behaviourism has been extensively 
refuted on grounds of a lack of a concept of "self' and is the antithesis of what is 
required for an account of moral psychotherapy which has to promote selves as agents 
involved in moral projects through their interaction with others. I indicate also that 
self theories themselves have problems of an opposite nature to behaviourism i.e. 
where there is nothing but subjective experiences of the self resulting in the person's 
own individual point of view. I also indicate the direction such self theories are 
moving towards, e.g. Rainwater's (1989) Self-Therapy. In her approach, the "self' 
develops as it goes along with no reference to anything beyond itself. Or put a 
different way these "selves" are not morally accountable to anybody but 
"themselves". One ofthe reasons that the theories ofthe self as "flux" have been 
allowed to flourish and gain the upper hand as Smail (1987) has indicated, has been 
due to lack of consistent and sustainable social science findings with regard to 
accounts of psychotherapy. Moreover such theories of "self' circulate within the 
person in therapy's own world. In many ways, persons come to think of their personal 
existence only in terms of such self theories.( Giddens terms the intersection between 
social theories and social practices, the double hermeneutics) 8 
When one has introduced the topic of morality into accounts of psychotherapy 
one is considering an account that is already necessarily social. I compare my account 
of psychotherapy with two moral accounts and two political accounts (with moral 
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implications) that fall under the rubric of social critical theory. These accounts either 
fail to integrate personal being with social being or they collapse personal being into 
social being (defined in terms of sociolinguistic practices). Also certain of these 
accounts are normative accounts which are underwritten by prescriptive rules. 
According to Miinch (1988) and Trigg (1985) such accounts do not allow for the idea 
of change. 
I introduce the notion of social critique into my account of psychotherapy. 
Underwritten in the concept of critique is the idea of examining certain social facts 
and offering something different, (as well as the means and ways of alteration to 
something different). The definition of the notion of social critique is considered as 
(a) social values, (b) transformation occurring between persons and their social 
practices, (c) practical knowledge as ethical knowhow required in the alteration of 
social practices and (d) emancipations which have to do with social exchanges that 
occur between persons or between persons and their practices that could be developed 
into more morally enhancing ones. All of these terms are incorporated into a 
configuration of persons altering their environment as they interact with it. My 
account of psychotherapy as social critique, incorporating such configurations, is thus 
a relational and developmental account. 
Chapter 3 moves the argument away from traditional individualistic accounts 
of psychotherapy. The title of the chapter is transformative agency. I consider the 
attributes of personhood or agency in terms of capabilities, intentionality and 
knowledge or information (or what I have termed knowledge-ability). These attributes 
are related to each other. Knowledge-ability is a competence or skill requiring 
capabilities or powers to manoeuvre oneself around the social world and intentions 
are defined as social acts that require knowledge and competencies in their enactment. 
Each attribute also co-implies both personal and social existence. 
I suggest that as well as the attributes of agency, there must be a notion of 
personhood with public accountability of one's moral actions and a notion of a self 
directing one's actions and having a particular point of view. Harre suggests that the 
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notions of personal being and social being are on two planes. Social being as 
personhood is determined by public criteria of sociolinguistic practices and the notion 
of personal being, the self, is realised through sociolinguistic practices. The emphasis 
is also on autobiographical histories of persons with capabilities and potentials with 
which to alter their social practices:the confluence of one person's autobiographical 
history being part of another's, e.g. that of siblings or lovers. 
Chapter 4 deals with the micro-activities of the person in therapy. The micro-
activities form the first of the dualities dealing with personal and social existence. The 
micro-activities involve co-present activities which have to do with colleagues, 
intimates, and others-such as therapists and persons in therapy involved together in 
goal-oriented activities. The importance of these activities is that they encompass 
both the social activities of the interview contexts and also the social activities of that 
person's existence, external to the interview situation. I have termed this section of the 
chapter, the "Two Worlds" of the Person in Therapy. Simply just offering a 
theoretical relationship between psyche and society, as proponents of critical theory 
have tended to do in order to theoretically structure an account of psychotherapy, will 
not be causally effective in producing psychotherapeutic betterment. 
The next section of chapter 4 provides the necessary linkage between the "two 
worlds" of the person in therapy. This section is entitled, "Transformation Points". 
Transformation points mark the switches between the micro-environment of the 
interview situation and the external world of the person in therapy. They are the 
"linked breaks" or regulated interventions in the therapy interview process. They 
occur in the dialogical exchange between the person in therapy and the therapist 
where the change or alteration or transformation might be expected to happen by the 
person intentionally altering their social practices (if not now then in the future). 
Transformation points are the formative processes in the dynamic and dialectical 
procedures of the interactivities of the interview. They, like skills, structure the 
process in a cumulative manner and at the same time act as the conditions for 
psychotherapeutic betterment. They interconnect the "two worlds" of the person in 
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therapy through their "contents"- namely social values along with a critical review of 
them. 
Social values, for my account of psychotherapy, are moral values with 
political implications. Moral values are conceptualised as moral exemplars. 
Exemplars are defined by me as an "example of', or better still a "sample" of 
worthwhile and appropriate social values. The idea of "sample" involves both what is 
being evaluated and a notion of a skilled evaluator or sampler. Hence my idea of 
moral exemplars links together my notion of values co-implying an evaluator and 
underwrites the notion of skills as regulatory and constraining features of the 
processes and outcomes of psychotherapy. 
What is sampled and is a product of the sampling is always a narrowing range 
of appropriate worthwhile conduct. Persons in therapy ongoingly interact with other 
persons, be it with therapist or friends. Each of them is one term in an active 
relationship and together their activities form a goal-directed process. Persons can use 
specific moral exemplars in their conduct with the other person. Such conduct 
specifies and directs the conduct of the other in a continuous series of behavioural 
loops. The taking of moral stands and the enacting of moral conduct ,I believe ,are the 
means by which persons in therapy might overcome their psychological 
vulnerabilities and which might enable them to act differently or to do otherwise than 
they would have done. The final section of chapter 4 offers two case-studies to 
illustrate the therapy procedures involved in a moral account of psychotherapy and it 
indicates the contents and timing of the transformation points. I also discuss within 
the contexts of the case-studies contemporary social processes which tend to de-
ethicalise social relationships. 
Bauman (1990,1991) and Giddens (1990) describe the problems of 
contemporary relations where micro-conduct has become spread across time-space. 
The distancing of time from space produces the disembedding features of social 
existence where persons are locationally distant from each other. This often leads to 
the substitution of impersonalised acquaintanceship for institutionalised friendship. 
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The effect of the disembedding features of modernity is increasingly recognisable in 
the autobiographical histories and social practices of persons in therapy. 
The second of the dualities is concerned with individuals and their 
institutional or macro-practices such as education, the economy, work and non-work 
and the organisation of family practices. Chapter 5 deals with persons and such 
macro- practices but it also deals with the relations between macro-practices and 
micro- activities. Macro-practices are those long term enduring institutional practices 
spread across space and time. As Bauman (1991), Nagel (1978) and Smail (1993) 
suggest they have a greater tendency towards impersonality, diffusion of knowledge 
and lack of moral accountability. Radical and critical theorists have focused on the 
implicated constraints and effects of the macro-practices on the micro-practices of 
colleagues, family peers and intimates. This is represented in Smail's notion of the 
fields of powers and is illustrated in his case-studies. The fields of powers involves a 
relationship between macro-social practices, micro-conduct and the person, and the 
influences of each upon the other, especially the influences of political and economic 
powers. (Smail,1993:36,65) 9 However, Giddens (1990) has pointed out that as well 
as the boundedness or integrating influences of macro-practices upon micro-practices 
there is a tendency now for such micro-activities to be "lifted out" from macro-
practices. Habermas (1975) makes reference also to such dysfunctional processes in 
modern technological societies. There is an uncoupling (or de-democratising) of civic 
participation from the state and political systems which has resulted in depoliticised 
activities. This is manifested in the decreasing influences of trade unions and the 
increasing influences of the role of consumption and leisure .For Habermas the de-
democratising processes have greatly lead to the relativising of morality 
This chapter deals with the notion of agents and their social practices and how 
in such accounts of psychotherapy persons must be able to alter their social practices. 
Certain social theorists such as Baudrillard (1983) maintain that such theories 
involving the notion of agents and such social structures are no longer tenable for the 
polarities have collapsed and neither of the terms is tenable by itself. In countering 
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such a notion I argue that it is precisely such social structures which have to be 
examined. Eliding them from social theories denies them any form of investigation. 
The paradigm of the relation between agency and social structures has originated, in 
the main, from Giddens' (1979) social theorising. However Giddens himself has 
conflated both terms with each other or there is caesura between them in the processes 
of analysis. I examine Giddens two terms for social institutional practices, namely 
social structures and social systems. In the first case I offer social values as a 
substitute for his concept of rules and make the notion of moral values the resources 
persons can draw upon in relation to their social practices. In the second case I refer to 
the notion of social systems as unanticipated consequences of action in which moral 
resources become diffused within institutional practices, since one is less likely to be 
in control of such action. Bauman (1991) suggests that we need a new ethics, an 
ethics of distance and distant consequences, an ethics commensurate with the 
uncannily extended spatial and temporal range of the effects of technological action. 
5 Conclusion 
I have examined traditional individualistic theories of psychotherapy but none of the 
theories have enabled me to link them to theories which would allow social existence 
to be incorporated into a theory of psychotherapy. I have also examined theories of 
social psychotherapy and theories of moral psychotherapy but none of the versions 
which I have examined have given me the attributes which I require for a theory of 
psychotherapy as social critique. I require my account of psychotherapy to be 
conceptualised within a configuration of agents with the attributes of intentionality, 
knowledge and capabilities, interacting with their social activities and practices. For 
an account of psychotherapy as critique, persons in therapy have to be dealing with 
and evaluating social values pertaining to their activities with others and their social 
practices. Some of these values will be immediately available others are more 
obfuscated. 
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Notes 
1. Freud's (1973) psychoanalytic theory is based on a dynamic system of the 
structure of the mind represented by the id, ego and superego. The dynamic 
system involves intrapsychic conflicts and tension between the interplay of the 
structures of the mind. The id is a psychic energy force seeking self-
gratification. One of the functions of the ego is cognitive control of the id's 
demands. Freud maintained that the id was the enemy of civilisation and the 
intemalisation of social constraints by the superego is II a most precious 
cultural asset in the psychological field. 11 
2. From a humanistic perspective, Maslow (1954, 1968) suggests that persons 
have different levels of needs. He proposes a five-tiered level of needs. The 
basic needs include physiological needs such as food, sleep and sex. The next 
level of needs include job security, affection and sociality. Level five involves 
self-actualisation processes which have an ethical dimensions as well as what 
Maslow considers as the ability to distinguish the real and authentic from the 
false and inauthentic. 
3. Hosford (1969) considers four factors necessary for a behavioural programme 
using the techniques of operant reinforcement. 1. There has to be sustained 
motivation on the part of the client, 2. The programme must be designed in 
such a means-end format that it does achieve the elicitation of the desired 
behaviour, 3. The reinforcer, contingent on the desired behaviour must be 
administered soon after the elicitation of the behaviour. 4. The application of a 
regulated schedule of reinforcers such as a fixed ratio schedule (the ratio 
between the response and reinforcer) is required. A fixed ratio schedule is an 
intermittent reinforcer; for example every nth time is reinforced. There are 
direct and indirect reinforcers. Token reinforcers are indirect reinforcers and 
are more commonly used in institutional settings. Token reinforcers are 
rewards such as a day away from the institution contingent upon the desired 
behaviours being enacted prior to the day away. 
4. No animal could survive and live without a terrestrial environment that 
surrounds it. Gibson (1986) maintains that persons do not perceive objects in 
the terrestrial environment but the medium, substance and the surfaces (with 
their layouts) that surround objects. One of the important terrestrial mediums 
is light.- the important feature of light for perceiving is ambient light. -that is 
light that surrounds any point in the environment. 
5 In the theory of direct perception ambient light is available to the observer and 
has structure. Such light makes directly available information about reflected 
surfaces. For Gibson, the ambient optic array is structured along with other 
mediums. The structure of an ambient array can be described in terms of a 
complex set of visual solid angles, corresponding to objects, with a common 
apex at the point of observation. The optic array changes in some respect and 
not in others as the point of observation moves or alters. Invariances are 
related to the concept of affordances and can be established by the concept of 
ambient light and the ambient optic array. The invariants in the terrestrial 
environment are the persistent features of the lay -outs of surfaces and the 
reflectant of these surfaces. To pick up an invariant is to perceive the 
persistence of a surface layout. The layout tends to persist because most of the 
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objects are sufficiently solid or rigid, as for example the layout of a chair. 
Different layouts have different properties. Gibson then asks the question how 
does one get from the notion of surfaces to the notion of affordances?. What 
one perceives are not their properties but what the property affords or offers. 
6. To "defer" is connected to Deleuze and Guattari's notion of difference, which 
in turn comes from the Derridian notion of differance. The latter carries the 
idea of difference and also to defer. Deferral is never wholly present but 
resides in past-futures and futures which have still to be. To defer is always 
an encounter with the new and yet to be known. As such it allows for 
possibilities and change. 
7. "Every 'object' presupposes the continuity of a flow; every flow, the 
fragmentation of the object. Doubtless each organ-machine interprets the 
entire world from the perspective of its own flux, from the point of view of the 
energy that flows from it :"(Deleuze and Guattari, 1990:6) 
8. The double hermeneutic involves the intersections oftwo frames of meaning; 
(a) the metalanguages invented by the social scientists and (b) the meanings 
constituted by lay persons. There is constant "slippage" of one to the other. 
9. Smail (1993) suggests that there are two forms of powers, one which is 
proximal and the other which is distal. Proximal powers are those powers 
which are of immediate influence upon the individual and are "proximal" to 
them and are associated with depressive syndromes, phobias and other 
anxieties of a psychophysical type. Persons suffering from such psychological 
conditions are considered by Smail as having a lack of psychological powers. 
The origins of this lack are the distal powers. These powers are both mediated 
and diffuse and arise within the interconnected institutionalised hierarchies of 
domination. 
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Chapter 2 
Chapter 2 Psychotherapy. 
1 Introduction 
2 Traditional Individual Accounts of Psychotherapy 
3 Social Therapies 
4 Social Critique. 
5 Conclusion 
1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 is divided into five sections. After a brief overview I provide a critique of 
the main orthodox accounts of psychotherapy such as behaviour and cognitive 
therapy and those accounts of psychotherapy developed by self theorists. I argue, 
also, that where there have been attempts at integrating these theories the means of 
integrating them are not adequate and hence have resulted in dualistic accounts of 
either mind and behaviour. I contend though, that the outstanding problem is that they 
are individualistic accounts about individual beings whether of a statistical or 
empirical nature (or neither). All theoretically exclude the social contexts of persons 
in therapy. 
It is impossible, though, in real life to ignore the social practices of persons in 
therapy, for at all times and places people are socially situated and the unit of analysis 
has to take this into consideration. Unless the social contexts of the person in therapy 
are considered then the account can only be a partial account and has little or no 
reference to the person's lives and their problems. I argue further that it is the tension 
between persons and their social contexts that initiates psychological problems in the 
first place. So both must be acknowledged in order that the tension can be determined 
and where possible removed. 1 Social practices, as stated above, are altered by 
persons employing what was termed the dialectic of control and acting back upon 
certain of their social institutional constraints. The resolution of the theoretical 
problem of accounts of psychotherapy comes about by acknowledging the 
23 
configuration of both social contexts and persons as a relational unit which allows 
also for the means of alteration, or rather of psychotherapeutic betterment. In the third 
section, I examine those theories of psychotherapy which are fundamentally social 
accounts. Morality presupposes a social account but there are few moral accounts of 
psychotherapy available. These are in the main normative rule-regulated accounts and 
are exemplified in Heaton's (1976, 1979) Newman's (1991) and Guignon's (1993) 
approaches to psychotherapy. I have also examined those social accounts which are 
more politicised moral accounts and fall under the rubric of critical theory. In this 
context, there is a mention also of Buss's principles of personal being and social being 
for an account of psychotherapy and I have countered these principles on the grounds 
of (a) lack of a concept of agency, (b) the unbridgeable schism between the two forms 
of being which in part has resulted from the non-conceptualisation of agency, and (c) 
his reliance on a form of empiricism for social sciences which has kinship with the 
laws ofthe regularities of nature and is value-free. The latter is problematic for his 
version of critical theory in which a central concept of critique has to be social values 
and their role in evaluating the theories of psychotherapy which he is proscribing and 
the form of society he is indicting .(Buss, 1979) I examine De leuze and Guattari 's 
(1990) reformulation of the concept of the Freudian id. Instead of the id as a wishful 
impulse incorporated within a tripartite mental structure of individual being, they 
offer the notion of desire as a social force (physical as well as social) that connects 
with other social forces. Their notion of desire is that it escapes categorisation and can 
call into question established orders of society. I suggest in order to have a social 
theory directed by a critical propensity one requires in addition the notions of 
knowledge, competencies and intentionality. 
I argue though that their postulate of social desire is an extension ofF reudian 
theory rather than a severance from it. They reintroduce the problems of the Freudian 
id which "knows no judgement of values, no good and evil and no morality." 2 In 
contemporary thinking there are those such as Deleuze and Guattari, and also Kovel 
( 1981,1993 ) who demand that the notion of desire has to be the primary postulate of 
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social theory and there are those who advance that powers of control are the primary 
postulate. Smail (1993) as a commentator on theories of psychotherapy, and a 
practising therapist, rather, has offered an interconnecting format of a field of powers 
and power as the connecting propensity. The field of powers is transmitted and 
retained through interconnected hierarchies of various discourses and practices. The 
field consists of macro-practices, micro-activities and personal powers, which one 
either absorbs or transmits. Macro-practices are institutionally structured and have 
powerful influences on both the micro-environments and the lay person's individual 
experiences and ways of life and psychological well-being or non-well-being. 
The fourth section entitled social critique examines the concept of critique and 
its function and its methodology in an account of psychotherapy. I have used 4 terms· 
to define the concept of critique; value, practice, transformation, and emancipation. 
Each of these terms has a double role involving the discourses of both (a) 
psychotherapy and (b) social critique and they become linked together as 
psychotherapy as social critique. I connect them through such concepts as 
transformation points. These represent the continuous points-in-time or specific 
aspects of the regulated developing procedures of therapy where the therapist 
intervenes in the therapeutic procedures. But the interventions have also to do with 
the person in therapy's problematic psychological existence and its social contexts and 
the critical resources and means to alter it. 
What has happened further in the process of writing up this account of 
psychotherapy is that I have realised that critical social theorists, apart from Smail 
(1993), have lacked the concepts to deal with the psychotherapeutic practices that 
achieve psychotherapeutic betterment. Conversely theorists of psychotherapy have 
theoretically excluded the disabling social contexts and their sustaining psychological 
features which have their origins and continuity in such social constraints. Both ideas 
are required in any paradigm of psychotherapy and are brought together in the 
concept of psychotherapy as social critique. 
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2 Traditional Individual Accounts of Psychotherapy 
In this section I look briefly at behaviourism, cognitive theories and self approaches 
to psychotherapy to indicate why traditional theories of psychotherapy are not 
theoretically adequate to furnish a social account of psychotherapy. My argument is 
that they offer only one term of an individual-social duality. Moreover, their version 
of individual being does not have the necessary attributes to allow for a moral agency 
able to overcome certain social and psychological difficulties. 
Behaviourism and behaviour therapy gained ground in the argument against 
what is called mentalism, where therapeutic problems could only be considered in 
terms of some intrapsychic disturbance. (Nelson-Jones, 1982) Traditional 
behaviourists believed that, on the one hand, the mind of the person in therapy was 
inaccessible to the observer and that any account of the mind was unscientific and 
depended on the individual's own belief system which was considered far from being 
incorrigible. It could be subject to delusions. On the other hand theories of 
psychotherapy based on behaviouristic principles could be available for scientific 
investigation. Behaviourism is considered in terms of the observable physical 
extended body in space rather than what might be termed a non-substance such as 
"mind". Overt signs of anxiety like palpitations or facial tics and symptoms of anxiety 
like sweating and shaking can be monitored and as such are available for scientific 
procedures of assessment, measurement and prediction. 
Behavioural psychotherapy stems from two main types of theories of 
behaviourism; classical conditioning and operant conditioning. The main tenet of both 
types of psychotherapy is that behaviour is regarded as being acquired and maintained 
through habit. It is believed that behaviours i.e. non-maladaptive behaviours could be 
learned and maintained which would be psychologically beneficial to persons in 
therapy. The idea behind classical conditioning is that a neutral object gets paired 
with an anxiety arousing stimulus and the neutral object then initiates and continues 
to arouse the anxiety. Behaviour therapy consists of pairing a non-anxiety provoking 
response to the psychologically problematic stimulus. That would involve a relaxation 
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exercise (e.g. calling up a mantra) being paired with a stimulus of a particular fear 
such as a picture of snakes. Wolpe (1958) conceptualised this as the reciprocal 
inhibition of neurotic anxiety in which learned and conditioned behavioural habits, 
e.g. conditioned fear of snakes are weakened or extinguished. Wolpe was the main 
originator ofbehaviour therapy based on classical principles of learning and he 
defined his behaviouristic approach to therapy as one involving the use of 
experimental principles of learning for the purpose of changing maladaptive 
behaviour. (Wolpe, 1958) From a different conceptualisation of learning theory, 
Skinner maintained that behaviour is learned and shaped by its consequences. Under 
certain prior or antecedent conditions, if one behaves in a certain way, such behaviour 
is likely to have certain consequences. Previous responses cannot be predicted or 
controlled but there is a probability that the response can be modified or altered in the 
future. Operant conditioning is behaviour that operates on the environment to produce 
a consequential response and also is contingent upon the consequences produced by 
the environment. (Skinner,1953) 
However, behaviourists themselves recognised the limitations of their 
assumptions. Persons had no personal activating role in producing their own 
psychological betterment - or they could be rather than just a response in the 
experiment, be a part of experimental 'effects' and in this sense could be biasing the 
experiment. (Secord, 1990) 
Orthodox behavioural principles involved in accounts of psychotherapy began 
to be recognised as limited if contextualised within a simple stimulus and response 
framework. (Nelson-Jones1982) There had to be a mediating principle of personhood 
with conscious awareness of what persons are about, if only at least to allow for a 
concept of suitably aware subjects to carry out human behavioural programmes. 
Firstly, Meichenbaum (1977) has attempted to rectify these problems with 
regard to classical conditioning. He has developed a two-stage version of the 
psychotherapeutic procedures of systematic desensitisation, which involves 
cognitions or self-awareness as well as behaviour. He believes that changes in certain 
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specific behaviours are brought about by changes in certain cognitions. Persons 
should become aware of the self-defeating cognitions and self-instructions they are 
giving themselves with regard to their therapeutic difficulty. He offers a programme 
of desensitisation and deconditioning. Positive results of changes in behaviour depend 
on reviewing one's self-instructions. 
Meichenbaum (1977) while recognising the need for cognitive awareness at a 
theoretical level, though, has not allowed for a duality of mind and behaviour because 
of his discrete two step approach to psychotherapeutic betterment. Also the notion of 
mind telling the body what to do in a one to one correspondence has been questioned 
from various points of view Harre (1983). Bandura (1977) has indicated that the 
learning process is more complex than Skinner's operant conditioning approach 
allows for. Learning is less reactive and largely occurs through the expectations 
people create for themselves. People do not learn all of their behaviour from the 
consequences of their reinforced responses. Bandura thus has distinguished Skinner's 
approach to conditioned learning from that of his own. Rather, Bandura maintains 
that persons do not only respond to their environment. They have what he has termed 
self-efficacy by means of which they believe they will successfully execute the 
required behaviour. In this sense, persons in therapy rather than the external 
contingencies are controlling their behaviour. Also the person in therapy is more 
likely to adopt a certain behaviour if it is internally positively valued. But Bandura 
can be criticised from two perspectives. Meier, McCarthy, and Schmeck (1984) found 
there was no true relationship between self-efficacy and behavioural performance. 
Also Bandura has relied on modelling, role-playing or observational performance 
techniques more so than imaginable processes. By relying on observational principles 
of behaviour he is still fundamentally behaviouristic. Neither Meichenbaum nor 
Bandura have achieved an integrated account that links cognitions to behaviour and 
thus they perpetuate the Cartesian schism of inner mind and extended external body 
as behaviour. 
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Overall, with regard to behavioural principles and methods, Breger and 
McGaugh, (1965) have pointed out flaws in the design ofbehavioural experiments. 
Even although there has been improvements of experimental design the evidence is 
still weighted against the empirical adequacy of behavioural programmes. Smail also 
points out that there are only a few very simplified behavioural programmes which 
can be operationally defined and manipulated to achieve the empirical results 
determined by a constant relationship between the hypothesis and data findings. 
(Smail 1978, 1987, 1993) Such experimental findings, though, bear little or no 
relationship to the autobiographical history and the social contexts of persons in 
therapy's psychological difficulties. Moreover, Ingleby and Smail have indicated that 
there are more fundamental problems with the behaviouristic approach. Behaviourists 
are not starting from a neutral or objective standpoint in any case for they are -
"presupposing something about the relation of conduct to its surroundings which it 
should be the task ofresearch to question, not to assume." (Ingleby,1981: 41) It is in 
the relationship or configuration between behaviour or rather conduct and its contexts 
in which the psychological problems reside and not in individual behaviour itself. 
This is where psychotherapy as social critique must direct its attention. 
Behaviour therapy has its opposite counterpart in cognitive therapy. Accounts 
of psychotherapy involving cognitions can be discussed in terms of Beck's (1976) 
account of cognitive restructuring. In this approach, persons are trained in therapy 
treatments to monitor their thought processes and to come up with alternative beliefs 
about themselves which are more realistic and more appropriate to the situations 
involved. The idea, again, is that persons need to alter irrational self-statements they 
hold about themselves. However there are arguments and evidence against this as 
Lewinsohn (1980) has indicated. They maintain that people who have depressive 
syndromes have a realistic view of themselves in relation to the world, compared to 
non- depressive persons who had a more idealistic view of themselves. Fonagy and 
Higgitt (1984) have also pointed out that certain of the concepts that are used in 
cognitive therapy are no more precise or revealing than concepts used in Freudian 
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psychodynamic accounts of the mind. Both sets of concepts involve internal 
constructions of the mind and carry with them all the problems of mentalism. Also, as 
with the behavioural concept of maladjusted behaviour, the maladjusted nature of self 
-statements begs political questions such as Illich, (1985) Ingleby (1981), and Smail 
have asked. i.e. where does the norm of adjustment lie in terms of adjusting to what 
and who are the proposers of the normalising categories. I have found from my 
practical experience in psychotherapy that persons in therapy do make realistic 
statements about themselves and in relation to their social contexts.However this 
contrasts with how they perceive others' perceptions of themselves. They perceived 
themselves via others, less realistically and almost always reductively. 
Moreover there are other sources of critique of cognitive approaches to 
psychotherapy as well. Harre (1983) in fact has argued against purely cognitive 
principles constituting the psychology of personal being. He has argued that cognitive 
theorists do not allow for a being with a core self, with a social history ,a point of 
view, and can control and monitor conduct. 
The self is conceptualised differently, though, in accounts of psychotherapy. 
The privileging of the self in approaches to psychotherapy has come from two main 
sources, that of the American psychologist, Rogers (1973) and the other being that of 
the English psychologist,Winnicott.(1958,1965) Though they make reference to a 
social environment of parents friends etc., it is a from-the-social to-the-individual 
phenomenon where the social phenomenon is cognitively internalised. But the upshot 
is that in reality it is an individual account and the social environment is made 
residual in the enquiry. The self becomes both subjective and objective being and 
there are no social beings, external to these selves. Rogers' objective being is offered 
through what he calls self-concepts i.e. a stable set of unifying perceptions about 
oneself. Subjective being is defined through experiencing processes of symbolisation 
which may or not be conceptualised into awareness (subception). The awareness 
processes involve not just cognitive informational awareness of the mind, per se, but 
take in bodily awareness as well. Awareness is neither defined as mental or physical 
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but is psychological and is named by him, the organismic self 3. The objective self or 
self-concept occurs through interaction with others. Through those interactions with 
others persons gain objective perceptions of themselves (perception is equivalent to 
general awareness). 
The self-concept is an ongoing grouping of concepts central to the person in 
therapy, some of which are evaluated negatively and some positively. When 
experiences are accurately symbolised and integrated into the self-concept, there is a 
congruence between the objective self and what is called the organismic evaluating 
self. The latter gives rise to good feelings about the self. Integration, however may not 
always occur. In Rogers' theory of psychotherapy there may be incongruence between 
the subjective experiencing self and the objective self-concepts which one has of 
oneself. When this occurs, experiences are not accurately symbolised and they are 
consequently distorted or denied. Anxiety arises as a state of tension as a result ofthe 
incongruence between the self-concept and the organismic evaluating self. i.e. bad 
feelings about the self. 
The practice of therapy has not only to reduce this tension-like state but has to 
increase the congruence betwe~n the perceiving self and his or her self-concepts with 
a view to what Rogers and others, such as Maslow (1954,1968) have termed ongoing 
self-enhancement or self-actualisation. 
Rogers did attempt to provide a more scientific account of psychotherapy with 
regard to greater understanding of psychological betterment. He introduced a self-
report evaluation programme by means of what he calls the "Q" test, (before therapy 
treatment, the person in therapy is given cards with certain terms that may be 
appropriate to an individual's self-concepts. The person picks out those that have self-
. reference .e.g.-. I am a bully- and ranks them in order of their being characteristic of 
him or her. Then he or she is given another set of cards with regard to an ideal self. 
The two "Q" sorts are correlated to find the degree of incongruence between bad self-
concepts and ideal self-concepts). The test is given at regular intervals including post-
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treatment of therapy to determine whether there is further alteration or change 
between the two forms of self-concepts. 4 
However there are problems with regard to Rogers 'phenomenological 
approach to psychotherapy and its relation to his experimental methods. Reality, 
phenomenologically, is understood only through the individual's perspective or 
through what is called his or her own internal frame of reference - what Rogers has 
regarded as the person's phenomenal field. But divisions begin to occur in the 
assumptions made in his theorising that do not tally with his experimental findings. 
The research dealing with discrete episodes of self-reports, mathematically correlated 
is not compatible with concepts such as self-actualisation. Self-actualisation as a 
process of flux is non-measurable and is considered by some theorists as outside of 
the domain of explanations or of statistical relationships. (Mackay 1975) Another 
problem is the emphasis Rogers has placed on the interactive nature of therapy and 
the role of the therapist as an intervening variable in therapy betterment. But this 
aspect of his work,also, founders, for some of the concepts such as empathy are 
grounded in philosophical problems of intersubjectivity in which inner being has no 
means of relating to outer being. This renders the units of analysis for interactive 
procedures in psychotherapy inoperable. There is no overall fit in his social theorising 
with regard to his proposed concepts and methods for psychotherapy. 
Overall if behavioural accounts of psychotherapy have reduced individuals to 
their modes of measurement, self theorists have tended (through the use of such terms 
as self-actualisation) to make of therapy some impossible nirvana to be arrived at 
through sensory awareness processes. Residing in these approaches is a latent 
optimism that comes from two directions. The first comes from the idealist nature of 
such concepts as self- actualisation where possibilities are limitless. The second 
comes about by theoretically removing the person in therapy from their social 
contexts and the constraints of society are necessarily removed at one and the same 
time. 
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Winnicott' s concept of self can be viewed as a more social version of the 
notion of self than Rogers'. Winnicott has maintained that "analysis" for accounts of 
psychotherapy must not be considered in individual terms, but in terms of a 
relationship. For Winnicott, what must be examined again and again in therapy is the 
early bonding of mother and child which can result in the offspring determining 
themselves as bad or good selves. Winnicott's overall theoretical assumption about 
the self is that there is an ideal non-analysable primitive self which is too precious to 
cope with the mundane world of growing up. A false self splinters away from the 
ideal self in order to cope with the external world and to protect the ideal self. The 
proper development of the false self allows for a mature independent being. Any 
collusive protection or psychological neglect of the child by the mother in bonding 
prevents proper psychological development and results in the "bad self' becoming 
prominent. Winnicott has stressed the gradual psychological development in the 
ongoing facilitative bonding. 
Winnicott did attempt to give more scope in his psychotherapeutic framework 
to the bonding of human relationships in early life but the assumptions both of 
relationship or development of bonding are not the crux of his theorising. For, in 
effect it is an individualistic account of psychotherapy. He has produced one 
formulation of what has been termed the bipartite divided self, (extracted by him, 
from the tripartite version of a Freudian dynamic structure of the mind). The false self 
is some protective psychological mechanism. 
Moreover, the nature of Freudian psychotherapy is essentially authoritarian 
from the superego's protective role in the dynamic mental structures of the mind right 
through to the role of the psychoanalyst. The "self' theorists rightly offer instead a 
more democratic approach to therapy. For example, Rogers' concept of empathy as 
one of the six necessary and sufficient conditions for psychotherapeutic change has 
some democratic nuances. 5 The democracy involved in the new and different 
bonding between persons and their psychotherapist out of which comes 
psychotherapeutic betterment such as positive self-regard is an important factor. This 
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is especially important where previous interpersonal activities have been skewed or 
distorted and the appropriate bonding mechanism is then reconstituted in the 
relationship between therapist and person in therapy. 
But both Rogers and Winnicott's form of democratic symmetry in human 
relations has produced an idealised form of human relations. In effect, I think they 
reintroduce what they are trying to eliminate. For the way their theories of self are 
constituted, the protective mechanisms of self, sever the self from the constraints of 
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their social contexts. There is no theoretical allowance made for the therapist to spell 
out or examine these constraints and the effect of these constraints upon the person in 
therapy and others. 
For me their proposals for a democratic symmetrical relationship of bonding 
in effect becomes largely depoliticised. But this is also reflected in the society in 
which the persons in therapy resides. Theories of self which have filtered into the lay-
person's world merely reinforce this. They do not have the theoretical means to 
counter it. 
What one has to do is to recognise that the world is problematic for most of its 
members and that human relations are asymmetrical as Bhaskar, (1986) Brittan 
(1977) ,and Douglas (1977) have put forward. The goal of therapy is to alter these and 
not to offer a benign world to the person in therapy that bears no relationship to the 
world and context in which the person in therapy resides. For this we need concepts 
like agency and the dialectic of control in which persons become skilled at acting 
back upon their social environments as they interact with them; not simply a 
psychotherapeutic approach concerning vulnerable or benign beings. 
At the time in the late 50's and 60's when Rogers and Winnicott were 
introducing their theories of self, it was the time when social institutions were in the 
processes of consolidating or expanding in a more liberalising manner. There were 
what Berger and Kellner (1982) have named cultural, political and religious 
movements of ordered re-enchantment. This would mean that persons would or could 
appropriate stable selves from such social environments. Also in the social sciences 
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reinterpretations of social and psychological facts were ongoingly occurring but they 
were still contained within the notion of a unifying principle such as Rogers 
"organismic self"-or from a Habermasean perspective the human sciences must still 
appeal to universal standards of agreement or consensus. These involve the universal 
claims of validity; truth; correctness and sincerity achieved through universal non-
distorted communications. 
But there is an emphasis now that both social theories about the self and 
societies are grounded in process of historical discontinuities. The notion of selves 
can now be considered as solely historically produced rather than the self being 
considered as a universal self. 6 
Giddens (1991) maintains that contemporary perspectives of the notion of the 
self must take into account the self as a reflexive project for which the individual 
alone is responsible. He suggests that, 
The reflexive project of the self, which consists in the sustaining of coherent, yet 
continuously revised ,biographical narratives, takes place in the context of multiple 
choices as filtered through abstract systems. (Giddens,1991:5) 
It is a reflexive project for which the individual alone is responsible. Giddens 
maintains further that reflexivity belongs to the reflexive history of modernity rather 
than the reflexive monitoring of action. 
What this means is that there is no notion of a core self with its social 
correlates, embedded withi11 or connected to its social institutions and contexts. If 
there is no relationship, there is no one alerting anyone to aspects of the break up of 
aspects of the relationship. If there is no duality of agents and their social structures 
and only selves and these selves differ from Rogerian stable selves, then there is no 
possibility for a social account ofpsychotherapy.·This is the conclusio~s that follows 
from Giddens' proposals and which he does not pursue. Such proposals, however, 
have become part of contemporary thinking in accounts of psychotherapy. Rainwater 
(1989) suggests that psychotherapy can only be successful if it is grounded in 
continuous projects of self -observation The individual queries what is happening to 
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him or her both bodily and psychologically in a serie~ of reflexively asked questions. 
"Holding a dialogue" with time underwrites the process of self -realisation At each 
moment the individual is asked to conduct a self-interrogation in terms of what is 
happening to hjm or her. Each moment of life is a new moment for self-questioning. 
However, Brittan (1977) expounds that this privatised self is contributing to the 
greater irrelevance now of public issues for the mass of the population. Brittan terms 
this the" idealist mess " that so much social thought finds itself in. It results in the 
belief that the suffering of the individual is not located in a given historical situation 
but is dependent on existential choices which may or not be available at a given 
moment in time.It is epitomised in Rainwater's proposal-what do I want for 
myself?.This latter phrase in addition can easily be converted into consumer choices 
where the issues that surround it are far removed from the origins of existential 
alternatives through political action. 
3 Social Therapies 
Having indicated that persons and their social contexts have to be considered in 
relational and developmental terms for an account of psychotherapy, I now examine 
four social accounts of psychotherapy. To a certain extent they have in one way or 
another all contributed to the development of my own account. The four accounts are 
Heaton's (1976, 1979) Newman's (1991), Deleu.Ze in conjunction with Guattari's 
(1990) and Smail's (1987,1993). Fundamentally my account has more affinities with 
the critical social theory of Smail which is expressed in terms of power/knowledge 
relations. These power/knowledge ·relations are manifested as systems of domination 
within institutions, practices and discourses. They are sustained as disciplinary 
powers rather than as systems of objective truth in which the former continue to 
define the latter. Such disciplinary powers permeate the discourse of psychotherapy in 
terms ofbehavioural technologies and explanations; psychoanalytic interpretive 
· methods as well as the privileging of the self as a master principle. 
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All of these social theorists have argued against individualistic accounts of 
psychotherapy with each theorist emphasising what they believe to be a particular 
problem in the theories of psychotherapy. Together their critiques cover and counter 
all the major orthodoxies of psychotherapy, namely behaviourism/cognitive-
behaviourism; self and cognitive theories and Freudian psychoanalysis. The range of 
their social accounts of psychotherapy takes in moral accounts of psychotherapy 
through to more politicised accounts of psychotherapy. Heaton (1976,1979) has 
countered psychoanalytic and "self' theories of psychotherapy. Those, for him are the 
theories of psychotherapy, which deal with self-knowledge. Heaton comments, 
They all assume that we get knowledge of our desires, pleasures, emotions, 
thoughts and feelings by observing ourselves. They believe that there is an internal 
psychical reality which is on the whole inaccessible to most of us, but that can be 
observed by part ofthe ego with training. (Heaton,1979:184) 
For Heaton problems in theories of psychotherapy have arisen because such 
scientific knowledge has got confused with ethical knowledge. Ethical knowledge 
cannot be considered in terins of universal laws of the mind or again in terms of 
behaviour, as an object of science. For Heaton knowledge of objects of science are 
defined in terms of univocal meanings and/or through units of measurement. 
Whereas, what Heaton has termed the science of human affairs has to do with the 
practical knowledge of public beings and any principles derived from such knowledge 
occur out of common happenings in the practices of living. Rather human existence is 
~ contextualised by the rules and meanings of the society people live in. Once, 
however, one has brought in Heaton's concepts for conventions or rules and rituals of 
living, then I believe his account is problematic in ethical terms and ultimately loses 
its ethical force. 
Heaton has used both of the terms, morality and ethics for his account of 
moral psychotherapy. Ethics are considered as the rules that constitute the society we 
live in, and morality involves the regulative rules that one reproduces in the practices 
of living. The constitutive rules of society are enacted in the processes of reproducing 
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moral conduct. Like Harre (1979 ) and Giddens (1984), he considers that the notion of 
actions or conduct is analogous to that of language. This is termed more generally as 
the linguistic analogy. Heaton has stipulated that "constitutive rules are basic to our 
actions and actions include speech". Ethical conduct has constitutive rules akin to 
grammatical forms of language and moral conduct has regulative rules akin to those 
that occur in speech-acts. For Heaton ethical rules are equivalent to rules of syntax 
and semantics of language which are presupposed and drawn upon in the context of 
sociolinguistic practices. These rules, however, whether they are action-based or 
language-based are organising principles which express how social existence can be 
ordered rather than changed. The patterning or ordering of human activities which is 
constituted purely by rules, whether one makes them, follows them or transforms 
them - for they in turn must be followed - can never provide the mechanism for 
change, or rather alteration and development which is required for psychotherapeutic 
betterment. Keat suggests that such interpretive social theory in effect views its 
objects rather as if they had already attained what should really be considered as 
unrealised historic projects. (Keat, 1981) 
It seems to me, moreover, that the examples cited by Heaton (1979) Searle 
(1983) and Melden (1967) to illustrate constitutive and regulative rules are to do with 
social codes of behaviour in respect of formalised games or rules of the road and other 
such similar sociolinguistic practices. None of these can represent the idea of moral 
abuses or psychological distress central to an account of psychotherapy. 
However, Heaton has also linked his account of psychotherapy to what he has 
termed the practical sciences. The latter take into consideration the manner of 
satisfactory living where the rules cannot be presupposed in advance. Such acts of 
living ,though,are much more open-ended than speech-acts could allow for, if the 
latter are ever to have sense-meanings. Although there is a contradiction in the 
theorising of Heaton (1979) with the greater emphasis ofhis social theory on an 
ethical science determined by rules, his particular delineation of the practical sciences 
establishes what is necessary for an ethical approach to psychotherapy. 
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Newman (1991) offers a method of psychotherapy that entails morality but his 
account of psychotherapy is politically contextualised rather than founded on moral 
theory or moral philosophy. His discussion involves the political framework of 
contemporary urbanised society and its macro-practices with its concomitant 
constraints on human existence; namely life-chances in terms of health, work and 
leisure possibilities. For Newman, disabling social environments have a direct 
influence on young persons, both psychologically and educationally. One has to 
create the appropriate liberalising or enabling social conditions in the social 
environment. These provide the only means by which people will develop 
psychologically. People, themselves, in these social environments have to actively 
participate in the creation of the appropriate learning milieux in order to learn and 
develop educationally and psychologically. Otherwise, people "die emotionally, 
intellectually and morally." Moreover Ziner, following Newman ,comments that, 
By expanding the traditional theoretical base of psychology to emphasize the 
relevance and,hence,explanatory power of social organization on human behaviour, 
outcomes of clinical practice can only improve. (Ziner, 1993 :42) 
Newman's account of social psychotherapy is centred in Vygotsky's 
developmental approach to social psychology (Vygotsky, 1979). The basis ofthis 
approach is that humans exist on two planes. The primary plane is interpersonal and 
one develops as a person, intrapsychically through a form of internalising 
interpersonal processes. Vygotsky's conceptualisation of development includes 
learning and together the planes form a dialectical unity. True development occurs 
only when there is a separation from learning with others interpersonally (external) to 
learning to learn by oneself (internal). This occurs as a continual process or passage of 
the one through to the other. Language activity brings about behavioural development 
and operates as a bridge between early and later development. Cole and Scribner 
comment that, 
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Vygotsky believed that the internalization of culturally produced sign systems 
brings about behavioral transformations and forms the bridge between early and later 
forms ofindividual development. (Cole and Scribner, 1979:7) 
Newman bases his theory for psychotherapy on these Vygotskian proposals 
and he terms his theory, Learning- Leading- Development (L.L.D.). People can only 
learn if the conditions in the social environment facilitate learning, and learning 
groups have to facilitate these conditions. Human development only comes out of the 
enabling conditions for learning and learning has to have appropriate contexts. 
Learning cannot involve the categorisation of the learner as neurotic or maladjusted 
for he or she cannot develop psychologically if defined and "socially constrained" by 
these categories. Newinan seems, though, to have two "vocabularies", one which 
uses the idioms of critical social theory demanding the notion of revolutionary agents 
and their role in altering institutional constraints or socially demeaning macro-
practices. This is undertheorised. The other "vocabulary" has a Vygotskian 
backgrounding of which Newman comments, "His (Vygotsky) is therefore both a 
normative and a descriptive statement - his psychology and his morality." 
(Newman1993:7) Thus, Newman, in his own words, excludes critical social theory 
from his account of psychotherapy. But I believe in any case that political critique has 
no basis in a Vygotskian model of social psychology where the emphasis is geared to 
the linguistic and non-manipulatory processes of sociolinguistic practices. Newman's 
social theorising is extremely insightful in the way he has theoretically linked the 
notion of learning and development to more democratic and politically enabling 
environments but the linkage is not sustained for theoretically he focuses on an 
educational model for an account of psychotherapy and disengages from the political 
model. 
Both Newman and Heaton's accounts of what they term moral or ethical 
psychotherapy are important in that they argue against behavioural and other 
traditional theories of psychotherapy. There are, though, problems in their accounts 
with regard to a lack of the conceptualisation of personhood, micro-conduct and 
macro-conduct and the relation of the one to the other. In Heaton's case, the notion of 
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personhood is only presupposed in speech-acts. The latter is not sufficient for a notion 
of persons who have to act upon the world and "be able to do otherwise" in the world. 
In Newman's social theory, personhood is underconceptualised. In this case it does 
require a Vygotskian notion of personhood which Harre (1983) makes central to his 
theoretical account of social psychology. But, it needs also the political 
backgrounding of the Giddensian concept of agency which is also lacking in Harre's 
particular approach. An account of psychotherapy needs to be contextualised within 
the terms of personhood, as a knowledgeable being who is aware of the moral abuses 
occurring to both himself and others in society and has the knowledge and capabilities 
to deal with them and alter them. 
Deleuze and Guattari (1990) do offer an emancipatory principle which is 
lacking in Heaton's (1976,1979) account of psychotherapy and is not properly 
developed in Newman's (1991) account of moral psychotherapy. Schizoanalysis, in 
contrast, to psychoanalysis, belongs to the tradition of critical social theory. 7 The 
primary postulate of the paradigm of psychotherapy is considered by De leuze and 
Guattari as "desire". The concept of desire reflects not idealised wishes but, rather, an 
emancipatory active force which has to deal with and prevent individual 
psychological repression and social oppression. There is no compartmentalisation of 
the mind into such dynamic sub-structures of ego, id, and superego. There is only a 
single primary id-like force or creative energy unfettered by constraints of the ego and 
the superego. Instinctual energy in its state of becoming or flux is not used up in 
fixations or fantasies by repressing the id. Desire is primarily a productive and 
subversive force and in its nomadic form refuses settlement and authority. It resists 
categorisation and representation. Its role is to investigate and decode or break up 
codes of representation and classification and signification. These codes have defined 
the way that people are theorised and categorised in society and in discourses with 
specific reference to the discourse of psychotherapy. De leuze and Guattari have 
pointed out that desire is socially constituted and one desiring proponent fuses with 
another. 
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The two theoretical constructs which they offer are desiring machines and 
desire production. Desiring machines can be conceptualised either as codes or as 
physical or as psychological or as social machines. They are not machines, as per, a 
piece of machinery, but are composites of general types. The mother who feeds her 
baby has not got a unified social identity obtained through being a mother. For after 
feeding her baby she could be a worker in a factory. There is no integrated role of 
being a woman or having a unified concept of self or identity. She is both being and 
becoming some other being, progressively through time. A desiring machine is 
defined as a system of interruptions or breaks. Every machine at the same time is 
related to an energy flow that it cuts into. (Deleuze and Guattari,1990:36) The notion 
of being is itself not a productive propensity but requires the energy flow or flux to 
ensure continuity. This, then, is desiring production in which desire is "the set of 
passive syntheses that engineer partial objects, flows and bodies, and that function as 
units of production." (De leuze and Guattari, 1990:26) In this process every moment of 
becoming is simultaneously co-extensive with the successive moment of becoming. It 
is the inclusion of the second moment, as discussed above, within the first that gives 
an understanding of the first. The idea of simultaneity does not involve a universaling 
principle which synthesises the two moments into a synchronic whole with its own 
internal self-justifications. Rather, it is the synthesising of two happenings as an 
ongoing and a productive process that entails ruptures and connections in relation to 
other happenings and their assessments. Assessment, also has to do with a unifying 
and developing or becoming process through which systems can change. What comes 
out of their theorising and is important for an account of psychotherapy as social 
critique is their notion of assessment or evaluation. 
May, following, De leuze and Guattari, suggests that, 
Without any transcendental clues as to how to elude the oppressions of a given 
system, one can only try things out and then assess the effects of one's own attempts -
its effects can be assessed and other action taken on the basis of that (epistemological 
and ethical) assessment... it is always a possibility for action and change .... that action 
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involves no transcendental promises - it must always be an experimentation. 
(May,1993:10,11). 
Likewise, no account of psychotherapy can offer in advance a blueprint for 
psychotherapeutic recovery or be comprehensive enough to accommodate everyone's 
autobiographical history and supply all of the conditions which will directly relate to 
and lead to psychotherapeutic recovery. What May can offer in these proposals for an 
account of psychotherapy is that recovery comes out of the trial and error processes of 
assessment. The recovery can only occur if the persons in therapy continuously 
modifies his social environment as he interacts with it and assesses it. 
There are, though, deficiencies in Deleuze's and Guattari's (1990) paradigm of 
psychotherapy. These deficiencies have firstly to do with a lack of a proper notion of 
self or agency having the attributes of intentionality, knowledge-ability and personal 
and social powers. Only with a notion of agency having these attributes, can one 
direct, modify and assess ones' action. This cannot occur with their notion of a 
decentred self which is the outcome of two arbitrary historic processes. For them the 
notion of a self has continuity in a unifying process only when he or she becomes 
other than he or she is. Secondly, they· do not allow for, in an account of 
psychotherapy, the idea of micro-conduct to do with the day to day happenings of 
persons in immediate contact with others. The reason for this, in the main, has to do 
with what they consider as the Freudian problem of micro-conduct - in this case 
conduct to do with the Oedipal family as agents of both psychic and social repression. 
For Deleuze and Guattari childhood and adolescent development, sociality and 
society are mediated through the oedipal family in a Freudian account of 
psychotherapy. But, at one and the same time, by countering a specific account of 
micro-conduct and offering no other account in its place, they have eliminated an 
important element of psychotherapy, namely the activities between spouses, friends, 
and lovers as well as the day to day dealings with colleagues and one's peers. 
Moreover unless one has a concept of micro-conduct in its own right one cannot 
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enquire into the de-ethicalisation of social relations and in turn, convey how the 
altering of institutional practices (macro-practices) effects modes of micro-conduct. 
Smail (1993), in contrast, to Deleuze and Guattari has made the concept of 
"powers" the primary concept for a critique of social theories and society and has 
indicated that no one can escape the latters' abusive influences. The idea of "powers" 
is considered theoretically as a field of powers which is expressed as a relational term 
involving personhood with special reference to the body, micro-conduct and macro-
conduct. The latter has greater force and greatly influences the other two. Within the 
fields of powers are distal powers and proximal powers. Power is wielded in terms of 
distal powers by the state and other social hierarchies. It hence originates at a distance 
from the individual. Proximal powers have reference to powers (or lack of them) that 
"surround" individuals which powers one either absorbs or transmits- either in 
material bodies or in the accumulation or lack of material goods or sociolinguistic 
practices. Persons in therapy suffer through what he believes to be a lack of their own 
powers; be it in terms of lack of self-esteem; or behaviours involving bodily stress. 
Present day accounts of psychotherapy through the proliferation of individualistic 
accounts must be considered as offering widespread support to the belief that 
psychotherapeutic difficulties and cures lie within the proximal powers (or their 
absence) of the person in therapy. Smail has put forward that, "we are thus restricted 
to making guesses, speculating and surmising about happenings in our proximal 
worlds which have distal causes". Smail believes that psychologists have ignored the 
macro-environments where economical and social powers of control reside and which 
are mostly out of persons in therapy's ken or reach. He maintains that what should be 
primarily held up for examination ,and forms the true study of a person's 
psychological difficulties, are the power relations embedded in social institutional 
practices; academic milieux; and human relations. Society in history rather than the 
individual person's case-history should be investigated or put under surveillance and 
explained. Psychological disorders originate in the economical and social practices 
and structures of capitalism. During the 1980's there has been a qualitative difference 
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in the type of problems presented to clinical psychology that corresponds to the route 
capitalism has taken. As a profession, psychotherapy should be seeking the origins of 
the persons in therapy's anxieties that arises from the form which capitalism has 
become rather than seeking it in individual psychological distress. Smail maintains 
that, 
The explanation of our conduct is thus not to be sought in a psychological analysis 
of individuals, but in a socio-economic, historical analysis of relations between 
people, and of the ways these have shaped the world we have to live in. 
(Smail, 1987:70) 
Venn states that the birth of the individual subject, 
produces the identity between the 'normal' subject of individualism and that of 
rationality and locates that identity inside the subject .... assumptions about mental 
processes highlight their connection with the notions of the individual which are more 
clearly found in administration and in economic calculations;(Venn,1984:133) 
Therefore, Smail argues, 
So unused are we to looking for the causes of our distress in the operation of distal 
powers that one needs to place particular stress on the necessity as well as on the 
empirical justification for doing so- (Smail, 1993:3 8) 
4 Social Critique. 
Traditionally, the role of social critique has been to put forward the limits of certain 
social theories and the values upholding them, as well as the examination of the 
institutions of society and the economic and social values in relation to those 
institutions. Theories were deemed to be limited when they did not consider persons 
in terms of some relational interaction with their institutional constraints and the 
means of overcoming the constraints. There is a belief by those advocating critical 
social theories that there has to be some relation as to how society is organised, its 
organisational influences on individuals and the need for theories and forms of 
explanation to specify what the relationship is between persons and their social 
institutions and the values inscribed in that relationship. 
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In the main, however, such theories have emphasised a relationship between 
constructs such as the unconscious or the conceptualisation of a rational being or the 
concept of desire and the constraining economic and social features of society. But 
none of the theorists such as Bhaskar (1987,1979), Marcuse (1972), and others such 
as Habermas (1972) could link constructs of the mind with notions of institutionalised 
society. The idea of the mind as a mental predicate could not theoretically be 
extended to incorporate notions of society with its long term enduring institutional 
practices. One of the reason for this is that they are on different time and "space" 
scales from each other. The means to integrate the psyche with the macro-practices of 
society has thus not been possible. Those radical commentators on approaches to 
psychotherapy such as Buss (1979) who have considered an account of psychotherapy 
in these terms have omitted from their accounts the everyday activities with peers and 
intimates which are directly influenced by economic and other social constraints. 
Moreover such interaction with peers, family and intimates is central to the 
autobiographical social history of the person in therapy and must initiate the therapy 
case-revtew. 
There are two factors surrounding Habermas' critical social theory. He deals 
with the personal as a rational reflective being in relation to micro-activities in his 
meta-theorising in Knowledge and Human Interests (1972). It is in this text that he 
introduces his paradigm of psychotherapy. He deals with the micro- and macro-
practices of rational beings in completely separate works such as The Theory of 
Communicative Action Vols.1 and 11, (1984) and Legitimation Crisis (1975). The 
first text differs from the second and third text due to the fact that they are on 
different levels of knowledge enquiry. The first is epistemological and has to do with 
Habermas' broadening of knowledge claims into three different forms, namely 
empirical-analytic sciences, the historical-hermeneutical sciences and a knowledge-
claim in respect of self-reflection. These knowledge claims are constituted by three 
forms of interests and refer to three standards of explanations. 8 The ~econd and third 
texts concern a social and political theory with regard to the uncoupling of the micro 
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activities of the symbolic life world of the family from the macro-practices of state 
administration and economic practices in the dynamics of welfare capitalism. The 
uncoupling prevents matters of public interest being debated or the people 
participating in civic affairs and issues. 
But what is apparent is that Habermas has not been able to offer in his 
paradigm of psychotherapy a relational account involving a notion of an active 
personhood acting within his or her micro-activities and acting upon his or her macro-
practices. None of these modalities can be elided from an account of psychotherapy 
because they are all central to social existence. Moreover the influencing of the one 
upon the other both creates the psychological problems and also offers 
psychotherapeutic solutions depending on whether those influences have positive or 
negative value. Drawing on Habermas' paradigm of psychotherapy, to some extent 
and in some respects creates problems for the discourse of psychotherapy. Ingle by 
( 1981) has countered traditional schools of psychotherapy and has offered Habermas's 
paradigm of psychotherapy in their place with special emphasis on the historical-
hermeneutical social sciences which supply a framework for communication and 
action. The assumptions of the Habermasean social philosophy which Ingle by draws 
upon are not the political assumptions about society but the epistemological 
foundations of ideal speech communication and universal consensus which Habermas 
believes should underwrite critical theory. This is somewhat paradoxical for lngleby 
(1981) is at pains to stress the primary nature of the economic and institutional 
backgrounds of the psychological difficulties of the person in therapy. As far as the 
person in therapy is situated within what is perhaps a chaotic and risk-laden life-style 
the offering of presupposed foundational certainties is not the way to approach 
psychological disaffections. How does the person if offered ideal conditions of 
existence deal with them in a contingent changing world in which these claims may 
have no reference?.One must find the critical means, rather, as Crook has stated 
between attempts to ground one's social theory in foundational guarantees on the one 
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hand and nihilistic attempts to deny the possibilities of guarantees, and in particular 
moral guarantees, leaving every situation to arbitrary chance. 
I have used four terms, namely values; practice; transformation and 
emancipation to delineate the properties of social critique. These terms underwrite a 
developmental and relational account of psychotherapy. In addition they establish and 
uphold my account of psychotherapy as social critique. 
(a) Values 
I start my argument for an account of psychotherapy as social critique by stating 
that social values are neither subjective nor objective but that both of these features 
co-imply each other.(Gibson, 1966) I conceptualise values as a two-way process 
involving values and their assessments or evaluations. In order to assess or evaluate 
values one does not simply presuppose an evaluator but stresses the notion of a 
knowledgeable being as an evaluator who evaluates. The latter refer~ to the therapist 
and person in therapy and obviously other people resources. I obtain the notion of an 
evaluator through the statement of Manicas (1990), whereby persons have 
discriminating and comparative capacities which are the basis of judging and 
evaluating, or subsuming. The values pertain to the social practices and activities of 
the person in therapy's social environment. The process of evaluation and evaluators 
is, as stated, a relational process. The notion of values and evaluation do not define 
each other or collapse into each other since one is personal (the evaluator) and the 
other is social (values pertaining to social practices) but they logically entail each 
other. The questioning and checking upon values and their assessment by the 
evaluator forms a unit of a goal- like task or practice. Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari 
consider the notion of the assessment of values to be essential aspect of any social 
theory or social practice. Deleuze and Guattari (1990) conceptualise the notion of 
assessment of values through the term experimentation and Foucault (1980) through 
the term problematisation. The former term, experimentation is not founded on rules 
or guiding principles: nor is there a privileged point of view. Assessments are an 
enquiry into what conditions ethical or non-ethical activities and the effects they 
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produce. The values of modernity must be subject to critical review. This diachronic 
process of assessments allows for possibilities and change. Scott, following Foucault, 
states, 
Rather than arguing for a position regarding what people ought to do, who they 
ought to be or how the world should be changed, he engages in a process of 
'constantly checking ' the regulations, procedures and constellations of power that 
make up our inheritances for identity and commitment. (Scott,l991:33,34) 
This forms part of the substance of Foucault's notion ofproblematics 
(problematisation).Cook following Foucault, stipulates that, 
problematisation involves "analysing not behaviours, nor ideas not societies, nor 
their 'ideologies' but the problematics by means of which being can and must be 
thought and the practices by means of which they are formed." (Cook,l987:217) 
I extend the notion of an evaluator evaluating values to include not just an 
evaluator, who is a person who discriminates and differentiates between social values, 
but that ultimately certain values have to be selected from one's social practices. The 
idea of intentional selection (in the processes of evaluation) means that one selects 
from one's social practices a certain value rather than others and one has foreclosed on 
less morally desirable options. The selection process is a constraining and modifying 
process and eliminates other less worthy values. This process of selection is an 
essential aspect of psychotherapeutic procedures and regulates and structures the 
processes incurred in psychotherapeutic betterment. 
I continue the important idea of the selection of social values through my 
conceptualisation of social values as moral exemplars. The main point of using the 
term moral exemplars is to focus on the idea that exemplar is "an example of' or 
"sample of'. The term "sample" or rather "sampling" has associations with evaluation 
and judging and requires a knowledgeable and discriminating being with regard to his 
or her subject matter. Moral exemplars are the "contents" of what have to be sampled 
and judged and this requires a person with knowhow in the adjudicating process. 
Finally, moral exemplars are worthwhile examples of social values which may require 
debate and critical review before being enacted in moral conduct. For any moral 
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account of human existence there has to be the notions of both moral exemplars and 
moral conduct. One cannot have an armchair philosopher debating morals extricated 
from human situations nor can one dogmatically "man" the political barriers without 
moral debate. 
(b) Practice. 
The term practice has several definitions. One general approach to the term practice 
is to consider the human sciences as practical activity which must always be prior to 
theoretical activity as Shotter (1975) has pointed out. For, Shotter the latter always 
emerges out of the former in the human sciences. This has to be a central idea of 
accounts of psychotherapy in which investigations or explanations must take account 
of the autobiographical social history of the person in therapy rather than subsuming 
psychological difficulties under an abstract theoretical model. For my account of 
psychotherapy practice or praxis refers to the configuration of persons interacting in 
their social environments. Bhaskar has put forward that practice is neither personal 
nor social but involves the relation between the two. 9 The important focus for my 
proposals is that practice is essentially to do with skills which have a personal and 
social dimension. The skills or knowhow relevant to an account of psychotherapy is 
ethical knowhow in the ongoing evaluation of moral exemplars or conduct. Brown 
(1990) has indicated that judgement or evaluation is a skill that requires practice, 
training and future assessments and cannot be an appeal to universal standards across 
time. Brown, however, does not relate persons to their social practices, necessary for 
any practice or skills related process as Healy indicates (1990). Brown offers a two-
stage process of evaluation. The first assessment concerns the individual and a quite 
separate second assessment concerns the social community. However, one requires 
both persons and the practice in the monitoring, modification and open-ended 
advancement of the practice. The essential nature of skills activity operating between 
persons and their practice is achieved through regulatory and constraining 
mechanisms and processes. Psychotherapeutic betterment occurs in the operation of 
ethical knowhow whereby the person becomes skilled (with others' helpful advice, 
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comments and assessments) in selecting the moral exemplar that is most apt for the 
contexts and situations in which he or she can enact moral conduct. 
(c) Transformations. 
The third term, transformation, is related to the notion of critique, values and 
practice. The way in which it is related to these three notions is through the central 
idea of alteration. The therapist must be a skilled practitioner in order to make a 
contribution in the alteration or "transformation" of the social existence of the person 
in therapy. Equally so, the person in therapy's own response to their social existence 
is to acquire the knowhow to alter their social practices. The notion of transformation 
gives critical impetus to the idea of values and to critique. Critique is Involved in the 
assessment of social values pertaining to moral abuses and the offering of alternative 
values by which to alter social practices. The idea of transformation involves the 
configuration of person in therapy with attributes of intentionality, knowledge-ability 
and powers or capabilities. These attributes of agency are necessary for the 
investigation and alteration of social practices. The key point also is that the notion of 
the concept of transformation as Bhaskar (1987) has stated is always situated in and 
stretches across space and time. It is an essential part of the ongoing structuring or 
patterning of human existence. Persons transform their social practices ~ they 
interact with them. Each of the two terms of the configuration, persons and their 
social environment specifies the other and contributes to the development of the 
other. The focal point, though, for the notion of transformation is that the 
specification can always offer something different in the second term which is already 
provided for by the first term. The first term regulates, directs, and modifies the 
second term. Linking the notion of transformation to the notion of constraints in the 
systematic procedures of therapeutic practices prevents it being associated with 
transforming or magicking away persons' moral and social dilemmas - nor does the 
term transformation give entry into political or social utopias, divorced from the 
realities of human travails. The key point for the notion of transformation is that it has 
to be considered as the intersection between the practices and procedures of 
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psychotherapy and the critical interventions in social practices of the persons in 
therapy. I put forward that both "psychotherapy" and "social critique" come together 
in the notion of "transformation points". These occur as significant interventions in 
the procedures of psychotherapy which the therapist believes will make a contribution 
to the altering of social practices by the person in therapy. 
(d) Emancipation(s). 
I have hesitated to use the idea of emancipation( s) because part of its references 
concern political and economic oppressions and uprisings against them. Using the 
term in accounts of psychotherapy could devalue its political impact. The other aspect 
of its references has to do with the conceptualisation ofuniversal freedoms. However 
the term, itself, has become demoted and unfashionable in critical social theory 
because some of its assumptions have to do with the idea of universal freedoms, 
universally determined (Laclau, 1992) - those who are committed to claims to 
knowledge being contingent and random will repudiate the possibility of emancipated 
universal utopias being universally determined. One has to be careful, also, that the 
usage of a term does not demote its essential meaning and the force that the meaning 
may have. This has occurred with associated emancipatory concepts such as 
"enabling" and "empowerment" which are more to do now with individuals or 
aggregates of individuals, as groups, competing against each other for scarce 
resources. Previously these terms presupposed a collective will and collective 
sociality. The term emancipation, however, by those who still recognise its value as a 
concept has remained political rather than personal. On those grounds it is worthwhile 
still to make use of it. For my account of social psychotherapy I draw upon Israel 
(1979), Still and Good (1992), and also Giddens' (1984) perspectives ofthe term 
dialectics to achieve what I mean by emancipation. 
Israel (1979) has established that the notion of the dialectic is primarily a 
relational and progressive term and occurs through two independent terms which are 
intrinsically related. The idea of the dialectic is that it unites subject and object but it 
specifies something beyond itself within that unification. Following Still and Good 
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(1992 ) I have used the concept of dialectics in connection with relational activities 
between persons, where one person provides the progressive social contexts for the 
other as what happens in co-counselling. In the case of a moral account of 
psychotherapy the person in therapy has to courageously introduce a moral dimension 
within the social contexts of their social encounters. Within an emancipatory 
perspective the person in psychotherapy has to re-ethicalise - de-ethicalised - social 
encounters. They do so by specifying the moral context of an activity or encounter for 
both themselves and the other person. In general, one can offer an emancipat?ry 
context for the other person only if one can separate out when to be the "caretaker" 
and when to be the mate, the colleague, the lover or the co-counsellor. The nature of 
such dialectic activities between persons must be as democratic as possible involving 
equality between female and male; female to female; male to male; adult to child and 
teacher to taught. There are, however, times when the notion of moral ascendancy 
must take precedence over the notion of equality. A similar position must be achieved 
within more politicised encounters in which persons are the recipients of the 
imbalance of economic, material and authoritative power, resources and facilities. 
They either have no access to them or have been divested of them For notions 
regarding democracy can never remain within the processes of interactions but must 
always be grounded in political facts which then implicate such interactions .Giddens 
( 1984 ) in his conceptualisation of the dialectic of control suggests that persons have a 
"transformative capacity" to intervene in their social practices and alter their social 
affairs (powers are logically entailed within persons and because of these powers 
persons have the capacity to act differently and do otherwise). Smail (1993), Bhaskar, 
(1987) Deleuze and Gtiattari (1990) conceptualise such a transformative capacity in 
their own terms. Smail considers this form of powers as transitive powers which are 
transformed by the person into some form of action. Smail and Bhaskar point out 
though that the imbalances of powers and the social and political asymmetries of 
human relations constrain and prevent much of such transitive powers. In this respect, 
for Smail powers are intransitive and reactive and more often than not remain as a 
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lack of proximal powers, and become associated with psychophysical suffering of 
some kind. 
There is one final point to do with the notion of emancipation and human 
betterment which includes psychotherapeutic betterment. Should betterment in a 
moral account of psychotherapy be organised around some value-ideal or should 
betterment be considered as different from or other than what went before?. Again the 
latter provides the approach to psychotherapy as social critique.One can bring in 
Deleuze and Guattari's notion of "difference" or "other than" along with their use of 
the term to "defer", but place it in a different context. This would imply that social 
affairs could become different in terms of possibilities and change which emerge out 
of a critical assessment of what went before and the gradual elimination of certain 
adversities -without any proposals encompassing ideal utopias. Dandeker puts 
forward that judgements of fact and judgements of value are logically and historically 
related.He comments, 
To explain the social world is to set limits on answers to the question of how it 
might be changed. What society is and how it might be changed are not different 
orders of question. (Dandeker, 1983: 197) 
5 Conclusion 
Most of the ways traditional theories of psychotherapy have developed over time 
were in response to the limitations in the prevailing accounts which were currently 
then available. However, over time, each has lost its innovative and critical raison 
d'etre and has been less subjected to empirical scrutiny. (Smail,1984) The inherent 
problem of privileging of inner or outer existence as mind or behaviour resulting in 
monisms still persists as is illustrated in Rainwater's (1989) notion ofthe rituals of 
self-observation. Such accounts of psychotherapy which have made attempts at a 
theoretical integration of mind and behaviour such as Meichenbaum (1977) and 
Bandura (1977) two-step approach involving mental predicates and then behaviour 
still maintain their dualistic problems. Where attempts have been made to integrate 
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personal and social existence for a theory of psychotherapy they too have been 
unsuccessful. 
In general with regard to individualistic accounts of psychotherapy they can 
never be considered as moral accounts for morality presupposes a social order 
grounded in social values. Moreover the nature of their scientific-analytic methods 
remains almost wholly value-free. (Smail1987) Nowhere do those theorists who 
endorse individualistic accounts of psychotherapy examine the social values which 
constitute their theories or the values that they have imposed on certain groups of 
society especially those groups under investigation through their scientific enquiries 
as Sampson (1981, 1985), and Secord (1990) have indicated. Another problem is in 
relation to critical theorists such as Buss. (1979) Although his account of 
psychotherapy consists of a critique of society and the social values inscribed in 
constraining social practices, the scientific account which he endorses belongs to the 
tradition of value -free scientific explanations and the methods to achieve them. 
Normative accounts in social psychology are assumed more often than not to 
be grounded in a moral order. (Harre, Shotter,1990) I query, though, if a moral order 
should be considered within what is a normative discourse which has its basis in 
conventions of language, symbols and signs or rule-related ritualised conventions. 
There is no means in Heaton's (1979) moral account of psychotherapy for the critical 
decoding of the conventions or putting meaning up to be examined and assessed. 
Rather, its the reverse for general agreements as to meaning and its interpretations are 
presupposed in an already prescribed social order. Also I believe where language is 
considered as primary in sociolinguistic practices there is not sufficient distinction 
between language as the medium through which social transactions mainly take place 
and linguistic practices as the principle by which almost all of social existence is 
organised. Bhaskar (1987), Smail (1993), Deleuze and Guattari, (1990) believe that 
an enquiry into systems of domination and apparatuses of knowledge must be the 
principle by which social theory is determined. Instead for them, modes of linguistic 
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communications are to be put up for investigation rather than the means by which 
both social theories and social activities can be determined. 
My proposals for an account of psychotherapy cannot be accommodated by 
individualistic principles of psychotherapy; nor normative principles of social 
psychology; nor critical social theory involving value-ideals; nor yet again in 
nihilistic accounts of subversive practices where values as to whether they are good or 
bad ones cannot be assessed; nor in relativistic accounts where all values have equal 
weighting and no appeal to adjudication processes is considered as necessary. 
I have indicated problems with both traditional and contemporary social and 
individualistic accounts of psychotherapy. I have offered in their place a moral and 
political account of psychotherapy which has affinities with Smail's political critique 
of social theories and social practices, conveyed through the principle of political 
powers. I have offered the notion of moral and political values as the organising and 
ordering principle for my account of psychotherapy. Basically I structure my account 
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around the configuration of persons with the attributes of knowledgeability, 
intentionality and social and personal powers interacting relationally with others in 
terms of activities or with their longer term institutional practices. Values are what are 
investigated within those activities and practices and these require and co-imply an 
evaluator along with other evaluators. Secord maintains that, 
an applied scientists must be more than a scientist,he or she must have considerable 
knowledge and experience relevant to the application n and must draw upon 
biographical, historical and social contextual knowledge if the application is to be 
effective ..... They need to obtain probing accounts of how the affected individuals see 
the projected social change, they need to understand how these accounts support the 
behaviour that is to be changed, and they must grasp how existing social structures 
relate to the target behaviour .... This is true because of the nature of our world, and not 
because of the immaturity or wrongheadedness of social science. 
(Secord, 1986:213,219) 
Notes 
1. There is according to Casell (1993 ) a primordial conflict between the 
individual subject and the social object. This means that one cannot resolve a 
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social theory by appealing to an idea of order for the latter poses a problem for 
any social theory involving the individual and his or her social existence. 
2. For Freud, (1973), the oedipal stage is part of the phallic pre-adolescent stage 
of psychic development. The oedipal stage has to do With the mother being the 
object of desire for the son (object~cathexis). To obtain discharge of the id 
(psychic desire), he has to assume his fathers' role (the Freudian concept of 
identification) and become a surrogate husband. In order to do this he needs to 
destroy his father. This wish then becomes reciprocated by the father in a 
desire to castrate the son. Displacement of desire occurs in restraints being 
proffered by other persons or finding alternative ploys and sublimating desire. 
Freud maintained that the id was the enemy of civilisation and the 
internalisation of social constraints by the superego is "a most precious 
cultural asset in the psychological field". Deleuze and Guattari (1990) oppose 
this family Oedipal triad.By submitting desire to the oedipal triangulation it 
becomes repressed and restrained by social mechanisms of control. Desire 
loses its subversive psychic energy. This means that the hegemony of 
hierarchical institutional practices remains intact. 
3 The organismic self also involves an organismic evaluating process in which 
there is a continuous evaluation of experiences as good or bad experiences. 
The organismic self then perceives itself as either "good me" or "bad me". 
(Rogers, 1973) 
4. The "Q sort" is a form of self-sort -technique introduced by Stephenson 
(1953). It has been modified by Rogers and Dymond (1954) as a self-rating 
procedure for persons in therapy. The purpose of the experiment is to find out 
if changes in self-concepts of the persons in therapy were attributable to 
psychotherapy and its outcomes or whether. they were attributable to initial 
relief in obtaining psychotherapy. The experimental tests are designed to 
include self-concepts to do with the preliminary interview, interviews during 
psychotherapy, and a post-therapy interview. The self-concepts involves an 
ideal self, a putative ordinary self; and how one perceives one's self in terms 
of others' perception of oneself. Correlations express the relation between 
tests. 
5. The notion of empathy is underwritt~n by a way of looking at social 
relationships. Rogers considers the concept of empathy as one of the six 
necessary and sufficient conditions of psychotherapeutic personality change 
(psychotherapeutic betterment). Empathy for Rogers occurs when a person 
experiencing the events "as if' by analogy they were his or her own. The 
notion of empathy though carries with it philosophical problems as Merleau-
Ponty has recognised. (Merleau-Ponty, 1964) How can self-knowledge of 
private experiences be extended to others as intersubjective knowledge. One 
must begin the philosophical argument not from private experiences but with 
common intersubjective suffering. The usefulness of the terq1, empathy, 
rather, has been its practical influence on lay and professional people's 
interaction with each other and the contribution it has made to the 
democratisation of social and work practices. 
6. There are two issues relating to "self' theories, the first issue involves the idea 
of the self as a stable unifying centre controlling all thought and action-
metaphorically the centre of the universe. This has been the paramount notion 
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regarding the self from the Renaissance onwards until this present century. 
The notion of self can be said now to have been de-centred and can now be 
considered as a ruptured product of history. (Rorty 1989) The first issue leads 
into the second issue as to whether theories are continuous throughout history 
or whether theories such as the decentred self are representative of a 
discontinuist view of social theorising. 
7. Schizoanalysis is a paradigm of psychotherapy constructed by Deleuze and 
Guattari (1990) to counter the paradigm of psychoanalysis. Social theories and 
the capitalist culture have categorised or coded forms of social existence, 
including mental health. In so doing they have imposed a repressive and 
suppressive social order through such categorisation. Persons such as 
schizophrenics resist the repressive nature of such categorisations and do not 
conform to the imposition of social order and social confinements. They do 
not recreate the representations nor are they determined by them. As a 
consequence they have more psychic and creative energy to deal with the 
world as it is- rather than conflict and contradictions being restricted and 
suppressed within the domains of social orders. 
8. The knowledge claims are constituted by three forms of interest; technical 
practical and emancipatory and they are related to three forms of validity 
claims of which interpretations (established intersubjective meanings) 
increasingly become central to Habermas' proposals for social philosophy. He 
emphasises moreso within the interpretive framework, communicative 
interaction which he considers as the irreducible category of social existence. 
For him there must be, moreover, an appeal to ideal speech situations which 
are divorced from the politicised distortion of everyday communicative 
interactions. There is, though, a body of critique (Ottmann1983) which argues 
that Habermas' three claims to knowledge are all distinct claims. His attempt 
to make the third knowledge claim, self reflection /emancipatory knowledge 
related as critique to the other two knowledge claims has failed because self-
reflection is entailed within self-knowledge. 
9. "A' practice' cannot be identified either with a 'structure' or with the 'agency' 
which reproduces or transforms it; it is rather, as it were, the structure at work 
in praxis .... Practices are the conveyors of history, but their individuation and 
articulation raise complex questions." (Bhaskar, 1987: 129) 
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1 Introduction 
In this chapter I offer a relational account of psychotherapy in which persons can act 
in a skilled ongoing manner with regard to their social activities or practices. For this 
to occur the notion of agency is required. The notion of agency is best considered as 
having three attributes, namely powers, intentions and knowledge-ability. Each of 
these attributes is related to each other and all are related in terms of a configuration 
of persons and their social activities or practices. 1 These attributes co-imply the social 
environments in which agents interact. Agents and their attributes cannot be specified 
without reference to their social environments. The attributes of agency allow both for 
argumentation and assessments and guides to action. The notion of agency entails 
neither a purely individual primitive unanalysable core self nor a purely public 
personhood (or social identity) but involves both a notion of self and public 
personhood. 
I have made use of Harre's (1983) concepts of personhood and selfhood to 
establish both social and personal being. The main Harrean idea is that personal being 
is related to and realised through the notion of social being. Social being is defined by 
public sociolinguistic practices and individual selves are realised through self- talk or 
the indexation of the use of the pronouns "me" and "I". For Harre, persons have 
personal and social autobiographies as well as having selves (theoretical selves) and 
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cognitive awareness. I extend his notion of autobiography by introducing the idea of 
persons as historical beings situated "in time" with developing autobiographies. These 
ongoing autobiographies are co-temporaneous with the autobiographies of others in 
conjoint activities. These autobiographies are historically situated and are the 
products of certain social practices and of the manner in which the individual deals 
with and particularises such practices. I then incorporate Jensen's (1990) social 
theorising into my account of psychotherapy for two reasons. The first is that Jensen, 
following Harre, considers human beings as autobiographical selves. The notion of 
autobiographical selves is conceptualised by Harre as selves with a growing grasp of 
capabilities and potentials, by which persons can act upon the world. This is Jensen's 
"self-in-activities". The key point (and the second reason for my use of Jensen within 
an account of psychotherapy as social critique) is that autobiography is not 
conceptualised as narrative but as action in which moral conduct has a central role. 
2 The Notion of Powers as an Attribute of Agency. 
I have divided the term powers into two, (a) powers as abilities and (b) powers of 
control. The first use of the notion of powers is to set it against what has been termed 
the mechanical model of man. (Harre and Secord, 1972) The second use is to set it 
against the psychoanalytical postulate of desire as powers. Deleuze and Guattari's 
( 1990) reformulation of the Freudian id as desire or force equate it with the notion of 
social and political powers. There are two relevant features of contemporary thought 
with regard to the notion of powers. One feature is that powers are conceptualised as 
desire as in the social theorising of De leuze and Guattari and is also, exemplified in 
Kovel's (1981) Age of Desire and Kovel (1993). The other feature is the 
conceptualisation of powers exemplified in Foucault's (1980) Powers/Knowledge. 
Smail, (1993) has proposed for the discourse of psychotherapy the second feature of 
this conceptualisation of powers i.e. powers of control (transitive powers) in terms of 
being able to act otherwise or being able to act differently. It involves being able to 
influence asymmetrical situations or superordinate groups of people. This form of 
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power is established as a field of powers conceived as a relation between the person in 
therapy and their micro-and macro-conduct, with their social constraints and social 
resources. 
The first notion of powers (a)- as abilities- within psychological science comes 
from Harre and his co-authors (Harre and Secord,1972, and Harre and Madden,1975). 
Harre argues against a psychological model ofwo(man) in which persons are nothing 
but operationalised respondents to stimuli and in which behaviours are acquired by an 
S-R (stimulus-response) process. Harre counters a mechanical model of man on three 
grounds. The first is the assumption of causal models in psychology that the same 
external stimuli always obtain the same responses. The second assumption of causal 
models has to do with Humean efficient causation in which there is_ only a contingent 
relationship between two events and one is dependent upon the other occurring. The 
third has to do with a psychological research model of causality in which methods are 
operationalised in terms of objective numerical values. Any other values such as 
moral values cannot be verified according to the principles of scientific claims to 
truth. Harre, in opposition to these three assumptions maintains that in a proper 
account of a psychology of persons one must start from the assumption that persons 
have powers as capacities or competencies to achieve tasks and to make things 
happen. 
Harre and Secord (1972) offer a paradigm of psychological science in which 
persons, in certain respects, are architects of their own and others' social existence and 
are not passive responders to causal events. Powers are part of what is required in 
order to make things happen and are the generative means by which things happen. 
Part of what a thing is and part of what it does in terms of powers are not separate. 
For having a particular power or liability is being in such a state that one is likely to 
behave in a certain way. The ascription of powers is ascribed in formulaic terms. As 
C1, C 2 C 3; then B, in virtue ofN. C represents a set of conditions forming an open 
injunction, B represents the ensuing behaviour and N represents the nature of the state 
of the individual, in virtue of being capable of doing B, should any of the conditions 
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of C obtain. An example of this is the physical and material properties of dynamite as 
(N) which will allow it to explode (B) i.e. dynamite has the power to explode given a 
set of certain conditions (C). (Harre and Secord, 1972: 18) 
Harre suggests that this ascription of powers can be brought into a 
psychological model of persons with the rider that humans have species-specific 
powers involving cognitive, manipulatory and social skills. The hand grasp and the 
powers of speech are particularly human phenomena. He makes use of Hampshire's 
(1959) and Strawson's (1959) theorising to arrive at his own notion of personal 
powers. Harre gives a summary of what he terms the anthropomorphic model of man 
and what the notion of powers consists of. (Harre,1972) This model argues for 
psychophysical beings located in space; A human being can initiate change and act 
upon things; he or she is capable of being aware of things other than himself or 
herself and knowing what they are. He or she has the power of speech and interacts 
through speech. Humans must be able to monitor their conduct and give public 
accounts of it. Language users must have a place in the same system of reference as 
that to which language refers. This has to do with not only the reflexive pronouns of 
"I and me" but also with terms such as "over here" and "over there" in relation to the 
person. A human being has also an existence in time and is located within his or her 
position- practices. Persons occupy positions as social identities and engage in 
practices that are located historically in time-space. Harre sums up his idea of powers 
by suggesting that, 
The point of application of power is in the primary structure, where the person is 
located, while the point of origin of the power is at the culturally idiosyncratic source 
or apex of the secondary structure. (Harre, 1983: 144) 
However, if one follows through this quotation with regard to speech-acts 
,incorporated within conversations (which is central to Harres account of psychology) 
then problems arise. The powers of speech as psychophysical acts or utterances of 
speech differ in kind from speech-acts involving communications such as 
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conversations, or logical assertive propositions.( Both, also, would imply someone 
having cognitive resources rather than simply powers, per se). 
Overall ,though,Harre follows the notion of powers through by reference to 
Gibson .(1966) Gibson's psychological theory considers persons as having 
manipulatory and cognitive propensities by which they can relationally engage the 
world. But also, Harre in opposition to this emphasises the essential principle of 
human existence as one which is organised around the intersubjective norms of 
human conduct- especially those involving conversations. 
If Harre (Harre and Madden ,1975) had reconsidered his discussion of powers 
as a field of potentials and established a different conceptualisation of powers within 
the discourse of social psychology, then I believe that he would have averted two 
problems. The first problem is where there is a severance of the notion of social and 
personal being i.e. between the individual with powers and his or her social 
encounters. Heft (1989) and Reed (1989), following Gibson, have countered in their 
theorising this form of severance and made the central features of their own theorising 
the co-implication of personal being with social being. The second is a corollary of 
this with regard to the ambivalence that is raised as to whether Harre's account of 
human behaviour is fundamentally embedded in a social and moral order explained 
by consensual meanings and expressive communications.Or whether explanations of 
human behaviour have to rely on structural properties of things with their generative 
mechanisms as when persons are to be construed as thinglike with psychophysical 
powers of speech.(Shotter1990) A means to avert the problem is to conceptualise 
powers within a form of field theory. A "field" is not thing-like but it is relational and 
has no substance or essence, only powers (or in the language of physics, it has 
potentials). But such a notion of powers requires to be converted to social powers 
which influence persons either as liabilities or enablements.2 This relational notion of 
powers however would still lack the political and moral basis of Smail's concept of 
fields of power, necessary for an account of psychotherapy as social critique. 
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The second notion of powers (b) is powers of control, or rather, powers 
required to make a difference to one's social affairs. Giddens (1979) in fact, starts off 
from Harre's concept of powers as capacities for action but uses the term in a 
relational politicised form rather than a psychological one. Giddens introduces a 
relational concept of powers in his major proposal for the duality of agents and their 
structures (rules and resources of social practices). I suggest that persons in therapy 
require social and personal powers in order to make a difference to those social 
practices which are preventing their psychological wellbeing. For Giddens powers are 
logically prior to the concept of agency but persons use such powers in relation to 
others. He maintains that "powers" is a relational concept but only operates through 
the use of a transformative capacity generated against structures of domination. 
Giddens suggests that, 
Power relations therefore are always two-way .... Power, in this relational sense, 
concerns the capability of actors to secure outcomes where the realisation of these 
outcomes depends upon the agency of others. The use of power in interaction thus can 
be understood in terms of the facilities that participants bring to and mobilise as 
elements of the production of that interaction, thereby influencing its course. 
(Giddens,1979:93) 
This is an essential notion for an account of psychotherapy as social critique and it 
allows for persons to act back upon disabling moral practices and their concomitant 
moral abuses. Persons, as agents, can take moral stances and use moral exemplars as 
guides for the form of action required to act back. 
Giddens (1984) compares his notion of powers to the central concept of 
Foucauldian powers. It was Foucault's (1980) intention not to adopt the notion of a 
universal stable self controlling all thoughts and actions. Giddens to a certain extent 
concurred with this proposal. He decentred what was a universal self, as ego but 
recentred it in his idea of agency ~ which has to do with beings having the powers to 
intervene in social affairs. He criticised Foucault for the total decentring of the self in 
which there is no agental self as a controller in the dialectic of control. 
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For the notion of powers which I wish to consider, I require both these concepts 
of powers. Agents having logically entailed powers which can be used to intervene in 
human affairs and Foucault's more diagnostic analysis and critique of the role of 
powers, as domination in human affairs. The regimes of powers involve a network of 
hierarchical practices which proclaim what has to be "truth and falsehood, normal and 
deviant behaviour as well as admissable and non-admissable bodies of knowledge." 
Smail (1993) as a practising clinical psychologist and commentator on the 
discourses of psychotherapy conceptualises his account of psychotherapy through the 
idea of powers. The latter is the principle by which knowledge regimes, discourses 
and institutional practices are organised. His concept of powers is expressed in a 
relational form as the field of powers involving persons, their macro-practices and 
micro-practices. The origins of persons psychological problems although manifested 
in proximal bodily symptoms emerge from the distal powers of politics and 
economics and the manner in which society is hierarchically structured. Each person 
operates within a power span or horizon and those with least access to consumer or 
economic resources will have less access to any of the establishments that uphold 
regimes of power. Any insurmountable frustrations directly associated with lack of 
bodily, economic or material power are designated mad or bad and these terms 
themselves demand only individualistic explanations. 
To sum up one could not survive without cognitive and manipulatory powers 
but as well as that one requires the powers of intervention upon one's social affairs 
through the processes of confrontation and debating social issues - as well as the 
taking up moral stands and enacting moral conduct. 
I suggest further that humans not only have species-specific powers or general 
competencies but they are always also particularised as individual competencies. 
(Harre, 1972) My proposals for an account of psychotherapy as social critique is that 
competencies are both social and individual. They are skills to be used by a person in 
order that he or she can intervene in his or her social affairs. Skills or competencies 
require not just the notion of capabilities and resources but they also require the 
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notion of knowledge or more specifically practical knowledge. I call knowledge 
which is skill-based, knowledge-ability and where it refers to morals or ethics, ethical 
knowhow. 
3 The Notion of Knowledge-ability as an Attribute of Agency 
(a) Practical Knowledge 
The idea of knowledge both with regard to its claims to truth and claims to 
universality has posed major problems. These problems evolve around 
epistemological issues of how do we know what we know. Such issues have entered 
accounts of psychology and psychotherapy as the self- knowledge of introspection. 
The self as an object of knowledge under the rubric of "self' observation, as discussed 
above, is still operative in Rainwater's (1989) approach to psychotherapy. Those 
committed to experimental research methods in psychology have traditionally 
repudiated self-knowledge on the grounds of its idiosyncrasies, particularity and 
unreliability. There is no means of reliable access to self-knowledge and hence no 
guarantees as to its validity. Behaviourists have traditionally argued for the 
psychological objects of knowledge to be inscribed in the laws of nature. 
This section on knowledge-ability attempts to overcome these problems by 
considering the idea of knowledge manifesting both objective and subjective features, 
the one co-implying the other. 
lnbuilt into the notion of knowledge-ability is the view that knowledge is 
primarily practical. Shorter (1975) maintains that for the discourse of social 
psychology, practical knowledge which has to do with the ordinary explanations that 
persons give in their accounts of behaviour should take precedence over theoretical 
abstract knowledge. Not only is the notion of knowledge-ability not contemplative 
knowledge, referring to propositional truths gained from inferences expressed in 
words or symbols, but it also differs from other forms of practical knowledge. For 
example, Habermas (1972) in his approach to critical theory suggests that one form of 
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his three claims to knowledge is practical knowledge. Such knowledge is constituted 
by interests. Interests are the mediators between the sociocultural practices of human 
existence and knowledge pertaining to them. The latter is considered as interpretive 
knowledge. This form of knowledge is founded on intersubjective understanding of 
meanings which can be communicatively shared. Rational consensus, as to what 
constitutes repressive free communications for Habermas could lead to a repressive 
free, or freer, society. This is achieved by an ideal speech situation of discourse which 
can be appealed to and for which there will be general agreement binding on all 
subjects. The validity claims or standards for practical knowledge are 
comprehensibility, truth, rightness and sincerity. 
The practical knowledge which I envisage for an account of psychotherapy, 
however, has to do with knowledge that one acquires by trial and error. The criteria 
for such knowledge claims are standards of success or failure rather than claims to 
truth or falsity or the validity claims inhering in linguistic communication. I propose, 
rather, that we all approach life by trial and error and for this one needs standards 
which are part of ongoing assessments. But one cannot approach life just by trial and 
error. It would be bothrisky and time consuming. I suggest that to orientate around 
the social world such practical knowledge will require social skills and such skills 
obviously short circuit the trial and error process. 
James Russell suggests that knowledge has both subjective and objective 
features. Russell states that, 
knowledge of an object must be held by a subject, and to give conditions for a 
system's (man or machine) possessing objectivity we are at the same time giving 
conditions for subjectivity. (Russell,1984:128,129) 
The relation of knower to known is especially important for an account of 
psychotherapy where information given by the therapist has to be assessed and acted 
upon by the person in therapy. What has to be considered for a social account of 
psychotherapy is the notion of an active cognitive being or rather agent exploring his 
or her social environments with others as he or she interact with them and for this he 
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or she requires knowhow. This knowhow is a skills-orientated notion involving both 
subjective and objective features of a knower as well as objects of knowledge. Such a 
notion of knowhow co-implies both a practitioner and his or her social practices 
which form a unity through the ongoing goal-related progress of certain activities. 
There is a two-way feedback procedure between the person and his or her task in the 
context and progress ofthe activity and there also have to be assessments of such 
activity which contribute to and alter the feedback process. The person evaluates and 
discriminates between alternatives in respect of social values. This is skill or 
knowhow as a regulatory and constraining process in which the person selects 
alternatives from his or her social practices and progressively replaces these with 
other alternatives. 
I obtain such a relation of knower to known in part, through Giddens' ( 1984) 
concept of knowledgeability and in part through Harre's (1983) notion of knowledge 
resources. Also for the idea of ethical knowhow I draw on the Gibsonian notion of 
values having both subjective and objective features. Firstly, Giddens defines the term 
knowledgeability as, 
Everything which actors know (believe) about the circumstances of their action and 
that of others, drawn up in the production and reproduction of that action, including 
tacit as well as discursively available knowledge. (Giddens, 1984:375) 
There are two issues with regard to his formulation of the term 
knowledgeability. Firstly, the emphasis within his social theory has to do with what 
he refers to as practical consciousness or tacit knowledge. The latter refers to an 
awareness of what one is doing in routine tasks of every day life. This is tacit 
awareness which involves consciousness but not reflective awareness. I require, 
though, to emphasise discursive knowledge which is used in public debate and public 
evaluations. 
Secondly, Giddens in his social theorising creates an analytic caesure between 
what the actors know and the object of knowledge inscribed in social practices. 
Although Giddens acknowledges that the subjective and objective features of 
68 
knowledge are both present existentially he has not been able to specify their 
relationship analytically.3 In order to focus on discursive knowledge required in 
debate and argumentation which is necessary for any grounding of morality I have 
used Giddens' term knowledgeability but hyphenated it to knowledge-ability. 
Harre similarly to Giddens, considers knowledge not just as cognitive 
awareness but as practical knowledge considered as a guide to action. Practical 
knowledge is required in the explanation of actions through its monitoring and 
accounting processes. Harre, therefore, suggests that, 
we may find ourselves required to accept a generic account of knowledge, wider 
than but including that which emerges when knowledge is studied only relative to 
Cartesian limits. (Harre, 1983:4 7) 
Harre in his social theorising also separates what he terms performance 
knowledge from competence knowledge, required for action. Competence knowledge 
is collectively stored and thus involves more than one person. Different people bring 
different knowledge resources to a project. For example, in case-study conferences 
involving therapists, lawyers and medical personnel, all draw on different knowledge 
resources but these are collectively stored (case-histories and reviews) and 
collectively deployed in decision making. 
But an important point for psychotherapy as social critique is that Harre is less 
concerned compared to Giddens (1984) and Luckmann (1982) with the social 
stratification of knowledge or the hierarchical organisation of knowledge in which 
there is differential access to knowledge resources by different groups ofpeople.4 
Further, Cook commenting on Foucault's social theorising states that, 
Foucault's expressed interest is in the system of domination specific to the modem 
age, as well as in the forms of knowledge and ethical behaviour which combine in 
that system to render modernity problematic and susceptible to criticism. 
(Cook,1991:142) 
Smail (1993) maintains in his commentary on the discourse of psychotherapy 
that the correlates of power and knowledge invested in the discourse have been 
instrumental in the production of human suffering as well as attempting its cure. 
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Thirdly, I have obtained the notion of values having both subjective and 
objective features from Gibson 's theory of affordances. (1966, 1986) I have 
conceptualised the subjective features of values as persons who evaluate values 
through Manicas' (1990) proposals. Persons, as discussed above, have cognitive, 
discriminating and comparative propensities which are the basis of judging and 
evaluating. I have considered the objective features of the notion of values as the 
values pertaining to social practices and what such values "afford" or offer up in 
terms of their use-value. (The term, afford, as used by Bhaskar, 1987, and Shotter, 
1983, has entered the domain of social psychology and social philosophy in· less 
rigorously defined terms than in Gibson's original formulation of the 
term,affordances ). 
However there are two additional problems with the use of the Gibsonian 
theory of psychology for my account of psychotherapy. Gibson implies that 
affordances as values furnish one for good or evil. But again such terms themselves 
require challenging, debating and evaluating for often the not so good is expressed as 
good. Also, I require to consider in my account of psychotherapy stocks of knowledge 
and prior knowledge of one's subject area. Knowledge resources held by communities 
are also historically changing and acculturisation processes require continuous 
probing and enquiry as to what effects they have upon individuals especially during 
times of rapid transition such as is occurring at the moment. 
(b) Mediated and Non-Mediated Forms of.Knowledge-ability 
By means of Crook's (1991) radical perspective on contemporary social theorising I 
offer a dual relation between a mediated and non-mediated form of knowledge-
ability, focused on values and the evaluation of values. Crook offers a two-step 
approach to a moral order for society. The first step is an enquiry into the social 
values prevalent at present in society and the second concerns what are the best means 
and methods to evaluate them. Crook wants to steer a middle couse between what he 
considers to be cultural nihilism on the one hand in which there are no moral 
standards and hence no means of objective assessments, and on the other hand an a 
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priori universal moral order which offers only prescriptive standards as to how life 
should be lived for all peoples across all times and places. 
I consider the problem of mediated and non-mediated knowledge in terms of 
critical social theory by examining Bhaskar's (1987) paradigm of psychotherapy in 
terms of what he describes as direct/indirect forms of knowledge. I then consider the 
problem of the non-mediated form of knowledge in terms of Baudrillard's approach to 
social theory. I finally return to the social theorising of Crook to obtain my mediated 
and non-mediated forms of knowledge concerning values and their evaluation and the 
role of ethical knowhow. 
Bhaskar (1987), in line with Habermas (1972), offers a paradigm of 
psychotherapy which is based on Freudian and Marxist principles. The combination 
of such principles allows for a combined social and psychological emancipatory order 
of existence. Bhaskar, especially, maintains that initially knowledge concerning 
psychotherapeutic problems of the person in therapy is not immediately available to 
the person in therapy but has to be deciphered. For this, one requires a mediator in 
terms of an applied scientist who can appeal to causal laws to find out what structures 
underlie the observable phenomena or symptoms of psychological distress. Bhaskar 
puts forward the view that persons in therapy have illusory or distorted beliefs about 
themselves which manifest themselves as observable anxiety symptoms of behaviour 
such as fits of shaking. Bhaskar proposes that the psychotherapeutic problem is not 
solved by dealing directly with the anxiety symptoms, or simply describing them, but 
by identifying the responsible causes of the anxiety. The psychotherapeutic situation 
evolves round a person in therapy Y who wants to, but is unable to perform an act or 
a system S of a class of acts. Scientific realism puts forward the proposition that there 
is a mechanism M blocking or compelling Y to behave in a certain way. General 
explanatory theory T investigates the structure of the blocking mechanism in the 
domain in question under the control of empirical data and research. Causal 
explanations in order to be adequate explanations enquire into the regular relations 
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between observed and unobserved happenings and the mechanism or structures which 
link them. 
The application ofT depends on the agent as well as the therapist. Thus, 
Bhaskar also recognises that during psychotherapy the social events of the life--history 
of the person in therapy alter independently of the therapy process: for the person in 
therapy is subject to contingent events during therapy. For example spouses often 
persuade their partners to go to therapy and during therapy the spouse informs the 
partner that they (the spouse) want a divorce. Knowledge therefore has a dimension of 
being socially produced and is the outcome of social practices. Equally important is 
the fact that Bhaskar also acknowledges the non-cognitive oppressive social 
conditions with regard to the psychological problem of the person in therapy and such 
conditions are not to be exempted from processes of transformation. 
The primary relationship which Bhaskar advocates, however, is not between 
the persop. and their social existence (which includes the alteration of social practices 
through persons acting upon them). The primary relationship is between the structures 
of the mind or society and their generative mechanisms i.e. their tendencies or powers 
to behave in a certain way. For Bhaskar this transfactual activity comprises the real 
basis of causal laws and the events which they "normally-conjuncturally generate". 
In terms of the paradigm of psychotherapy it is the transformation of 
unwanted sources of determination to wanted and needed sources of determination of 
the individual which allows for psychotherapeutic betterment. The relationship is 
founded on what Bhaskar terms scientific realism or his emancipatory version of it -
critical realism. Critical realism is still entailed within the realism in which ultimate 
objects of scientific enq11iry exist and act for the most part independent of the 
enquiry. Critical realism has kinship with the physical laws of nature. This is what he 
terms the intransitive dimension of knowledge which is explanatory but not 
predictive. 
But Bhaskar also realises that although scientists do not create the laws of 
nature, science itself is an historical process and produces knowledge. The latter is 
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what Bhaskar terms transitive knowledge which he stipulates complements 
intransitive knowledge. Both together constitute critical realism which provides for a 
reality that is "structured, differentiating and changing". He maintains that, 
-science must be seen as a social process, irreducible to an individual acquisition, 
whose aim is the production of the knowledge of the mechanisms of the production of 
phenomena in nature. (Bhaskar, 1989: 18) 
For various reasons Bhaskar, however is not able to extend theoretically such 
unwanted determinations of the person in therapy into emancipatory social acts. One 
of these stems from the fact that his social theory is encapsulated within and has as its 
basis a model of the mind. His paradigm of psychotherapy takes into consideration 
the mind as wants and beliefs and having powers to act but these in themselves do not 
achieve action or allow for persons' existence to be socially contextualised. As Harre 
stipulates, actions can exist, paradigmatically only in the reciprocal intentions and 
understanding of more than one person .(Harre,1990:148) Moreover Bhaskar 
stipulates that social existence is primarily pre-given and pre-exists persons and their 
activities. (Bhaskar, 1987) At that level of society there is no possible relationship 
between mental predicates of the mind and institutional practices for they are on 
different space-time dimensions. Kellner (1988) in Post Modernism as a Social 
Theory also considers that such depth psychologies are not theoretically viable in 
historic terms. He maintains that, 
Modernity was the era of Marx and Freud, the era in which politics, culture and 
social life were interpreted as epiphenoma of the economy, or everything was 
interpreted in terms of desire or the unconsciousness. These 'hermeneutics of 
suspicion' employed depth models to demystify reality, to show the underlying 
realities behind appearances, the factors that constituted the facts. (Kellner,1988:246) 
Kellner suggests that such theories have been overtaken by what Baudrillard 
(1983) proposes is happening historically to depth theories of psychology. Baudrillard 
maintains that the two related forms of a depth knowledge can no longer be 
scientifically substantiated. He stipulates that one form of these knowledge-claims has 
"imploded" into the other. There is no longer the polarity between such knowledge-
claims. There is only a one dimensional form of knowledge which is a different form 
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of apparent knowledge and whose origins lie in imitative processes. Imitative 
knowledge is considered scientifically as simulated knowledge. Simulated 
knowledge, in the main, is part of informational systems such as computers. 
Knowledge is no longer produced by persons in social life in which they are involved 
in crafting or creating objects or testing out ideas among peers or behaving badly or 
otherwise. Computer systems simulate social life by first making it abstract and 
numerical and then computer programming it to simulate general patterns of human 
behaviour. In such proposals there is no social theorising occurring about the nature 
of personal and social being. Such theorising is fundamental to any social theory. 
Social theorists, further cannot offer the theoretical means of intervention to allow 
persons to make "things different" in their lives. Nor can such a theory allow for the 
practical intervention of social theory into social existence as Bhaskar ( 1987, 1989) 
advocates. Rather, the computer programme writes its next and next again 
programmes without human intervention. The numerical information is represented 
by a binary system having two variables whose values are either affirmative or 
negative and each cancels the other out. There are no longer claims to truth or falsity 
in which direct experience could be considered as false or illusory or distorted and 
where theories could be considered as making claims to truth based on the symmetry 
between predictability and explanation. There are no longer good and bad social 
values as these cancel each other out and there can be no proper adjudication between 
them. The problem for social existence, according to Baudrillard, is that this 
simulated form ofknowledge has "imploded" into social forms of life. Meaning and 
moral values have collapsed. Forms ofviolence are apparent everywhere on the signs 
of things and there are no longer critical features of knowledge to counter such 
violence. The most psychologically vulnerable groups of people or individuals will 
suffer these ill-effects as they are in any case removed from any of what could be 
either life enhancing features of society or the hypereality of simulacrated or make-
belief manifestations of reality. Although Baudrillard points to nihilistic features of 
society, he does not offer any critical propensity for examining such features of 
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society nor offers any theoretical or social alternatives. There must surely be an 
examination of social values whose signs of violence are everywhere. These signs 
must be available for general acknowledgement and exploration as to their merits and 
demerits. Violence itself could be an indicator of what is problematic in society rather 
than an evil effect of society and its practices. 
I consider my notion of mediated knowledge to be in the tradition of critical 
social theory. Foucault (1980), Crook (1991), Deleuze and Guattari (1990) repudiate 
critical theories which involve a unitary principle such as a reflective self or an idea of 
the unconscious that organises all experience, or forms of causality or predictable 
laws of nature which determine social realities. 
Foucault maintains that epistemes of knowledge are not independent of the 
historic conditions and regimes of power which constitute them. This is equally true 
of economic and adplinistrative institutional concerns as it is of academic discourse. 
Foucault makes specific reference to the discourse of psychotherapy and suggests, 
The problem is not changing people's consciousnesses-or what's in their heads-but 
the political, economic, institutional regime of the productionof truth .... It's ... a matter 
... of detaching the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social,economic and 
cultural, within which it operates at the present time. (Foucault,1980:133) 
In addition Crook's ( 1991) discussion of critical social theory allows me to 
establish a relation between what I have termed mediated knowledge and non-
mediated knowledge with regard to social values. Crook suggests that there has to be 
a way forward between what is considered as an impossible a priori form of 
knowledge with universal standards and processes of evaluations to which all forms 
of knowledge must make reference to and appeal to: and knowledge which is 
considered as nihilistic in which there are no judgmental procedures involved in 
ethical discourses. He maintains, in contrast, to Habermas' (1972) appeal to an 
emancipatory status for knowledge that there is no special status itself to be accorded 
to emancipatory knowledge. What has to be considered are the ways knowledge and 
values are appropriated and put to work. For this to be achieved, he proposes a dual 
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relationship for an enquiry into social values. The first part of the dual relationship is 
a first-order mundane enquiry into social values. The mundane enquiry is an 
empirical enquiry into the social interests of members of society and such an enquiry 
has to engage with the first-order value problems faced by social actors and 
communities. Enquiry can challenge and provoke, as well as support the social values 
it relates to. 
What I suggest is that this form of mundane knowledge is to be considered as 
a non-mediated available form of knowledge pertaining to social values which, as 
Crook suggests, is a mundane enquiry which can engage directly and pragmatically 
with the first order value problems. However, rather than utilising Baudrillard's 
(1983) idea of signs, or Baier's (1985) notion of facts incorporating values I want to 
suggest that values are conveyed in information that pertains to social practices. 
Social practices for a mundane enquiry yield knowledge or information. Such 
knowledge is in an available form for persons to deal with. Persons have to explore 
and familiarise themselves with such available information in society. 
The second part of the dual relation is an orthogonal enquiry into the second 
order of value problems, namely the "value of values". In its radical form, it is not 
dealing with the interests or social values of groups or their members. Rather the 
focus of the second order of enquiry is, according to Crook, the investigation into 
how judgements are made and why certain judgements are agreed to or not. Such 
judgements result in certain theories being taken up into social sciences and other 
theories being excluded. For example, moral theory was included in the early stages 
of the discourse of psychology and has been excluded until very recently when it 
seems to have found a minor place within accounts of psychotherapy and a possible 
place within social psychology. When one is evaluating modernity or the history of 
the social sciences one has to recognise that knowledge is interested and not impartial 
as Habermas (1972), Foucault (1980), and Smail (1993), indicate. 
Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth: that is, the types of 
discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances 
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which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is 
sanctioned ; (Foucault, 1980: 131) 
The dual relationship that Crook considers is one of values (a first order 
enquiry) and the processes of evaluation (a second order enquiry). I maintain that 
knowledge or information regarding values is firstly non-mediated and initiates the 
first order enquiry and then is further examined to discover any hidden obfuscations. 
One thus has an non-mediated form of knowledge regarding values (a first order 
enquiry) but such non-mediated knowledge always demands further investigation. A 
second order of enquiry must be adopted to find out who or what is upholding social 
values and who is making the judgements about these values. One must initiate the 
enquiry by considering the non-mediated forms of values in social practices - what is 
to hand or what is available in the mundane practices of people and then enquire into 
the mediated form. The latter must emerge out of the former. This is my dual relation 
of values. I also propose that evaluators (connoisseurs) and their evaluations of values 
(starting with the non-mediated form of values) co-imply each other. The selection of 
values from social practices (the first order enquiry) simply pre-empts the evaluating 
process (the second order of enquiry). 
(c) "Knowledge-ability" 
I have used the term knowledge-ability as knowledge or information differently from 
the Gibsonian notion of information. The concept of information which Gibson 
( 1966) has made central to his concept of affordances is stimulus information. It is 
information that is already structured in the activity of perception. But the structuring 
process which I require for an account of psychotherapy has to do with the knowledge 
that persons draw upon in the processes of social activities and social practices and 
the reformulation ofknowledge as the outcome of those practices. As Gibson states 
knowledge is not perception but is an extension of perception. (Gibson 1986: 258) 
Such knowledge would include stocks of knowledge, and knowledge involving past 
experiences and "memory traces" for a set of skilled activities. I have similarly not 
drawn upon Reed, (1991) and Rogoff(1990) and Lave's (1988) concept of cognitions 
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requiring social contexts because they also exclude from the notion of cognition such 
knowledge resources which are discursive and used for argumentation. As Reed has 
indicated, Rogoff and Lave consider cognitions in terms of problem solving or task -
related processes of development. Their research proposals involve cognitive task-
related problems or cognitive processes of development in the contexts of social 
settings. Although they do make reference to the variety of contexts which facilitate 
cognitive skills and learning they are concerned with thinking as a cultural product. 
Further, I have not used the term knowledge itself, for it is entailed within 
specific epistemological issues that would not have allowed me the scope to advance 
an account of the practices of psychotherapy (which entail presuppositions and 
assumptions about human nature and human action). Moreover, Giddens' concept of 
knowledgeability as tacit knowledge is in the tradition of social and psychological 
theorising which includes Langer (1992), Polanyi (1967) and Searle (1983). These 
theorists emphasise the concept of tacit knowledge in three ways: either as the ability 
to make tacit inferences; as routinised knowledge with conscious awareness but 
without reflective awareness; and as scripted action. I argue against the privileging of 
tacit knowledge since focusing on it prevents the emphasis on discursive knowledge 
necessary for debate and assessment, and the adjudication between values. What I 
have argued for is some theoretical means to make sense of what are readily available 
social values (as well as their obfuscations) and the skilled means of their evaluation. 
(d) Knowledge-ability as Social Skills 
The concept of skill in psychology was originally considered as conditioned and 
maintained habits. Habits differ from skills in that habits allow for no variation of the 
skill. (eds. Taylor and Wright, 1970) The notion of skill has since come to be 
considered as involving both the subjective organism and the objective social 
environment. Taylor and Wright suggest that a skill, 
must be initiated and directed by both environmental signals and those which are 
generated as a result of the operators' own activity: internal and external feedback .... 
The signals have the character of a field or pattern which, although it may be highly 
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differentiated ... still retains its identity or 'wholeness'. ( eds. Taylor and 
Wright, 1970:325) 
Skills can be defined as abilities that require practice and training (skills 
would be downgraded if not practised). Skills also involves goal achievement and this 
achievement has reference to persons and their social environment Psychology, 
mostly, deal with sensori-motor skills that have application in the laboratory or with 
task-related skills. 
The social character of skills is necessary in a social account of psychotherapy 
and must involve both the content and direction of altered social conduct. Social skills 
models, in general, have been considered in terms of social communication in face-to 
face interaction. Argyle has offered different versions of social skills models which 
include biological bases for skills created activities, reinforcement theory (Argyle, 
1975), rules-related approach to social skills (Argyle, 1983,1984), and a social 
powers model. (Argyle, 1975) He has now introduced these features into an ethogenic 
model of social psychology.(Argyle 1990) His main plea is for a cognitive approach 
in social psychology to be complemented by a model of social interaction. Harre 
(1990) suggests that by introducing the notion of artificial intelligence into his 
cognitive approach, Argyle has thereby severed personal being from social being. 
Harre maintains further that Argyle has considered a conversation model to be one 
which requires empirical investigation rather than making it the principle by which 
social explanations can be established. 
Overall Argyle has given his ethogenic model too broad a basis which leads to 
incompatible psychological principle in his social theory as, for example when a 
concept such as stimulus reinforcement is linked with the notion of intentionality and 
rule-governed conduct. But there are other equally more problematic issues at the 
heart of his model for social psychology. In the main the function.ofhis social skills 
model is that of the control of other people in social interactions. (Argyle, 1975, 
1983) The patterns of interlocking behaviour in Argyle's proposals mean power or 
domination over others in social encounters. In many ways people do need to invest 
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in social skills to psychologically operate in social contexts. But to offer models 
which are predominantly the antithesis of moral conduct suggests a fundamentally 
flawed account of human conduct. Argyle has also underpinned nearly all his 
theorising with what I consider are forms of managed or virtual identities and actual 
identities - in other words a "back and front region" - one for public manifestations of 
behaviour and one for private manifestations. However, these two forms of identities, 
according to Baudrillard (1983), have collapsed into each other giving rise to a single 
counterfeit order of social identity which disallows moral values. 
I prefer instead Roche's (1973) approach.to social skills. This is more 
appropriate to the configuration of persons actively dealing with the nature oftheir 
adverse social environments. Roche suggests that, 
A skill-employing entity necessarily must be social, and equally it necessarily must 
be intentional also .... Thus intentionality is associated with the thesis that a person's 
intentions consciously conform with, or break with ... expectations and pictures which 
he believes others have of how he and people like him, or people 'in his position' 
ought to act". (Roche, I973:298,301) 
Roche's notion of skill is useful for my account of psychotherapy since it 
allows persons to break with expected patterns of conduct if these are psychologically 
damaging and this implies also intentionally intervening in collective social practices. 
For this to occur, one. requires as well as knowledge about social affairs, knowhow as 
to how and when to take moral stances and how and when to intervene in de-
ethicalised relations. 
Brown ( following Putman, 1978 and Polanyi, 1967), maintains that not all 
claims to knowledge can be established by formal theories and that claims to 
knowledge are also embodied in skills. Brown (1990) suggests that judgement or 
evaluation is also a skill which requires prior experience and training. Brown wants to 
steer a course for rationalism between what he considers as foundationalism (which is 
ahistoric and which founds the fixed and unambiguous rules and standards of science) 
and a particular form of relativism in which every one's knowledge-claim has equal 
merit. 
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Brown admits, (as does Roche,1973) that claims to knowledge can be rule-
bound but they cannot always be appealed to in foundational guarantees. Brown also 
maintains that judgements without rules are far from being fallible or arbitrary. 
Rather, judgement is a skill that involves the ability to evaluate a situation, assess the 
evidence, and come to a reasonable decision in which rules of adjudication may not 
be available. Moreover it is a learned ability. It requires ongoing training and 
experience in assessing evidence and attention to the details at hand. This is precisely 
as discussed above what Heaton (1979) as a practising therapist and commentator on 
psychotherapy has suggested in his account of moral therapy. Persons in therapy are 
not to be explained in terms of faulty minds or faulty behaviour. What they, in fact, 
lack are practical judgements and skills as to when and how to assess their social 
situations. For the idea of skilled connoisseurship in connection with ethical 
knowhow, I suggest that, values and evaluations co-imply each other. Like Brown, I 
also suggest that processes of evaluation are skills related. The skill of judging allows 
a person to modify the practice or skill on the basis of his or her judgements. I 
reinforce this idea with the concept of moral exemplars as an "example" of morality. 
Examples or "samples" of morality like any other sampling process requires not just 
an evaluator but a skilled connoisseur, only in this case having ethical knowhow 
about social affairs. 
4 The Notion oflntentionality as an Attribute of Agency 
The idea of intentionality like that of knowledge has been a central topic in 
philosophy. Intentionality is also a central concept in my account of psychotherapy. It 
stands opposed to explanations of the mind involving causes such as are involved in 
the psychoanalytic notions of repressed motives or the structural mechanisms of 
society. (Bhaskar,1987) Moreover it stands opposed to an account of psychotherapy 
considered in terms of passive responses to stimuli. The concept of intentionality in 
my account of psychotherapy is linked into and reinforces the central notion of 
configuration of persons actively altering their social contexts. The notion of 
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intentionality is a key attribute for the alteration of social practices. (Bruner 1982, 
Reed 1989) Traditional philosophical issues concerning the notion of intentionality 
have been formulated around the questi"on as to whether intentionality is a species of a 
causal happening which is then redescribed in action reports or statements. Or 
alternatively, whether intentionality has to do with agency involving the mental 
components of wants and desires or reasons for acting. 
The notion of intention as desires or wants brings with it various conceptual 
problems. According to Brand (1984) if one considers intentions as desires, the 
endpoint can only be considered as satisfaction, whereas the endpoint of intentions is 
fulfilment of action. The key point for an account of psychotherapy is that the latter 
requires the person's own effort and purpose rather than passive happenings to a 
person. Harre, in turn queries the term fulfilment and considers it to be 
philosophically problematic since not all intentions are fulfilled as actions. For there 
are many more intentions than are ever fulfilled, as every one is aware of. Harre 
(1983) also queries Davidson's concept of intentionality. Davidson (1968) considers 
the notion of intentionality as a two-step process: a pro-attitude or a want and a belief 
that the action will be carried out. This pro-attitude initiates the action, and 
redescription of that want occurs in the action itself. Harre maintains that Davidson 
shifts the locus of the power to act from that of psychological necessity to a natural 
necessity in which human agency is reduced to hidden lawfulness. (Harre, 1983: 182)5 
Searle's (1983) views on the notion of intentionality would seemingly have 
more resonances for an account of psychotherapy as social critique involving the 
notion of powers, knowledge and intention. He maintains that the activities pertaining 
to mind require a background of capacities and skills or knowhow which give rise to 
efficacious causality allowing the person to purposefully carry out his or her 
intentional acts. The criticism of Searle's notion of intentionality is that the mental 
aspect of intention i.e. a prior intention is "identical" to what is occurring in the 
observable reportable action i.e. the intention in action. However gifts that are given 
to spouses or partners may not have had the prior intention that the recipient assessed 
82 
in the action itself. The unfolding plots of gothic horror stories also point up the 
schism between prior intentions and observed actions. O'Hear maintains, in addition, 
that there is an over fixation with the "stuff of the mind". For him what should be of 
interest is what people can do, how they react and how generally they themselves go 
about their world. (O'Hear,1985:22I) 
Harre (1983) and Giddens (1984) consider the notion of intentionality as being 
linked to the idea of an ability or capacity to do things. They view it as a "doing" 
concept or a competence /skill requiring knowledge resources. It is not just contained 
within the idea of a mental state or having freedom ofwill to act. To fulfil the 
requirements of a social account of psychotherapy, the attributes of agency such as 
intentionality must be both social and relational as well as involving the idea of 
knowledge and action, or in the case of moral practices, conduct. 
Brentano (1973) is considered to have proffered the idea that intentionality 
takes an object. It also points beyond that object. In other words, intentionality 
specifies something beyond itself and more importantly other than itself and this is a 
correlate in which two terms, subject and object, are involved. An advancement of 
this form of correlate is that the second term also has a specifying function. Heft 
(1989) suggests, following Gibson (1966), that (wo)man and his or her environment 
can only be considered in relational terms. He maintains that the relation occurs 
through the notion of intentional goal-like acts. These are situated with regard to both 
the functional characteristics of the environment confronting the individual in terms 
of what it specifies and in relation to the purposeful information seeking behaviour of 
the individual. The social environment is not specifiable independent of the 
individual. Intention therefore is not solely to do with the self-direction of goal-like 
acts of the autonomous individual (such as those acts brought into teleological 
explanations by Charles Taylor,1967) .6 
Heft (1989) following Gibson (1966) suggests that the stream ofbehaviour 
arising from the interaction with the environment is redirected and shunted by the 
intentional acts of the individual. Reed (1989) like Heft indicates that the notion of 
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intentionality involves both objects and subjects and both require a social setting. 
Intentions are, again, not discrete mental events. For as Reed suggests "intentions are 
spread across mind and body, information and ecological and social settings." 
The key point for an account of psychotherapy as social critique is that 
intentionality as a notion has to do with alteration of social practices by an agental 
personhood. Reed provides this requirement in his social theorising by commenting 
that, 
the theory proposed here is that, within any real world task context, the emergence 
of intentions is the growth of the ability to select specific affordances for the observer 
to become aware of and to use. This selection process operates on all kind of 
affordances in all kinds of situations, from the simplest to the most complex. 
(Reed, 1989:45) 
For Reed the perceived meaning of intentions is the growth of the ability to select 
specific affordances for the person to become aware of and to use. There are two 
factors relating to Reed's conceptualisation of intentionality necessary for my account 
of psychotherapy. One is that I use the notion of affordances as social values or moral 
examples or "samples" which the person in therapy selects from his or her social 
practices and in the process of "sampling" further refines the selection. The gist of the 
proposal is that persons intentionally select social values from what their social 
practices afford but also evaluate and continuously assess them. Secondly, the notion 
of intentional acts, especially, has regulatory and constraining features due to the 
processes of discrimination. Intentional acts are being ·differentiated, and alternatives 
are being systematically eliminated. The discrimination occurs in conjunction with 
what values the social practices specify and what is intentionally selected. The 
discrimination and selection processes of values pertaining to social practices are two 
constraining and refining procedures which co-imply each other. This is a two way 
process involving the person's selection and what is being refined in the selection 
process but it is also a process involving continuity as there is a continuous stream of 
transactions occurring between the social practices of the social environment and the 
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individual which are being systematically modified and altered. The notion of a two-
way intentional process allows for social practices to be altered as people interact 
with each other. 
Intentionality is a key notion in an account of psychotherapy as social critique 
whose remit is to allow for the values which pertain to social practices to be other 
than they are and which requires the attributes of knowledge-ability and powers as · 
capabilities. Intentionality is also linked to the other concepts in the configuration of 
persons and their social practices and it is linked into deliberate and deliberated 
actions rather than routine actions that persons are not reflectively aware of in their 
monitoring processes. As Reed (1989) and Bruner ( 1982) suggest the notion of 
intentionality requires conscious effort. This is in line also with Harre's comments. 
Value accrues to human beings just in so far as they are seen to be intentional 
actors because by that alone they can lay claim to personhood, to a place in a moral 
order. This is not because they are then seen to be responsible for good actions, but 
because of the respect due to beings who are capable of planning and acting. 
(Harre, 1983 :272) 
The quotation from Harre may seem somewhat cryptic and it tends to 
overemphasise the notion of a competent being but it also underlines the idea that 
living life morally demands a knowhow about how the world operates and 
intentionally redirecting and achieving ways to act differently within it. 
Overseas students who came to study in The U.K. often suffered from a reactive 
syndrome of depression. The reasons that induced such depression were a mix of a 
lack of financial funding, substandard accommodation and intermittent racial abuse. 
They also were part of an academic elite when younger, and later on they had to 
compete for scarce academic places. Governments also could take away scholarships 
on political grounds as well as academic ones. The parents of overseas students often 
had to put up a financial bond for their offspring to study abroad and if the students 
failed academically the bond remained with the government and sometimes the 
parents' home was taken away as part of the bond. In addition, their home culture was 
often altering economically and politically. 
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All of this induced high levels of anxiety and depression as well as broken sleep 
patterns and lack of energy and psychological withdrawal from their academic 
communities and their own national communities. To explain psychological 
symptoms of distress in terms of repressed motives based on an individualistic 
account of psychotherapy could not provide these students with the means to deal 
with their psychological problems. A more psychologically beneficial approach was 
to explore the knowledge or information and values they themselves selected from 
both host and home social environments. It was an enquiry into which values they 
selected from which culture and which had a use-value in terms of moral conduct 
with, where relevant, its political implications. They had to be encouraged to select 
certain social values pertaining to their immediate social environment which fitted in 
with what they believed to be a different manner of living. After that there was a need 
to find out what conduct could be intentionally fulfilled, or not, due to their 
depressive states. Such an approach involved a continuous process of narrowing down 
the alternatives for them while offering them the advantage of possibilities afforded 
by their social environment. When they intentionally altered their environment as 
they interacted with it, the goal attainment which emerged out of the interaction gave 
them more control over their situation. This occurred as a feedback process between 
the person and his social environment in the context of action. The affordances or 
use-values in the social environment gradually allowed for a growing sense of what to 
look for and what to make use of in their social environment which would be 
conducive to psychotherapeutic betterment. Such a "growing sense" implies 
knowhow or knowledge-ability and as Roche (1973) maintains "the attribute of 
intentionality is entwined in a non-solipsistic attribute of sociality in the concept of a 
skill-user." 
5 Moral Agency 
My proposal for the notion of moral agency starts with the Vygotskian idea that 
human existence is on two planes, one social and one personal. The latter refers to the 
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higher-order mental functions. The child's cultural development appears twice. 
Firstly, it occurs on the social level and then secondly, on a personal cognitive level. 
Transformation occurs from external social existence considered as collective speech 
reports to inner existence involving personal speech reports (child talking to her or 
himself and using indexical pronouns) through a process of intemalisation 
(Vygotsky, 1979:52). Harre gives a rendering of a Vygotskian two plane model as a 
duality between personhood and selfhood. He considers the primary structure of 
human existence being that of conversations having rule-related grammatical 
structures. For the intentionality of actions and talk are interpreted within the 
framework of the meanings of social interactions. Persons as social individuals are 
locations in the primary structure and so are identifiable by public criteria. The main 
point for Harre is that there are no inner versus outer manifestations of human 
existence. The primary structure is formed around a concept of personhood. This is 
the basis for my use of the term "person in therapy"_? However, the public criterion 
which I require for psychotherapy as social critique, needs to have much more· 
political force than that envisaged by semantics and grammatical syntaxes. They 
involve civic and political collectivities with their debating procedures rather than 
speech-acts. 
The Vygotskian and Harrean concept of the person does not exclude the notion 
of the self or individual. The properties of the primary structure of a social world once 
appropriated by an individual as a secondary structure is modified to a greater or 
lesser degree by an intrinsic personal process. The Harrean notion of self consists of 
the unified organisation of experiences (perceptions,feelings and beliefs )and the 
indexical nature of language (the child learning to refer to him or herself as "I" and 
being a "you" for other people). The notion of the self is not just a unifying centre to 
prevent the flow of experiences occurring in a state of non-permanent flux. It also 
involves an acquired identity transmitted from social practices, conscious awareness 
which involves the monitoring of one's thoughts, and agency which involves 
capabilities, decisions, and actions. These three aspects of the self give rise to a 
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unified centre of being in which people experience themselves within a unified 
process of consciousness, point of view and action. I offer a less well defined notion 
of the self than Harre has offered ,since I am not so much involved with the structures 
of conscious awareness as with those aspects of being that have certain attributes that 
are species-specific which one must have if one is to beneficially alter human 
situations. I require a notion of a core self enduring over time that will intentionally 
direct activities and be morally accountable for them. I make the idea of agency entail 
all three dimensions of the Harrean self, albeit with different emphases. Rather than 
agency being one of the three dimensions of the self, agency has three attributes of its 
own: intentionality, knowledge-ability and capability. I also want to make the notion 
of social and personal beings have social and personal histories - in other words 
autobiographies- rather than an acquired identity. Nearly all case-records of the 
profession of psychotherapy are formulated out of autobiographical case-histories and 
not acquired identities. I achieve my notion of autobiography by allowing the person 
to have a social identity but conceptualising it as "identity and difference" as 
discussed above. This involves historic continuities and discontinuities in which 
every moment ofbecoming is simultaneously co-extensive with successive moments 
of becoming and discontinuities in the second or third moment arise out of prior and 
future continuities. (Deleuze and Guattari,1990) This idea is best illustrated at 
transitional points in lived existence. For example, the boy becomes other than he is 
in terms of manhood i.e. he has an identity in time through an autobiographical 
history. These autobiographical histories have confluences with other persons 
occurring in the contexts of social activities. This is illustrated in the Barmitzvah 
celebration of boys reaching puberty. The boy does not acquire a fixed social identity 
but an identity through time. He joins the Barmitzvah celebration with peers, for 
example cousins, who are at present having their own celebrations along with those 
who will have their celebration soon and those who have had their celebration in the 
recent past (as his own celebration will soon be). 
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However there are other aspects of Harre's own conceptualisation of 
autobiography that are important for the formulation of my account of psychotherapy. 
The first important point with regard to the Harrean autobiography is his emphasis on 
the notion of capabilities and potentials, a view which is reinforced by Jensen. (1990) 
The second important point is that autobiography is not considered as narrative but as 
social activities. Barthes (1985) stipulates that linguistics furnish the structural 
analysis of narrative. Rather, I require concepts which can be incorporated into moral 
conduct and Jensen's notion of autobiography as the "self in activities" underwrites 
moral conduct for me. A moral decision is made as to which communities one has 
solidarity with and which not, and what one is prepared or not prepared to fight for 
(or take moral stands about). It is through such involvements that moral agency can 
have viability. 
I believe that Jensen (along with Hampshire,1979, and Guignon,1993) 
integrates a moral theory with a theory of psychotherapy but in the process of doing 
so splits personal existence from social existence. In addition social existence is a 
constant. Both these features disallow the theoretical means for persons to modify and 
alter their social practices. For example Jensen suggests that, 
the self is ... the function of activities as conducted in interpersonal relations,and a 
function of our realization of particular ideas and values. (Jensen, 1990:261) 
What occurs within these three social theories is that persons are obtaining their 
ideals from social practices such as expected rule-borne norms and rituals which do 
not alter. It is always a from-the environment (social ritual or moral prescription)- to 
the person i.e. It is always a from-to situation. The person never seems, in turn, to 
modify or alter the social practices of his or her social environment. Those persons, 
who have had emotionally distorted parenting and who have written about it in their 
autobiographies or memoirs could not have survived psychologically if they had not 
in some ways modified and altered their social contexts as teenagers. Making social 
practices a constant in terms of ritual behaviour or other social practices reveals 
another problem. That is the mediating terms between social existence and personal 
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existence all belong to this 'from-to' phenomenon; namely intemalisation, 
appropriation and realisation. For Laing (1982), et al., these mediating concepts have 
no connecting principles. 
What is required is not just a notion of social being and personal being linked 
through some mediating propensity but the acknowledgement that personal being co-
implies social being. I have offered the idea of co-implication via the notions of 
intentionality, knowledge-ability and personal and social powers, as well as through 
the notions of values, involving the sampling and selection of social values along with 
their evaluation. If there are no appropriate or potential social values pertaining to 
one's social practices available, then the emphasis must be (a) on the transformation 
of one's social practices or (b) a search elsewhere for other possibilities, a to-from-
situation. For both (a) and (b) he or she requires the attributes of intentionality, 
powers and knowledge-ability. For an account of psychotherapy one must be able to 
select what the social environment offers as worthwhile exemplars (a from-to-
situation) as well as modifying or transforming that social environment (a to-from-
situation). Heft (1989),following Shorter (1983), suggests that, 
These environmental modifications, in tum, transform the surround, which may 
influence the individual, and so on in a reciprocal manner .... As a result the individual 
may take an active role in fashioning his environment in important ways. These 
ongoing reciprocal exchanges form an essential part of the individual's psychosocial 
history and, consequently, serve as the foundation from which subsequent 
development proceeds. (Heft, 1989:9) 
6 Conclusion 
The discussion in this chapter involves ways to overcome problems inherent in 
certain individualistic approaches in psychology, e.g. the mind-behaviour problem in 
traditional concepts of intentionality. lfpersons are to use intentional strategies to 
overcome their social constraints, such traditional concepts have to be considered in 
relational terms that involve both social and personal being. I have tried to avoid for 
my account of psychotherapy as social critique, problems of knowledge-claims which 
have to do with mechanisms that are not directly available for investigation such as is 
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represented in repressed consciousness or the causal mechanisms that structure 
economic interests and their effects in society. I have avoided aligning my account 
with depth explanations but have, also, avoided aligning my account with a 
Baudrillardian form of simulated knowledge. I have offered a different approach 
through the notion of mediated and non-mediated knowledge-ability. These two 
forms of knowledge or ethical knowhow have reference to persons as evaluators, 
evaluating their social practices as they interact with them. I have indicated that the 
evaluation process is a skilled process in which there is ongoing feedback It is a 
regulating systematic process. I have used the notion of values (pertaining to social 
practices) and evaluation (person evaluating) akin to the Gibsonian concept of 
affordances as a two way process. Where he has proposed invariances underlying 
affordances I have emphasised a regulatory process evolving from the skills involved 
in evaluating. 
I have used Harre's concept of powers to underwrite the notion of competencies 
which are required in skill-related activities. However I have made his concept of 
powers into a more political phenomenon by using the Giddensian concept of the 
dialectic of control. I have found Harre(1990) and Jensen's(1990) proposals for the 
notion of self, personhood and moral agency very useful for my account. There is a 
tendency, though ,in their proposals, for social being and personal being to lack a 
connecting propensity ,or personal being to be immersed within conversational 
practices. (Harre 1983) However in comparison to Deleuze and Guattari(1990) as 
well as Foucault (1980), Jensen and Harre do offer a form of moral selfhood that can 
direct moral activities, whereas the other three only allow for a contingent self formed 
out of two arbitrary happenings or contingently historic occurrences. 
I have given a relational account of psychotherapy involving the configuration 
of moral agents with the ·attributes of intentionality, powers and knowledge-ability all 
of which are necessary for persons to transform their social practices as they interact 
with them. I have also attempted to relate the three attributes of powers ,knowledge-
ability and intentionality by indicating that each of the three requires to be 
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complemented by the other. These attributes are not instrumental competencies and 
skills but skills involving ethical knowhow. The skill is involved, also, in the dialectic 
of ~ontrol in which persons in therapy have the moral agency to act back upon the 
world and in some small way transform it through the taking of moral stances and the 
enactment of moral conduct. 
Notes 
I. In line with the clustering of the attributes which I offer, Harre suggests that a 
general psychology of social action requires knowledge as a necessary 
component of competencies and capabilities. (Harre,1983:54) Further Russell 
(1984) comments that any notion of intentionality is underwritten by cognitive 
processes otherwise there can be no intentional acts. Furthermore Giddens 
(1984) considers intentions as capabilities and also that capabilities require 
knowledge in their performances. 
2. There are two areas of Harre and Secord's (1972) paradigm of a psychology 
centred on their notion of powers which need to be extended. One is a 
recognition of Lewin's (1938, 1951) concept of "powers field" as a social 
phenomenon in which the source of a power field can be a person and involve 
the individual's social life-space. The other is Harre and Madden's (1975) 
notion of the field of potentials. Lewin 's psychological theory is underwritten 
by tension reducing psychological needs of negative and positive valences 
which have affinities with magnetic forces of repulsion and attraction, Harre 
and Madden's concept of the fields of potentials offers a more contemporary 
expression of the terms forces and powers. The term force no longer means an 
actual exertion, but a potential or power. "The fundamental entity is a single 
unified field in perpetual process of change as its structures modulate from 
one distribution of a certain value to another". The field of potential is a 
relational term. Moreover Harre and Madden consider the field as a source of 
action which has to have "something" of the character of an agent.( Harre and 
Madden,1975:176). The line of thought to develop a new paradigm for 
psychotherapy is (a) Lewin's emphasis on both psychological and social 
features of power fields but (b) conceptualised within Harre's fields of 
potentials. 
3. See Archer on the Giddensian problem of the relationship between micro- and 
macro-practices.(Archer 1986:75) 
4. Giddens (1984) proposes that the level and nature of "penetration" that actors 
have of the conditions of system reproduction depends on four factors. The 
means of access actors have to knowledge in virtue of their social location; the 
modes of articulation of knowledge; circumstances relating to the validity of 
belief-claims taken as "knowledge", and factors to do with the means of 
dissemination of available knowledge. 
5. Natural necessity differs from logical necessity. Natural necessity for Harre 
and Madden (1975), and Bhaskar (1979) involves the concept of generative 
mechanisms and powerful particulars and their effects. It is an empirical 
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relation based on the laws of nature and not a logical relation between what 
needs to be explained, its mode of explanation and the explanation itself. 
6. The behaviour of persons is established by laws in terms of which an event 
occurring is held to be dependent on that event being required for some end. 
(Taylor, 1967) 
7 An important feature of my account of psychotherapy is the term "person in 
therapy". It has been chosen in contradistinction to the term patient or client 
and is derived in certain respects from the Harrean notion of personhood. The 
term patient has associations with the non-agency of passive beings within a 
medical model of psychotherapy. The term client has associations - even 
moreso today with the business or professional world as a client who is 
offered a private consultancy, out of which the owner of the business makes 
money. In contrast the most important facet of the term "person in therapy" is 
the notion of civic and public personhood with civic and public accountability. 
Persons in therapy develop the skills of social existence by participating in 
and assessing public conduct. 
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Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 Micro-Conduct in An Account of Psychotherapy 
1. Introduction 
2. The "Two Worlds" of The Person in Therapy 
3. Transformational Activity 
4. Moral Exemplars 
5. Moral Conduct 
6. A Relational and Developmental Approach to Micro-Conduct and 
Psychotherapy 
7. Case-Studies 1-2 
8. Conclusion 
1 Introduction 
This chapter offers a different theoretical approach to an account of psychotherapy. It 
is centred on a relational and developmental approach to social interactions. It is 
based on the belief that the psychological problem of the person in psychotherapy 
arises out of previous and sustained or present problematic social interactions. The 
theoretical substance of psychotherapy, therefore, needs to be grounded in the means 
to counteract existing problematic social relationships and to offer a different focus on 
human conduct. 
The profession of psychotherapy itself is underwritten by large amounts of 
government or personal finance in the training of psychotherapists in the development 
of (as well as demanding professional standards for) interpersonal skills. These 
interpersonal or interactionist skills are considered necessary for the psychological 
development of the person in therapy.l If good interpersonal relationships between 
therapist and the person in therapy are considered important theoretical grounds for 
human development (or specifically for psychotherapeutic betterment) it seems odd to 
theoretically exclude the modes of ongoing interaction between the person in therapy 
and his or her colleagues and friends etc. 
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Most persons who come to psychotherapy have been involved in the kind of 
social relationships that have gone badly wrong for them in psychological terms (with 
the effects being physical and/or emotional). But psychological problems and their 
remedy are not simply to do with the reduction of the psychological effects of anxiety 
or depression (expressed in bodily symptoms or the manifestation and 
acknowledgement of some inner fear). People's anxiety and depression seem very 
often, nowadays, to be a function of social relationships at any one time. A paradox is 
occurring in which the social transactions of persons are psychologically 
unsatisfactory but when they do withdraw from certain social interactions they have 
high levels of anxiety, brought about by feelings of abandonment and isolation. This 
is not just to_do with only the break up of intimate relations but with other forms of 
relationships. I found also, rather than states of anxiety or depression being the 
presenting problem that the latter was increasingly to do with present interactivities 
with others - some with intimates and some not. 
According to Bauman (1990), Giddens (1990), Macintyre (1992) and Smail 
(1993) social relationships have psychologically and morally deteriorated due to 
certain social conditions pertaining in contemporary society.2 Giddens (1990) and 
Bauman (1990) point out that there-embedding nature of friendships with the 
institutionalisation of loyalty and trust no longer holds. The opposite idea of a friend 
now is being instituted. For Giddens this involves the notion of'acquaintance' or even 
'someone I don't know'. Persons in therapy who withdrew from inadequate relations 
of friendships, would then have good reasons to believe that they were being 
psychologically abandoned. Bauman can offer another dimension to this in his 
suggestion that the "stranger" often now masquerades as a friend. He terms this the 
"alien neighbour" who has a set of techniques for de-ethicalising social interactions. 
Far 'fro~ moralizing' human life, modem society has failed abominably to replace 
the moral impulse which the process of modernization defused and marginalised. 
(Bauman ,1990;35) 
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What I propose for an account of psychotherapy is that the moral dimension of 
social interactions should be its central focus. Psychotherapeutic problems, past and 
present, can always be defined within a moral principle be they child abuse or other 
forms of abuse. Moral abuse can never be excluded from the diagnosis of 
psychotherapeutic problems. What one requires in social transactions is for a person, 
including the person in therapy to courageously take moral stands if moral abuses are 
occurring within social interactions. The goal of the therapist is to offer the person in 
therapy the means to do this and the means by which they can alter their social 
contexts through the processes of their interaction. This involves ethical knowhow 
about contemporary social practices and also a recognition that one is oneself 
inscribed within those practices. The title "psychotherapy as social critique "is a 
recognition of the two social environments of the "two worlds" of the person in 
therapy. This refers to both the therapy environment and his or her own social 
environments. I indicate in section two that these worlds obviously bear some relation 
to each other as well as having differences. The conceptualisation of most accounts of 
psychotherapy however concentrates on the one, the therapy environment while 
excluding the other. I argue that contemporary social predicaments must be described 
and explained as well as how they are particularised within psychological 
predicaments. 
In the third section I consider the linkage between the "two worlds" of the 
person in therapy through the concept of "transformation points" and its functions in 
the development of psychotherapeutic betterment. Transformation points are basically 
the therapeutically useful interjections or interruptions that any therapist makes in the 
dialogical exchange between herself or himself and the person in therapy. In my 
account of psychotherapy the "contents" of these points have to do with social values. 
The transformation points structure and regulate and direct the therapeutic processes. 
For an account of psychotherapy as critique they are not solely interjections but 
represent the "switches" that occur in therapeutic interaction between the therapy 
environment and the person's own social environment. Transformation points 
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represent the intersection between the procedures of psychotherapy and the 
procedures involved in transforming or altering one's social existence. The fourth 
section of this chapter is entitled, moral exemplars. These are defined as the range of 
appropriate worthwhile and socially "competent samples" of moral conduct. Moral 
exemplars involve the evaluation of values debated by both the therapist and the 
person in psychotherapy and involve the skills of ethical knowhow as regulatory 
functions which order one's own and others' existence. In the fifth section ,entitled 
moral conduct, I examine two interactional models of social psychology whose remit 
is to consider that social psychology is theoretically a moral enterprise. But I suggest 
that the terms that are used and the modes of human development which are proposed 
do not theoretically allow for persons to develop through their moral interactions. In 
the fifth section I argue for a relational and developmental account of micro-conduct 
that is grounded in moral values. Psychotherapeutic development comes out of 
particular forms of moral interactivities. 
Section 7 of this chapter offers two case-studies. They are illustrations of the 
main ideas incorporated into an account of psychotherapy as social critique. 
2 The "Two Worlds" of the Person in Therapy 
The theory and practice of psychotherapy is unique in that the person who is "in 
therapy" belongs to two worlds, namely the micro-world of the therapy environment 
with its practices and procedures for psychotherapeutic betterment and the micro-and 
macro-world of their social and work environments. The development of skills for 
living occurs in the therapy interview room through the therapeutic processes, but 
these skills are relevant for the world external to the interview room. In all other 
activities as for example learning to type, the skills of typing, as Heft (1989) 
indicates, implicate the structural characteristics of the objects utilised in the 
performance of the action and the structural characteristics of the body that engages 
with these social objects. It is a cyclic process that has reference to the operator of the 
task and what is accomplished in the task. Both operator and task co-imply each other 
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as for example in the goal directed act of typing and finishing off a letter. But the 
skills on how to live that the therapist imparts in the therapeutic procedures to the 
person in therapy are not demonstrative in the same way. The skills of living are 
applicable and effected in the social environment external to the world of therapy in 
which the therapist is almost never involved. Accounts of psychotherapy can never 
just be a model of psychotherapy concerned with the procedures of therapy but must 
involve the two worlds of the person in therapy. 
In nearly all accounts of psychotherapy there is a theoretical separation with 
regard to the therapy environment and the social environment in which the 
psychological problem originated ,and in which it must be countered and rectified. It 
is as if there are two parallel worlds. This applies in any cathartic account of 
psychotherapy. The technical inducement and measurement of cathartic processes 
becomes the raison d'etre of psychotherapy procedures. The universal problematic 
social environments of partners, family and colleagues and especially lack or loss of 
them which occasioned these feelings and emotions are made theoretically residual to 
psychological explanations and psychotherapeutic procedures. 3 Contrary to this, are 
those adherents and commentators on radical traditions in psychotherapy, such as 
Buss. (1979) Buss offers an approach to psychotherapy that deals with the concepts 
of psyche and society where society and its constraints are recognised as the 
determinants and influences upon the psyche and the cause of psychotherapeutic 
difficulties. He has not considered the therapy world and the role of psychotherapist 
within that world with their professional experience and knowledge. I would suggest 
also by not considering the micro-conduct of the therapist he ignores the fact that the 
therapist themselves could be knowledge resources of such social institutional 
constraints. Further such radical models of psychotherapy ignore the skills and 
experience of the therapist in promoting and developing the psychotherapeutic 
abilities of persons in therapy so that the latter can and do make a difference to their 
everyday institutional or interpersonal constraints. One must consider the micro-
environment of the therapy world and the micro-world ofthe persons in therapy 
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external to the therapy world. The concept of the critique of social environments in an 
approach to psychotherapy cannot be taken without reference to psychotherapeutic 
concepts, practices and goals. 
The two terms, psychotherapy and society are necessary for an account of 
psychotherapy (society in this chapter refers to micro-conduct between friends, kith 
or kin, or other relationships). These two environments do not necessarily collapse 
into each other but have meaning and value only if they underwrite each other. What 
is required, essentially are concepts that can intersect the two worlds of the person in 
therapy. Such concepts have to be representative of both a psychotherapeutic 
approach and a recognition of the place of social critique in the discourse of 
psychotherapy. 
3 Transformational Activity 
The term transformation points is touched on by Giddens in his social theorising 
regarding society and its institutional social practices. Giddens converts the 
mathematical term, transformation points into social structural relations. An example 
of the latter has to do with private property as a cluster of rights of ownership. Such 
structural relations become translated into factors of control such as managerial 
control or industrial authority. Transformation points mark the "point" where social 
practices intersect with such authorities and the use of powers of control at these 
points. (Giddens, 1984) However there are obvious differences between Giddens' 
conversion of the term transformation points and the way I require to use these points 
to bridge the two worlds of the person in therapy. 
Transformation points have several functions. Transformation points have to 
do with both therapeutic procedures as well as providing the intersection between 
these procedures and the reformulated social practices or those social practices in the 
process of reformulation by the person in therapy. I have used the notion of 
transformation points to indicate that these are the points of therapeutic activity where 
therapeutic betterment is most likely to occur. 
99 
They are equivalent to the interventions or interruptions that the therapist 
makes with regard to the narrated contents of the social autobiography of the person 
in therapy: The therapist "cuts into" or"breaks into" the flow of the autobiographical 
information offered by the person in therapy. The therapist controls the flux-like 
situation and judges what should be the interventions or transformation points and 
when the interventions should occur in the process of achieving psychological 
betterment of the person in therapy. The interventions or transformation points 
involve the nature ofthe "contents" and timing of the intervention. They also include 
either encouragement by the therapist or psychologically distancing oneself from the 
person in therapy in order that he or she at certain points can take more control of the 
therapeutic activity. They involve the skill of probing and they also incorporate the 
notion of repetition in order to reinforce certain issues. They also involve giving 
advice and negotiations regarding the use of appropriate moral exemplars. 
The therapist makes use of transformation points at the points most likely for 
psychotherapeutic betterment to occur. If the interventions are psychotherapeutically 
ineffective at a particular point ,they are there, though, as "markers" for future 
possibilities in the continuity of psychological betterment. 
The regulation of these transformation points although part of the therapist's 
profe~sional skills and judgement is formed out of the ongoing activities between the 
therapist and the person in therapy. The therapist intercedes in the flow of the 
autobiographical narrative history of the person in therapy at the transformational 
points and imparts or offers what he or she would consider a range of appropriate 
social values. The person in therapy debates and evaluates the appropriateness of 
these values for his or her own social contexts. The therapist directs, redirects and 
structures the therapeutic interviews by means of such transformation points towards 
more personally enhancing moral practices for the person in therapy to enact. The 
contents and contexts of the transformation points themselves, altering and becoming 
different as a result of the dialectic social interchange and in turn such exchanges are 
altering the contents and contexts of the dialectic exchange. Transformation points 
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directing and being products of such exchanges are part of the regulatory structuring 
process of psychotherapy through which the systematised development of 
psychotherapeutic betterment can occur. 
Transformation points in an account of psychotherapy as social critique fits 
into the overall configuration of persons and their social environments, with special 
reference to the notion of alteration of the latter. Transformation and its specifics in 
transformation points are one of the essential aspects for the idea of the configuration 
of persons and their social context. Transformation of one's social practices at the 
transformation points cannot occur without the relational attributes of agency, namely 
intentionality, knowledge-ability and social and personal powers. This has reference 
to both the therapist and the person in therapy. These attributes too are necessary to 
systematically control, direct and regulate the procedure of psychotherapy and are 
the enabling propensities of any transformation. Transformation points are the link 
between the two worlds of the person in psychotherapy and occur at the points where 
one world intersects with another. But in an account of psychotherapy as critique the 
implications are that the contents of these transformation points as social values have 
both a diagnostic and transformative propensity and hence take on the role of social 
critique. They are open themselves for critique, and enquiry into their efficacy in the 
production of psychotherapeutic betterment. 
Transformation points also differentiate and regionalise one account of 
psychotherapy from another through the contents and the ongoing methodological 
procedures and constraints of particular psychotherapies. My account of 
psychotherapy sets it apart from Rainwater's (1989) notion of self-actualisation 
processes which are considered as reflexive processes of flux - or a development of 
self in which the person reflexively (intrinsically self-referential) constructs his or her 
life history as an ongoing series of "moments". Theoretically both the social dialectic 
exchanges occurring between therapist and person in therapy and therapeutic 
interventions which direct that exchange are missing from her accounts of 
psychotherapy. The notion of transformation points incorporated into the dialectical 
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exchange sets it apart, also from Wolpe's (1958) systematic desensitisation 
programmes in which there is a discrete arithmetic ranking of a listing of a hierarchy 
of fears. It also sets it apart from Heron's discrete six categories of intervention taught 
in the training of trainee therapists.4 These approaches also do not allow 
theoretically for the transformation of social contexts to be a continuous process and 
product in which future transformations emerge out of the previous ones with the 
transformation points characterising and regulating the psychotherapeutic process-
with the rider that these transformation points occurring within social contexts 
theoretically require the notion of agency as well as that of the dialectic interchange. 
Other differences in psychotherapeutic approaches can be established in the 
timing of interventions. In general therapists who use cathartic approaches in 
psychotherapy make the interventions early on in the procedures to both reduce 
psychological tension and prevent psychological blockage of emotion. 5 
The contents also of the transformation points along with the timing 
differentiates psychotherapy as social critique from other accounts of moral therapy. 
For example in an account of psychotherapy as critique early discussions would be 
about the social values in one's proximate social contexts and later ones would refer 
to icons or archetypes of social values that condition the micro-conduct of everyday 
life. 
4 Moral Exemplars 
Moral exemplars are part of the broader concept of social values which are considered 
as value-laded rather than value-free. Crook (1991) endorses Smith's (1988) approach 
to social values. She, too, does not wish to be identified with either a moral order of 
universal values with universal standards that are valid across all time and cultures or 
a form of nihilism where there as been a "collapse ofvalues". Moreover she believes 
that everyone's decision about social values cannot have equal merit and there must 
be a means of evaluation between values which results in some values being more 
morally enhancing than others. She, like others such as Baier, rejects the fact- value 
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dichotomy on the grounds that, when values are not prescriptive there does not 
require to be a logical separation between facts and values. 6 
Like Baier (1985) she believes that there has, in fact, to be a continuity of 
values across discourses and the fact-value separation obscures the problematisation 
of values within and across discourses. 
From a different perspective, Macintyre (1992) believes that values and their 
collective evaluations and standards have been eliminated from both moral theory and 
moral life in preference for values which have to do with individual choices or 
preferences. 
The notion of moral values which I propose also runs counter to those 
accounts in social psychology as for example Shotter's(1990), and in psychotherapy 
as for example Newman 's(1991).They both firstly oppose value-free accounts of 
psychology and psychotherapy such as behaviourism with its adherence to laws of 
nature. But they secondly place moral values, within a rule-regulated normative 
conventional social discourse where the standards have to do with agreements 
regarding meanings rather than values. 
Baier asks, 
do we need normative theories, theories to tell us what to do, in addition to theories 
that present to us the world in which we are trying to do it. Theories tell us what the 
world is like, and we need to know that if we are to act successfully in it, either to 
maintain something in it or to change it. (Baier, 1985:232,233) 
She believes along with Crook and Smail that moral values involve an empirical 
enquiry and empirical justification to determine their use in social·affairs. She is also 
of the opinion as well that moral theory instead of influencing the assumptions that 
certain discourses hold has become entaiied mimetically within such discourses. 
There is the meditation, the examination of conscience, the confession .And now 
there is cost-benefit analysis, moral philosophy imitating the accountant and the 
merchant, and game- theoretical approaches .... if, we are to imitate, to be aware of 
why we choose the model we do. (Baier, 1985:241) 
103 
However, I have had to find a place for social values within an account of 
psychotherapy which allows for the psychotherapeutic development and betterment 
of the person in therapy. Social values, too, must form part of a relational and 
developmental configuration of persons and their social contexts. This can be 
achieved by considering social values as moral exemplars and defining moral 
exemplars in a particular way as "examples of' or "samples of'. The best way to 
focus on this suggestion is to consider exemplars involved in the processes of 
"sampling". The idea of sampling involves both a sampler and the samples to be 
evaluated and the one co-implies the other. The sampler in any craft exhibition 
involves a connoisseurship or skilled person in the judgement of the samples. He or 
she are more often than not involving his or her judgements with other connoisseurs. 
His or her main task is that of selection and evaluation which involves discrimination 
and differentiation as a refining process. As indicated in chapter 3, skills provide a 
regulatory function that involves progressive feedback in refining and directing the 
procedures in the goal orientated task. This process is undeiwritten also by Reed's 
(1989) notion of intentional selection of social affordances~ thereby eliminating other 
social affordances. The intentional selection is a two way regulating process between 
practitioner and the practice that one becomes skilful at. The information offered in 
social values acts as a constraining and regulating propensity as it eliminates other 
values. The person as a skilled evaluator as time goes on more ~apidly picks up such 
information specified in social affordances. It is a goal directed task which involves 
~ 
both.the sampler and what is being sampled. Intentionally selecting t from x, y, z 
means that t differs from x, y, z and the selection oft eliminates other alternatives and 
alters the course ofthe activity. The "sample" is not an instantiation of a law or 
representative of an ideal type that has no concrete representation in the mundane 
world but it is an exemplar which is the outcome of an intentional and constraining 
process of selection and assessment. But the point, though, of overlaying the notion 
of sampling upon the previously discussed notion of evaluation is that the concept of 
moral exemplars distinguishes my account from other modes of evaluation in 
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accounts of psychotherapy and also from other notions of how moral exemplars are 
conceptualised such as Arendt ( 1961) or Macintyre's ( 1992) notions of moral 
exemplars. 
Moral exemplars are closely related to Hampshire's (1979) conceptualisation 
of moral values which are part of the mundane world of everyday social practices. 
Moral values are not invoked or intuited as some universal law across time and place. 
Nor is there one overriding moral exemplar such as equality or justice or cruelty or 
comradeship but all are equally underdetermined. Nor are they reductive like the 
greatest good for the greatest number in which certain significant concerns of groups 
of people have to be sacrificed or marginalised. 
Hampshire (1979) has offered two forms of moral values. Those which will 
have resonances for almost all peoples and in which there is general agreement or in 
his terms agreement by association. He has named this primary morality and for 
Hampshire this has to do with the universal protection of children, kinship bonding 
and ritual observances to do with the newly dead. Secondary morality has to do with 
moral values offered in certain social practices that are pluralistic, conflictual.and 
require to be debated and elucidated prior to being enacted. But, I prefer to combine 
Hampshire's concept of pluralism in which conflict is involved ,along with Wahl's 
(1920) notion of pluralism. Pluralism is not a multiplicity of perspectives but through 
"the elucidation of conflict, difference and change can be established." 7 
However, primary morality is itself undergoing alteration also. Kinship roles 
have altered and I would say often fall under the rubric now of secondary morality. 
Males live today in a household of children, none of which are their own and for 
which they have no legal parental responsibility. Their role has often to transcend 
custom related parent-child relations. Similarly youngsters live in the same household 
with other youngsters with which they have no sibling kinship ties. The blood sisters 
/ 
and brothers of these youngsters often live apart elsewhere. Kinship bonding and 
cross sex bonding has no longer the universal provenance it once had. So that persons 
in therapy are presented today with different moral quandaries and conflicts involving 
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different forms of social relationships. The moral exemplars of moral practices have 
to be explored, evaluated and sought after in the situated contingencies of the 
mundane world. There are few prescribed conventions for heterosexual or 
heterosexual/homosexual threesome households or how to be a modem step-parent 
perhaps living apart from one's own children and apart often from one's step children 
as well. Giddens (1991) makes reference to such social dilemmas incurred by 
divorced people. The divorcee has to have a new sense of self- and reflexively "make 
up" such identities as he goes. along - the self has to be routinely created and sustained 
in the reflexive activities of the individual- we are no longer what we are but what 
we make ourselves. I maintain instead that persons have to be extracting relevant 
moral exemplars from contemporary contingent social practices. What we need is 
relevant information for the task in hand with regard to what to select and the 
appropriate contexts for social practices and not to invent our "selves" which if there 
is a trajectory of self uniting past to present one cannot in any case do so. 
5 Moral Conduct 
Smail (1987) has put forward that the common feature of all psychotherapeutic 
profiles of persons in therapy is represented in te~s of how one treats one's fellow 
beings. Psychotherapeutic problems are constitutive of how one conducts oneself in 
relation to another or how others have conducted themselves in relation to oneself. 
What therefore requires examination and explanation is what we do to one another in 
terms of moral· conduct. The explanation and the resolutions of psychotherapeutic 
problems has in the greater part to do with treating each other differently and thus 
"better" in a moral sense. Psychotherapeutic explanations are not to be found in 
maladjusted thoughts or maladjusted behaviour. For when one brings in concepts 
concerning what one does to one another and its moral implications, then one is not 
dealing with theories seeking psychotherapeutic explanations in terms of individual 
beings but explanations inscribed in theories of interaction between persons. 
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. There are problems concerning the role of ethics, though, with regard to a 
model of interaction in t}J.e social theories upon which I have drawn. Authors such as 
Bhaskar (1987) who emphasise the constraining features of institutional practices do 
not allow for the influence of one person upon another at the micro-level of 
interaction.(They acknowledge the role of micro-conduct in social theorising, e.g 
Bhaskar recognises, in his own theory, Giddens' concept of position-practices which 
is a form of social identity with historic and cultural implications which "position" 
one in society. Bhaskar, though, in his paradigm ofpsychothrerapy does not indicate 
how the effects of one person influencing another, can result in the way the mode of 
interaction is directed and altered). 
Giddens (1984) has a more elaborated version of what can be termed the 
micro-conduct of co-present ( face to face) activities. He separates the notiqn of 
human relations from human interaction. The latter refers to social encounters which 
people engage in and through which institutional systems become articulated. 
Interaction depends on the "positioning" of individuals in time-space contexts of 
activities. However according to Kilminster (1991) there are certain problems 
regarding Giddens' conceptualisation of social encounters. There is no 
interdependence between persons and hence no developmental bonding between 
persons in Giddens' notion of social encounters. Kilminster maintains that the lack of 
the concept of the bonding involved in human activities occasions simply aggregates 
of persons. This means that humans are separate entities, arithmetically "summed" 
up. 
Harre makes an important statement that draws together essential features for 
a moral account of social psychotherapy. He suggests that among the many changes 
that go along with taking persons and their actions as the focal point of social 
psychology is the shift away from abstract studies such as dissonance or bystander 
effects. Both have to be substituted for a methodology which focuses on the concrete 
situated activities of persons. This Involves the admission that people are moral 
beings and that issues of moral responsibility are essential with regard to how they 
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behave. All sanctions too, are embedded in moral orders,along wih systems of duties 
and obligations with associated value criteria. These link in with the conceptions of 
"\ 
the propriety and virtue of oneself and ones' associates as persons. 
This statement seemingly would cover all the points to be considered in the 
idea of micro-conduct implying a moral order. It should also allow for how an 
individual handles moral endeavours and the interpretive and critical or evaluative 
accounts that can be given with regard to them. It also moves psychology into what 
Harre has termed the expressive order of social psychology which has to do with 
interaction rather than a psychophysical order of action with its concomitant 
philosophical problems of either inner being with mental predicates or outer being 
with extended observable behaviour. 
However, there are problems which I believe pertain to both Harre (1990) and 
Shorter's (1983) social theorising that detracts from their theories being grounded in a 
moral order. 8 Harre endorses Shorter's notion of intentional beings having freewill. 
They conceptualise the latter not as freewill, be-cause of the philosophical problems 
that surround the concept, but as autonomy in which persons have freedom of choice 
and action and individual rights. They also emphasise obligations and sanctions that 
persons are "duty bound" to perform. Harre emphasises the ritualistic sanctions 
pertaining to social practices and these combined rituals amount to what he terms a 
person's moral career. However, if one considers his concept of moral careers, the 
sanctions element of disgrace greatly overridc;:s the autonomy of the individual. The 
notion of autonomy thus either is elided from his moral order or becomes 
encapsulated in the individual and there is really not any moral progressive career at 
all. It then results in'an optimistic perspective of choices being considered as 
individual rights or a non-optimistic notion of persons having to obey society's 
demands with no interrelated means for the individual to overcome these sanctions. 
There is a schism, also, with Shorter's proposals for a social theory of 
interaction. Shorter (1983) correctly moreso than Harre puts forward a relationship 
and developmental model of human interaction in which to ground a social 
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psychology discourse. But I do not believe that his psychological model constitutes a 
moral order of interacting beings. He has rightly argued against individualistic 
accounts of human behaviour and has proposed that the unit of analysis has to 
consider two terms of a personal relation and the intentional effect of one person's 
action effecting another. One person through their intentional interactivity provides or 
specifies the developing formative contexts for the other. However by introducing 
Bohm (1980) and Prigogine's (1980) notion of development he has undercut his 
notion of dialectical and dynamic exchange where one person does provide the social 
contexts for the other. For they are no longer two independent personal terms that 
come together in ongoing intentional activity. The schism occurs when he emphasises 
the binding element or ordering propensity in human relations as something that is 
self-produced and the formative cause of its own production - "an ordered and 
structured activity based on inner movement". The intentional being is not then 
developing through the context of others but is in some self-formative process of his 
or her own. 
Finally both Shotter and Harre for a moral account of social psychology 
ground their notion of a social psychology in both rights and obligations. But together 
these two notions combine to act as checks and balances for each other, incorporating 
a balance of personal duties and personal rights in a well ordered society. 
A model of psychotherapy must acknowledge the asymmetries in human 
existence between persons as well as the symmetries. Bhaskar (1987) and Brittan 
(1977) suggest that the world is problematic for most of its members. One has to 
consider that human encounters consist of what Bauman (1990) terms both ethical 
encounters (meetings) and more often now than in the past de-ethicalised encounters 
(mis-meetings). For those in therapy the latter must be translated into to the former as 
much as possible and this cannot be considered outside a mode of developing 
interactions which Bauman's terms, however, do not provide. 
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6 . A Relational and Developmental Approach to Micro-conduct for 
Psychotherapy 
Reed (1989) and Heft (1989), following Gibson (1986), do recognise the influence of 
one person's behaviour upon another. The classical phrase is one person affords the 
behaviour of another. There are negative anarchic connotations though within the 
conceptualisation of such a phrase - the implications are that violence could beget or 
afford violence. Still and Good (1992) offer an approach in which the complexities of 
human conduct can be better addressed. 
The idea of a dialectic social exchange .involves two terms of a personal 
relation or ongoing activity. Examples of this are the dialectic relation between 
mother and child, coach and trainee or the therapeutic activity between the therapist 
and person in therapy. There are always two terms in the personal relationship. Each 
term.in the personal relation co-implies the other person or his or her activity. The 
dialectic social exchange also recognises that each person has a different relationship 
to the other within the activity and sometimes one person may have to take the moral 
ascendancy in the activity. The activity involving the two persons is a relational unit 
of analysis. Persons and their activity imply and specify the activity for the other. 
Each person is not just participating in the activity but setting, altering and disrupting 
the context of the activity for the other through a systematised spiral of behavioural 
loops including both parties within the social contexts of the activity. The 
asymmetries and symmetries ofhuman activities can be incorporated into the notion 
of such a dynamic and dialectic exchange. The therapist offers shifting social contexts 
for the other, sometimes a.nurturing context, other times assuming a more impartial 
and open-ended mode of conduct - other times confronting the person with regard to 
how they relate to others. Also the idea of the dialectic of control means that the 
person can be influential in altering the moral asymmetry of social conduct. They can 
intentionally specify certain social values in their own conduct which they believe is 
appropriate for the conduct of both, and, if and when, necessary debate such values. 
What separates the notion of the dialectic exchange from such ideas of behaviour 
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affording behaviour is the notion that persons have intentionality, knowledge-ability 
and competencies to control their conduct with others and make morality intrinsic to 
that conduct. Also the notion of dialectics can be considered not only as a relational 
term but it is. significantly bound up with progress and change. (Israel 1979) 
This notion of progress and change though is not conceptualised as some 
totality or unified whole but involves a temporal progressive dialectic unit of persons 
together directing their moral activities towards more morally enhancing conduct. The 
nature of progression is a regulated continuity which allows for and specifies the 
discontinuities of one form of moral interactivity and the uptake of another through 
the ongoing assessment of social values. (De leuze and Guattari, 1990) 
7 Case-Studies 1 and 2. 
With many post-adolescents, if you queried them about social values, they would 
surprisingly deny having any values. This would include college students doing 
options with a political dimension within the option. (All people, except those where 
the medical prognosis of health considered as a non-conscious state, uphold certain 
social values). The problem is that in many cases the people often have not been able 
to articulate social values because they have not found collective groups which would 
confirm them as shared social affordances. I believe also that when peop~e often deny 
having values it means that values in their immediate social environment have never 
been questioned or appraised. 
Rather than viewing this negatively a more positive approach is needed which 
is achieved by probing and appraising social values as explanatory accounts of human 
conduct. However "probing" persons in therapy initially with regard to social values 
is not always insightful for them or they might believe that not being able to articulate 
their value-system involves a personal lack pertaining to themselves alone. 
Extraneous sources in these cases are quite helpful. Often, ironically, persons in 
·therapy bring books or discuss films or pop songs which are in fact value-saturated 
and have some collective import for values. 
Ill 
I offer two case-studies to illustrate my proposals for a new account of 
psychotherapy. The tWo case studies illustrate ways of acquiring social values and the 
means to evaluate values. The· first case study emphasises social values incorporated 
within modes of social conduct to do with the micro-conduct of intimates, family and 
colleagues and the second case study has to do with a micro-conduct study in which 
macro-conduct or institutional practices are implicated. 
Case-Study 1 
The first case-study concerns the psychological difficulties of a male student, Colin, 
who lived in student lodgings with a mixed sex group. He had been brought up by a 
timid mother and an emotionally cold father. The father had been away at sea and left 
the looking after of his five children to his wife. When he returned home on leave he 
did not like the laissez-faire environment which his home afforded him and he 
continued to command the home as if he were on board the ship. The children 
objected to these periodic bouts of puritanical and officious fatherhood and he let it be 
known that he was far happier on board ship. Things came to a head when he was 
made redundant. His wife saw the only way out of her husband reconstituting the role 
of master of the ship to master of the hearth was to start divorce proceedings against 
him, on the grounds of incompatibility. The adolescent children had never been 
afforded an emotionally strong roie model from either parent. They alternated 
between bouts of lethargy, and bouts of cruelty to each other and their parents. There 
tended to be no family networking and although they remained in the one family 
home they tended when not being aggressive to each other, to ignore each other. 
When the student went home he psychologically terrorised the family to such an 
extent that he was asked not to come back. It seemed to me, though, that he was the 
one who was psychologically holding the family together. Often the person who has 
implicity been given that role by his family members is explicitly denied the means to 
do anything about it by them. The person succumbs psychologically to a double bind 
situation. The student began to suffer panic attacks and was starting to 
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ps~chologically disintegrate and along with other anxiety symptoms to feel as if parts 
of his body were missing. A common occurrence of this is where people believe and 
feel, for example, that their stomach is no longer there or is being eaten away. 
The outstanding characteristic of this student was his frank and direct 
approach to life. His mother frequently mistook his directness as an aggressive threat 
to her. But he was gradually losing that frank directness and becoming uncertain 
about even his psychological existence. This uncertainty began to occur, also, with 
regard to himself in relation to peer group activities. 
The first point of intervention or "transformation point" for this student was to 
reinforce his direct and frank approach to life. However to temper such an approach 
with a more complex value-system than the one to which he was committed ,for he 
tended to evaluate social matters as either yays or nays. The underlying personal 
qualities, though, of frankness and directness was that which was necessary to take up 
moral positions and moral stances for the purpose of transforming his social practices. 
The first extraneous "material" which I used was an essay that the student had 
just completed. The essay was apt because it's subject matter was Joseph Conrad's 
"Lord Jim" .9- "Lord Jim" had jumped a lascar ship after it had collided with another 
ship when he was sharing the responsibility and command of it. He had expected, if 
he had remained on duty, to be drowned along with the over-the-number limit of 
passengers on boar~. But the ship was saved. He lied in an officially signed document 
about the conditions of the accident before obtaining the news that it had been saved. 
The parallel was that student's own father had metaphorically jumped ship by not 
taking responsibility for his children's upbringing. Also there are underlying currents 
that come through Conrad's literary, work of males not able to deal psychologically 
with the female world. Conrad had difficulties himself in portraying or characterising 
women. His "heroes", as a result, are not explicitly or implicitly sexually involved 
with women or do not develop emotionally through encounters with women. Conrad's 
hero, "Lord Jim" to a large extent represented the social and psychological 
predicaments of the student's father. However my use of the text is not only for the 
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person in therapy to obtain a moral perspective in respect of his father's conduct but to 
bring in the relationship of fathers and sons and in particular his own relationship to 
his father. Also to separate the father's fear of commitment to women from the person 
in therapy's withdrawal from social activities which included non-involvement with 
women. 
Further, one of the purposes Conrad had for his novel was to express the 
ambivalence in the character and actions of the protagonists and to question if Lord 
Jim were a coward or not during and after the boat incident. The point of this for the 
student was that the student should consider "problematising" the moral values in 
relation to Lord Jim and then map these values onto his own family network and their 
problems. Certain moral theorists would demand that the ambivalence be understood 
as simply a conflict of values or ranking of choices. I wanted the moral values and 
evaluation of values to come out of the exploratory processes of probing his family's 
social contexts and for the student to review his previous assumptions about his 
family. The major problem was that the moral and social standards for his father and 
mother's conduct had been laid down by a previous generation and when the divorce 
occurred they had to formulate their social and moral standards as they proceeded 
through the divorce machinations. The student on his part had to a certain extent been 
wrongly critical of seeming timidity expressed by his parents at this stage, when in 
fact his parents had no Social guidelines as to how to conduct their OWn and their 
children's lives in the divorce proceedings. It was lack of how to go about life rather 
than timidity at this stage that was splitting the family further apart. The student had 
to judge what were the moral exemplars best suited for a family going through their 
family crises and share some of the social affordances that were being offered by each 
to each other but which were being ignored by one to another. What I wanted in 
psychotherapeutic terms was for the student to build up a body of knowledge or 
knowledge resources about his family affairs and to develop the skill of ethical 
knowhow which as Brown (1990) suggests involves skills in evaluation. This 
knowhow involved placing his parent's psychological predicaments in wider terms of 
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contemporary social predicaments but developing the skills of knowhow and 
judgements that would be applicable across multiple social predicaments that he 
would come across in both present and future social circumstances. 
·Giddens stipulates that, 
Modernity is essentially a post- traditional order. The transformation of time and 
space, coupled with the disembedding mechanisms, propel social life away from the 
hold of pre-established precepts or practices. This is the context of the thoroughgoing 
reflexivity which is the third major influence on the dynamism of modern institutions. 
(Giddens, 1991:20) 
Giddens maintains no one can escape from or opt out of the problems of modernity. 
He believes that the notion of self-identities is no longer a given but self-identities are 
reflexively constituted as one engages in social practices. For Giddens this has also 
specific reference in the act of divorcing. Giddens suggests, that a divorced person 
needs moral courage to try new relationships and find new interests. Many people in 
such circumstances lose confidence in their own judgements and capabilities, and 
may come to feel that planning for the future is valueless .... Children of divorced 
couples ... often suffer profoundly from the dissolution of the family household. 
(Giddens,1991 :11) 
Much of this form of suffering is common knowledge but the important point is that 
Giddens (1991) and Smail (1993) are identifying and offering for analyses the 
psychologically risky features of contemporary existence that condition personal trials 
and personal crises. Without such analyses. it would be difficult to identify the 
problematic social contexts of the person in therapy and its relation to his particular 
psychological predicament. Giddens also reverses the debate and asks what do these 
personal crises tell us about modernity. 
The second extraneous piece of "material "that I used for this student, was a 
practical critique of one of T.S. Eliot's poems.1 0 
The key point that the critic picks up is of a younger man wanting to end a love affair 
with an older woman. He goes to see the woman about ending the relationship but is 
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brought into a collusive scenario with her. There is one relevant quotation where the 
·woman using flattery and intimacy, comments, 
"I have saved this afternoon for you" 
The critic expands on this, 
'How does one meet this request when one has not asked to have it saved' 
The young lover in his stream of consciousness, asks 
"How can I make cowardly amends for what she has said to me?" 
The critic then states, 
'This must be the classic reformulation of that complex mental state in which 
one feels irrationally guilty for the other's breach, not one's own, or guilty for one's 
inability to respond to a demand that should never have been made.' (Schneider 
1975:19) 
There must have been some undisclosed needs originally between the two lovers 
which means that the relational activities were by no means disinterested love. So this 
allowed her to make psychological demands on him. Somehow in these relationships, 
you have to spell out your present and future intentional acts with the other person 
who is made aware also of these intentional acts and there has to be some form of 
negotiation as to how to conduct joint activities in moral terms. This has to include 
what the other person may demand or need in terms of the relation. In this case needs 
are opened out and are demanded as more honest needs. You do not have to treat this, 
either, as a dialogue of "rights" that you are in fact demanding for yourself but you 
have to express what your moral projects are in terms of the relationship and what are 
the moral exemplars that are to be selected in shared affordances. 
This is tied further into what one is wanting to convey and achieve in therapy 
procedures. For the most important point of the scenario is that the lover is made 
powerless both in terms of action and the articulation of the truth and cannot take the 
moral stands that he wishes to do because of the collusive statements offered. So that 
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I use this passage over and over again to break the impasse in the taking of moral 
stances that persons in therapy find themselves in with regard to their social 
interaction with others. Also it not only acts as a stop to the collusiveness occurring in 
the shared affordances but it makes the other person realise that you are not affording 
them the means to be collusive and that the collusive strategies have no import. It is 
not one sided moral highmindedness of one person controlling activities on behalf of 
the other. For the taking of moral stands and the articulation of them redirects the 
intimate physical and interpersonal activities elsewhere. There is a dialectical and 
ongoing social exchange between the persons where one person specifies and 
intentionally offers moral values for the other and by doing so sets the moral contexts 
of conduct for both himself and the "other". The other person in turn perhaps selects 
the moral exemplar offered and redirects or shunts forward the mode of activities. As 
Still and Good (1992) state it is a double dynamic flow. When necessary morals 
exemplars as characteristics of the flow have to be evaluated and, at other times, the 
moral values themselves allow for the contexts of the encounters to go forward 
without recourse to evaluation. 
What also happens is that the person in therapy in his or her own social 
encounters sensitively brings in his own transformation points with regard to the 
timing and content of the appropriate moral exemplars he or she wishes to use. It can 
be conceptualised in general as ethical knowhow which involves a critical awareness 
of the world and oneself within it. Also the use of the appropriate moral values 
specify, regulate, direct and redirect the social exchange. It has less systemised 
constraints than the therapy social exchange but it still involves skilled regulation of 
the procedures. 
I was beginning to find also that persons in therapy were panicking both when 
they were with people and if they were left alone. On both counts they were feeling 
socially isolated and this is also what was happening to this male student. The third 
piece of extraneous material used to explain the student's predicament was Bauman's 
. notion of de-ethicalised relations. Bauman (1990) puts forward the concepts of 
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mismeetings and meetings which elucidates this student's predicament. Previously in 
more cohesive societies human relations were clear-cut. One was either neighbour or 
about to be neighbour and he conceptualises this relationship as meetings; the 
converse of this is the interaction with the alien/foe which he conceptualises as mis-
meetings. But he finds that the mismeetings of aliens or foe are masquerading as the 
meetings now, with the result that meetings between people are becoming de-
ethicalised. The key point also is that society in its fracturing of its moral resources 
through its disembedding processes has made many persons psychologically 
vulnerable. Bauman states that, 
The art of mismeetings relegates the Other to the background; just a blot on the 
backcloth against which the action is set.. .. His is an irrelevant presence,: ... a non-
being being, an incongruity resonant with his own. By the technique of mis-meeting 
the stranger is allocated to the sphere of disattention. (Bauman, 1990:25) 
Although Bauman is a sociologist he has expressed what is happening to 
many persons psychologically today. This student, Colin, suffered from what is called 
loss of self or non-being being. It has come about through the mismeetings both past 
and present in the person's interactivities in which the person becomes "morally" 
powerless or what Bauman calls the moral void of personal existence or what Smail 
believes persons suffers from as a loss of moral viability. It cannot be explained, as 
Smail stipulates, either in terms of mind or body dysfunctions or as an existential 
non-being or personal alienation but only through the influences of economic and 
social institutional features of contempor~ existence and their implications in the 
de-ethicalising of micro-conduct. 
This moral void is a common occurrence with many post-adolescents who do 
feel that their values are insubstantial. The psychological directness of this male 
student was being deflected and ignored or as Bauman states, allocated to the sphere 
of disattention (Giddens term for it is civic disattention or better still civic 
indifference). This student in a morally powerless state suddenly ceased to be a 
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democratic member of his peer group and suddenly became a case-study or object of 
psychological investigation and explanation to his mates. Bauman suggests, 
Aliens appear inside the confines of the life world and refuse to go away .... they are 
... both neighbours and aliens .... people are ... morally distant but physically close ... .it 
is rather ,an indiscriminate amorphic totality in which individuality dissolves .... units 
are replaceable and disposable. (Bauman, 1990:24,26) 
In such situations person's power to give moral command is denied. It is at this point 
in human interactivities that people turn to the safe haven of welfare agencies. But 
Bauman is critical of these welfare agencies. 'He states of the welfare personnel that 
"It is my courtesy and good judgement which makes me tolerate their presence. In 
doing so, I give tribute to my generosity, not their rights. (Bauman,1990:26) 
The implications behind Bauman's remarks in certain ways mirrors the collusive 
substance of the statements of the female lover. It seems to me that the profession of 
psychotherapy institutes a peculiar asymmetrical protective role for its clientele ' 'I 
have saved this afternoon for you' can be translated into 'I have saved this therapy 
hour for you.' A form of pseudo-intimacy is then set up by the therapist on behalf of 
both the therapist and the person in therapy. The relationship is not bounded by any 
regard for democratic principles of solidarity or political equality. Nor is the 
therapeutic relationship upheld by more politically democratic principles that Bauman 
(1990), Deleuze and Guattari (1990) Maclntyre(1992) and Smail (1993) argue for, in 
a reflexive and critical psychotherapeutic discourse. It is not that one is denying the 
necessary comforting role of the therapist or that the skills involved in psychotherapy 
procedures should be trivialised as of no consequence, but the debate regarding 
human suffering cannot be conducted within a psychological discourse to do with 
mental predicates or behaviour or solely the empathic role of the therapist which often 
now consist only of emotional support and the only request asked by the therapeutic 
clientele. 
Case Study 2 
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Bess, a female student had had a particularly traumatic childhood. Her mother had left 
her father for another man and she had returned to the West Indies. For most of her 
adolescence her father had been unemployed. He spent his nights and most of his 
days on a settee in a run down council house. He suffered for years with depressive 
and anxiety syndromes which seemed to be a pre-condition and result of his marital 
breakdown. Much of his existence resulted in exhibiting indifference, sometimes 
intentionally and sometimes unintentionally to the world at large and to his family in 
particular. The children in such cases have to be psychiatric nurse and emotional 
comforters rolled into one. Often with the emotional supports, which they afford to 
their parents, not being reciprocated. 
Bess could not psychologically manage her domestic and emotional duties and 
attend school as well. The school welfare officer came up against an unwillingness of 
any of family members to respond to the demands of her attendance at school. In the 
end as a result of a case-work decision she was suddenly sent away to a children's 
home. What remained of her agental power to combat the world made her rebel and 
she rebelled so often by running away that she was eventually allowed to return 
home. She reached puberty at an early age. Although she had achieved what she had 
wanted by leaving the children's home, she tended not to spend much time in her own 
· home and spent the time with older friends of both sexes. Part of her reasoning for 
this was that her father when she returned from the children's home blamed her for the 
now regulated and frequent house visits by welfare personnel to his home. She drifted 
into an early marriage, partly because her boy-friend threatened to commit suicide if 
she did not. She found his dependence on her and his paradoxical need to flirt with 
other women too much to deal with, and she drifted out of the marriage with not 
much interest in it or anything in the future. She came to see me along with a student 
welfare officer who had asked her to live with him. He had tried to help the father 
since her family and his family shared the same social and economic affordances. But 
becaus.e Joe had worked and had redundancy money, Joe felt that he could select out 
of his environmental resources what he valued and leave behind what he did not. Joe 
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said that the father was part of a social underclass and his problems were social not 
psychological, and Joe said that he had been willing to help him in any way he could. 
When, however, the extra welfare money that he had found for Bess' father was used 
up th~ father treated him to the same indifference that he offered to his daughter. 
Joe felt that he could only cope with Bess' unconcern about himself and he 
stopped seeing the father and suggested that she deal with him herself. At that point 
she told Joe that she had had incestual sex with her father. He asked Bess to talk to 
her father about the incestual events. The father said on one occasion that he was 
sorry and on the next occasion that he had no recollection of saying that. She stopped 
trying to make sense of what the correct information was that the father was really 
affording her. Joe felt the father's lack of responsibility and lack of guilt with regard 
to his sexual dealings with his own daughter, too much to take and said that he would 
damage the father for life and at the same time say goodbye to her. Bess came then to 
the counselling service to find a way for Joe and herself to become emotionally closer 
partners. She felt that she could as easily drift out of this relationship as she had done 
with her father and her ex -husband, even although there did not seem any reason to 
do so with Joe. 
The first transformation point or probing intervention within the therapy 
procedures was to find out what values the children's home had afforded her and what 
her primary home had afforded her and why she had wanted to return to her primary 
home and what was there for her to return home to. What were the different 
constraints afforded by each and what were the differences in each with regard to 
family "politics". In her primary home the "motif' was abandonment and in the 
children's home "rescue" and could she start to detect anything different in these 
motifs. 
She felt that her house-aunt had afforded her kindness but that the kindness 
was built into a formalised discipline which was in contradiction to any significant 
regard for her. Almost as if decency was dictated by house-rules. There was always a 
benign, or not so benign discipline over-riding the acts of kindnesses. Also the 
( 
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kindness was not so much an altruistic value towards others, as tied into wider less 
positive social values. The resources the home offered were e?ucational and social 
training for adolescents in a family environment. But Bess detected in the information 
given that they somehow managed to condemn most of adolescents' home 
environment while at the same time transposing what they saw as social inadequacies 
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of their background onto them as individuals. The reason for the adolescents being 
there was, that originally they were, in the main, from problem families but very 
shortly, they were being defined individually as "problem persons". Instead of the 
values of the home involving surrogate parenting, the values of the home were being 
enacted within a custodial framework. When she had wanted to find an ally in her 
father with regard to the shared affordances of what the children's home offered in 
terms of custodian values and the freedom he afforded her, she was stunned into an 
inarticulateness by his indifference as to whether she came back or not. 
The first transformation points were not implemented for the purpose of 
catharsis or release of ~motion about her childhood suffering. As far ~ I am 
concerned compassion not backed up by the relevant information and its assessment 
to find out the way such disciplinary powers operate is a form of sentimental 
collusion. What was required was a seeking of the relevant information and then a 
correct endorsement of the information which she herself had detected and to explore 
further that information with her. So the second major transformation point was to ask 
Bess to what extent the father believed himselfto be a decent father. He said that he 
had not been particularly keen to go out to work but had given up going out to work 
to look after her two older brothers and herself. He felt cheated that his wife whom he 
felt that he had rescued from being sexually used by men had turned her back on him 
and walked off. He said that he had been overwhelmed by the domestic chores and 
the squabbling between herself and her brothers. Smail suggests that, 
They therefore tend to attribute 'the cause' of how they feel to the proximal 
experience of events or the actions of people close to them which are in fact 
determined by distal influences well out of their sight. (Smail,I993:66) 
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Bess picked up the information that nurturing his family had been important to 
the father, but the father had been incapable of raising the family by himself. The 
social contexts of his environment afforded no opportunities for him to be 
resourceful, both psychologically and materially and lack of these resources reduced 
his ability to be morally altruistic and look after his children's basic interests. The 
point of his answer for me, was to convey to her that his relation to her, in her early 
life had been lack of ability in dealing with family matters rather than lack of love. 
Before I investigated further l wanted her to realise that she had had some foim of 
early father-daughter relations in which he had wanted to be a moral resource for her 
even although it was only being articulated and confirmed in the present. However the 
notion of indifference had to be explored further. Because the independence that he 
allowed his daughter was tied into an indifference that belied any form of democratic 
freedoms. The indifference which he meted out to her was not really endorsing her 
liberty to come and go as she please but was masking an unarticulated dependency on 
his daughter. For when she came back from the children's home, the original 
dependency upon her returned. This time not as any practical dependency but only as 
an emotional dependency. However his needs could not be demanded in the same 
manner as previously since Bess went much her own way and ignored him. Masked 
behind his indifference to the world was something akin to a feeling of being 
abandoned. He knew his wife had actively done this to him and not his daughter. So 
the second time round his sense of abandonment took a different form. He became a 
sort of voyeur to her presences and absences from home. He mostly believed that he 
still was not committed in any way to his family's interests and activities and so the 
voyeurism was rationalised somehow by him as non-involvement with his family and 
for him the voyeurism did not exist. However as well as partaking of these voyeuristic 
practices, which in reality did exist, there were times when the indifference to life 
became so overwhelming that he felt his body physically disintegrating which is a 
symptom of extreme psychological distress and panic attack. He did not know what 
was happening to him. It was at those times that the incestual sexual acts occurred. It 
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was not so much a sexual assault on her or a sexual need for her but it was to prevent 
himself from physically disintegrating and he needed another person there to prevent 
what he felt was physical disembodiment. Smail puts forward that, 
Environmental influence becomes embodied (i.e., becomes a collection of 
biological assets and liabilities). (Smail,1993:230) 
From Bess' perspective the indifference he had meted out to her in her early years 
had prevented her from believing that he appreciated her or that she could be a 
surrogate sexual partner in lieu of her mother. She just believed that the sexual 
fondlings and sexual acts were what happened to problem families when they went 
further into social degradation. She was neither particularly sexually stimulated nor 
disgusted and she gradually began to treat the incidents with indifference but 
continued to remain away from home as much as possible to avoid any recurrence of 
such incidents. In a few years time she left home and only occasionally returned and 
on those occasions the sexual intimacy was not acknowledged or enacted. This can be 
elaborated further by Smail's comments that social powers are socially distributed and 
differentiated. They are to do with, material and authoritative resources at the social 
apex which are not allowed to be shared by those at the bottom of the apex. 
There were two things she had to do as far as I was concerned : one was to 
find out how she wanted to take a moral stand with regard to her father's conduct to 
her and two to decide how she wanted present and future transactions with her father 
to be conducted and what sort of adult-daughter relationship did she want to have 
with her father. These represented the core moral exemplars and she had to put them 
into use by taking moral initiatives in the ongoing moral transactions. She had to find 
out what her father's intentional conduct to her was. I detected from the information 
that she gave me that her father was highly selective in what information he did give 
her. She had to detect when her father, firstly, preferred to remain silent because he 
had come now to view his daughter in a voyeuristic sexual role rather than a daughter 
and secondly when he had actually psychologically disintegrated to the point of 
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needing her physically to ensure that he was still the "stuff of this world" with the 
incest episodes following after those bouts. He had to separate out the fears being 
produced by unarticulated feelings of abandonment and those that forced his daughter 
to have sex with him in order that she could perform the role of "rescuer". From my 
point of view, it was incorrect wholly to see her as shamed victim and he as guilty 
perpetrator or for her to clamour only for rights for victims or joining groups in order 
to express aggregated feelings. To me they were democratic street-wise people who 
. felt more exploited socially and politically than covering up shame or guilt. Bogue 
(1989)in his commentary on Deleuze and Guattari suggests that "there are those who 
have to shoulder the blame of the real and be responsible for all that reactive life 
metes out." Such reactive circumstances, according to Smail, (1993) become more 
private and individual as people become more detached from the possibility of 
acquiring associative power. Such power is likely to become available for them only 
through a therapy or legal framework. 
8 Conclusion 
I have offered firstly a social and moral account of psychotherapy which can stand 
opposite to traditional individual accounts of psychotherapy. In addition I have 
proposed a different social and moral account compared to other accounts, such as 
Heaton and Newman's. The main proposals for my account is that it is a relational and 
developmental approach and it is concerned with moral conduct. Central to my 
account is the belief that person's moral conduct can be enhanced within the domain 
of psychotherapy and that, in the main, this should lead to psychotherapeutic 
betterment. Conduct like action is open-ended but the notion of conduct is entrenched 
in the idea of sociality to d.o with the relations between person or their activities. My 
social and moral account concerns the shifting contexts of conduct between persons 
and the therapist's role in offering the ways and means to benefically alter conduct 
and its social contexts. 
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Secondly I have pointed out that the person in therapy inhabits two worlds 
which are not mutually exclusive. For a psychotherapy entitled social critique, critical 
attention must be paid to the problematic social contexts of the person in therapy and 
the resulting personal trials and crises must be addressed in the processes of 
psychotherapy. The connecting principle between them is termed by me, 
transformation points. This term has a significant part to play in my account and links 
procedures in psychotherapy with the social contexts of the person in therapy. The 
term transformation provides a duality between personal and social existence. 
Personal existence is defined by me as transformative agency and includes the 
attributes, knowledge-ability:intentionality and personal and social powers which 
notions allow persons to alter their social activities and practices. 
Thirdly I have estabished that morality needs to be a practical affair if it is 
directly involved in altering social activities. (Baier,1985) My notion of morality is 
thus set against morality involving either intuitive processes or prescriptions or 
typifications of morality. The essential idea for morality is that it has to be considered 
as moral exemplars taken as samples of morality which need assessing and evaluating 
in the processes of, or prior to their enactments. For this one requires an evaluator 
becoming skilled in the processes of evaluation. I have endorsed both Baier ( 1985), 
Crook (1991), and Smail's (1993) empirical enquiry with regard to social values and 
their assessments. 
The central ideas in this chapter have been introduced into my case-studies 
and conversely my case-studies illustrate _my ideas involved in my approach to 
psychotherapy and its procedures. 
Notes 
1. See Rogers (1957). The necessary and sufficient conditions oftherapeutic 
personality change Also see Strupp(1987) in A.Gurman and A.Razin's 
eds.Effective Psychotherapy:A Handbook Of Research. 
2~ Giddens (1991) proposes three features of modernity which effect social 
relationships. i. the separation of time and space - for example fathers often 
work away from their home and their country and lack the intimacy of family 
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life. He can have immediate access to his family by information only as, for 
example by phoning or faxing his family. ii. the disembedding process in 
which social interaction becomes separated from or lifted out of institutional 
practices. iii. the reflexivity of social practices in which there is chronic 
revision of new information which has to be assimilated. 
3. Perls, F. (1969) 
4. Heron's (1975) Six Category Intervention Analysis. 
5. . Confrontational approaches require more in-depth monitoring as to the timing 
of the interventions, otherwise the person in therapy may feel psychologically 
pressurised and evaluate psychotherapy processes negatively. But the timing 
of the transformation points in respect of confrontation pr~cesses nevertheless 
separates out different approaches to psychotherapy. Ellis (1962) with his 
more cognitive approach has a more flattened curve. Assertive approaches to 
therapy have a sharper curve. 
6. Normally it is considered that the explanations associated with facts causally 
explaining why someone behaved as they did are logically distinct from those 
facts which prescribe how to behave. 
7. See Wahl (1920) on the notion of pluralism. 
8. Harre and Shorter oppose Husserl (1973) who did not achieve a notion of 
intersubjectivity since his mainstream philosophy disbarred such a notion. His 
primary notion of a transcendental ego was to provide the conditions of 
thought within the thinker and this necessitated bracketing out the social 
world. They also opposed simply a presupposed form of an intersubjective 
world. They believe that sociolinguistic practices (language is essentially 
intersubjective) organise social existence e.g. language is structured 
grammatically and social existence is explained through its collective use and 
its accounts. 
9. Conrad's (1971) Lord Jim. 
10. EliotT. S. (1975) Portraitofa Lady. 
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Chapter 5 Macro-Conduct in an Account of Psychotherapy 
1 Introduction 
2 Social Structures in an Account of Psychotherapy 
3 Social Systems in an Account of Psychotherapy 
4 Agents and Their Institutional Practices 
5 Individuals and Their Social Practices 
6 Macro- Micro- Conduct 
7 Conclusion 
1 Introduction 
When dealing with the social practices of persons in therapy in terms of macro-
conduct, one is dealing with deeply layered, hierarchically organised institutional 
practices such as work, school and family. Long term institutional practices or macro-
practices are extended in greater time and space. Thus the binding of time is different 
with regard to macro-conduct in comparison to micro- co-imply-present activities. 
The former is termed by Giddens as the long dun~e involving the continuity of 
reproduced and sedimented institutionalised practices to distinguish it from the short 
dun~e of more fleeting face-to face encounters. To have an adequate account of 
psychotherapy, though both micro- and macro-conduct have to be acknowledged. 
Also the way they can or cannot be related is an important issue for the account of 
psychotherapy which I offer. Firstly, Giddens notes that, 
Thus one could investigate how the actors' motives and processes of reasoning have 
been influenced or shaped by factors in their upbringing or prior experiences and how 
those factors have in turn been influenced by general institutional features of the 
' . 
wider society. (Giddens, 1984:31 0) 
Secondly, Secord argues for the notion of social structures to be included in the 
discourse of psychotherapy and from a similar perspective suggests that, 
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Any attempt to apply social psychology to a social problem is apt to fail if it does 
not take the social setting or social context into account.Social structures play an 
important role in maintaining or changing behaviour .... The interconnectedness of 
social life means that various behaviours are facilitated or discouraged by social 
structural factors that must be taken into account. If they are not dealt with in the 
process of attempting to bring about social change, the effort is largely wasted. 
Examples are legion. Consider the case of individual psychotherapy. Hundreds of 
thousands of people are seeking psychotherapists who limit their contacts to the 
troubled individual despite the fact that most social behaviours, including undesirable 
ones, are supported by the significant other people with whom the patient interacts .... 
These properties of the world demand that application be interdisciplinary - no one 
discipline can aspire to explaining social behaviour in real-world settings. 
(Secord, 1986:214,218) 
Giddens (1979,1984,1991) more than any other social theorist has been the 
background impetus for my social account of psychotherapy. His notion of the duality 
of structure and agency (and"how the one implicates and influences the other) has 
been an important factor in the conceptualisation of my main ideas for a social 
account of psychotherapy. There is a recognition of both constraints and enablements 
running through his social theorising which is essential for any account of 
psychotherapy. For example, agents are coerced by social constraints bunhey are 
intentional beings with powers to act back upon dominating long term institutional 
practices. The important point for an account of psychotherapy is that Giddens 
emphasises that institutions are hierarchically organised and that knowledge is 
stratified within them. Long-term institutional constraints such as educational 
constraints are reconstituted in persons' social activities. Poor education, no-work-
situation, split up families all have escalating effects on day to day micro-activities. 
Such activities are often reduced to within the four walls of the refuge of home, as 
was illustrated above in the case-study of Bess with reference to her father. I had 
originally thus intended to embed my social account of psychotherapy within 
Giddens' conceptualisation of the duality of structure with its emphasis on both social 
constraints and powers of control; however because of certain inherent problems 
·within his social theory, I have had to rely on other sources. 
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In section 1, I consider the notion of social structures for an account of 
psychotherapy. These are defined by Giddens as rules and resources but I substitute 
values for rules. In section 2, I consider the notion of social systems defined by 
Giddens as the unintentional consequences of action. But, I define social systems as 
the unanticipated consequences rather than the unintentional consequences of action. 
In section 3, I relate social structures to social systems through the notion of agency. I 
introduce, in section 4, the notion ofthisness or hecceity. The latter refers to the 
particularity of the person in relation to institutional practices. One has to recognise 
that persons have species-specific attributes but they also have differing competencies 
and skills and differing autobiographies. I have drawn on the notion of hecceity or 
thisness from Deleuze and Guattari (1990) to express my idea of the particularity of 
. the person. They subscribe to the view that the particularity of a person or what they 
call their thisness is not a synthesising unity of an"I" or a "me" but is a function of 
productive processes that interact with each other. However, I have altered the 
meaning of hecceity or thisness to fit in with my account of psychotherapy and its 
notion of self and agency along with the autobiographical case-history. Their notion 
of particularity allows for no fixed identity or fixed point. It is metastable and can 
eventuate in any number of forms and has only a differential relation to other 
particularities or singularities. For example neither the mother or young child have 
fixed social identities. They have rather only a differential relation to each other. 
While they are mother and baby at play they are also a member of a nursery or worker 
in a factory. For Deleuze and Guattari they are "known" only in their differences to 
each other. What I consider as the notion ofthisness or hecceity is an emphasis on 
and extension of the Harrean selfhood rather than the Harrean personhood. 
(Harre1983) I spell hecceity as haeccity to underscore my meaning for thisness and to 
distinguish it from the term hecceity. In section 5, I have emphasised economic and 
social institutional constraints which effect the psychological health of persons in 
therapy.(Goldberg and Huxley,1992) I have also pointed to the uncoupling ofmacro-
practices from the micro-practices of social interaction in contemporary times. The 
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ongoing shifting contexts in which this occurs leads to greater psychological 
problems for persons in psychotherapy. I have illustrated these factors with collective 
case-studies. 
2 Social Structures in an Account of Psychotherapy 
There are two main points, initially, with regard to the notion of social structures. The 
first, is that in the past as Ritzer (1983) indicates, social structures were often linked 
with social systems as in, for example, structural functionalism. I The second point is 
that Giddens has separated the notion of social systems from social structures and has 
linked social structures with the notion of knowledgeable and intentional agents. But 
in his reformulation of both terms, social structures , are enacted through social 
systems. 
Giddens has formulated his idea of social structures from the social theories of 
Parsons (1978), Durkheim (1982), and from the European influences of structuralism 
(Kilminster, 1991): and also from the philosophical theories ofWittgenstein.(1972). 
I 
\. 
The main difference, though, in comparison to all of these influences is that Giddens 
has provided for the notion of personhood, or rather agency. I believe, however, that 
there are problems with Giddens' concept of the duality of agents and social structures 
due to an incompatibility between the social theories upon which he draws. 
Giddens has offered four features pertaining to social structures. 2 The 
applicable ones for the discourse of psychotherapy are structures and structural 
properties. 3 Structural properties are defined as rules and resources in social life. I 
have elaborated upon the notion of resources in discussing the idea of powers. 
Resources are mediators between persons' agental powers of control and the practices 
they intend to control. The main features of resources are twofold. One has to do with 
allocative resources or material resources including technological resources, and the 
other has to do with the authoritative resources which people have themselves in the 
dialectic of control or have access to with regard to others. Rules are generalisable 
procedures for the enactment of social life. Such procedures refer to a generalised 
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capacity to respond to and influence a number of indeterminate social circumstances. 
In order for this to occur rules are not static but are carried in time and are 
transformative. Rules are implicated and generated in action and are, in the main, the 
means of its production. Structures such as rules have no existence of their own, they 
are virtual. Structures simply exhibit social properties. Structures give shape to and 
come into being only when constituted in social activities. They provide the medium 
and outcome of those social practices in an ongoing manner. Structures presuppose 
the agent who draws upon rules in his or her enactment of social conduct. Social 
structures are both constituted recursively by human agency and are the medium and 
outcome of that constitution. Giddens maintains that, 
The constitution of agents and structures are not two independently given sets of 
phenomena, a dualism, but represent a duality. According to the notion of the duality 
of structure, the structural properties of social systems are both medium and outcome 
ofthe practices they recursively organise. (Giddens,1984:25) 
However there are several problems within his social theory and in-particular 
his conceptual ising of the duality of structure. Agents and social structures on the one 
hand existentially presuppose each other but they are bracketed or separated for the 
purpose of analytic investigation. But the recursive nature of the duality of structure 
poses further problems. The point at issue is that Giddens does not offer a proper 
mediating principle between his notion of agents and structures and as Cassell (1993) 
suggests agents are not rules. The two phenomena of agents and social structures are 
recursively the medium for each other and hence a degree of circularity occurs. 
Bryant and Jarry (1991) query; moreover, how is it possible to investigate a structure 
of rules and resources when structures do not produce a set of unmediated effects?. 
The result is that the two phenomena of the duality of structure collapse into each 
other. 
Another issue that has to be considered is the notion of constraint within 
Giddens's social theory. It seems to me that two ideas of Giddens ( 1984) are conflated 
into one even though he gives different definitions for each. The first is the notion of 
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coercive social constraints and the second is the notion of the regulative constraints of 
rules of procedures. The notion of coercive constraints is derived from Durkheim's 
. (1982) social theorising. But these latter constraints become depoliticised and 
incorporated into the structural constraints of regulative procedures and they 
underscore routine rule·regulated activities. These constraints involve a structuring 
principle to do with the binding of time and the internal coherence of the flow of 
action and they stem from ideas in structuralism.(Culler,1984) The rule-regulated 
routinisation of action gives what Dallmayr (1982) considers "an air of 
domestication" to Giddens' social theorising. In the main also it is the depoliticised 
version of constraints in the Giddensian duality of structure which is drawn upon by 
social theorists such as Heft (1989) and Shorter (1983). Generally the process of 
depoliticising his concepts for social theory prevents Giddens having a place within 
critical social theory. (McLennan, 1984) 
3 Social Systems in an Account of Psychotherapy 
Social structures are virtual and have no existence of their own. They are implicated 
in social practices or social systems. As far as Giddens is concerned social systems 
are fundamental to the social scienc·e enterprise. McLennan (1984) in this case 
believes that Giddens conceptualisation of social systems is the most useful aspect of 
his social theory and Giddens rendering of the concept of social systems is equally 
useful for founding an account of psychotherapy as social critique. Social systems are 
regulated institutional practices, which are deeply embedded in space and time. 
Giddens (1979) has indicated that social activities reproduce widespread patterning or 
degrees of systernnesss that are being constantly mediated. The consequences of 
persons' action in institutional practices are extended well beyond their immediate 
· control. Systems have thus an affinity with structural constraints which prevents 
persons having control over their existence and as such must have reference to 
persons in psychotherapy. Giddens, though, has opposed traditional 
conceptualisations of social systems as unintentional consequences of action and has 
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introduced the concept of intentionality. When both are integrated into an account of 
social systems and have some form of interplay then they have resonances for an 
account of psychotherapy. For the person in therapy, through intentional action, has 
..., 
more control over the effects and consequences of his or her action. 
Traditional examples of unintentional conduct are when persons fall in love 
and get married. The unintended consequences of their action of getting married is 
that overall housing needs may be altered when couples <:;hange from the parental 
home to their own home This has the unintentional effect of altering housing 
statistics, such as are expressed annually in the government publication, Social 
Trends. The couple's intention was to get their own house, in order to rear a family 
and not the unintentional consequences of altering the demographic and social 
features of society. As a consequence of their action, however, these features do 
become altered. Another example is illustrated when a happening is mediated in terms 
of the next happening (Giddens calls this the accordion effect). The intentional act of 
switching on the light reveals the unintentional happening of a burglar being present 
in the sitting room. The intentional act of switching on the light was to light up the 
room but the by-product of the action revealed the burglar. · 
The notion of the unintentional consequences of action, however, has to be 
more seriously considered for psychotherapy as critique. In the examples cited the 
missing element is the intentional agent who can, under his or her own auspices, 
directly effect his own an_d other's conduct. The key statement comes from Giddens 
who suggests, 
To understand what it is to do something unintentionally, we have first of all to be 
clear how 'intentional' should be understood. This concept I define as characterising 
an act which the perpetrator knows and believes will have a particular quality of 
outcome and where knowledge is used by the author of the act to achieve the quality 
or outcome. (Giddens,l984:10) 
However, rather than using the term unintentional conduct, which is 
embedded in mediateness, I prefer to use the term unanticipated consequences of 
action. The lack of control of the consequences of one's actions is to a certain degree a 
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central problem concerning persons in psychotherapy. As Gouldner (1957) indicates, 
certain problems of which the layman complains can be analysed as the unanticipated 
consequences of his or her own actions, policies and commitments. A theory of 
unanticipated consequences of action systematically directs the attention of layman, 
therapist, and social scientist to the problem-generating forces most directly 
accessible to the person in therapy's control. However the meshing of the intentional 
agent with the unanticipated and unforeseen consequences of action are the terms 
which must underwrite an account of psychotherapy and be offered in its research 
enqumes: 
The male partner who has taken his partner for granted often rewoos his 
partner when she starts to be indifferent to his presence. He starts to shower gifts, first 
on his spouse and then on his daughter, if the marital break up becomes more of a 
probability. He has somehow to be aware of the unforeseen effects of his conduct. He 
believes that he is not in control of the reciprocity ofhis family relationships and 
offers expensive gifts to prevent it breaking down. But in the offering of such gifts 
collusion can occur or expensive presents from him are often destroyed or given 
away. The offerings often bring in their wake, cruelty or indifference by the recipient 
of the gift and they never have the value that was originally intended. The person, 
learns too late about the gift-factor in human relationships and the consequences of 
his action. The therapist has to focus on the unforeseen consequences of his 
supposedly altruistic_ gesture. 
The concept ofunanticipated consequences of action as Gouldner (1957) has 
put forward, is also an important factor with regard to persons who repeatedly 
conduct their social affairs to their own psychological detriment. Persons, as more 
knowledgeable agents can anticipate moreso what cumulative effects and outcomes 
their actions will have in their social contexts. The next important step is to consider 
the terms unforeseen action in wider contemporary affairs of moral and political 
practices. As Bauman (1991) suggests in the past the effective range of action was 
"small" and so were the good and evil values about which action" had to care". ln his 
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words these values lay close to the ad, either in the praxis or in its immediate reach. 
Each action though in contemporary times is for Bauman both mediated and 
mediating. If there is a causal link between one's behaviour and its consequences it is 
considered now as a fault of reason rather than an ethical failure. The loss of ethics in 
the mediateness of action means that persons are seldom confronted with their choices 
of action and its consequences. In these cases action is morally neutralising and 
belongs to no one in particular. Further as Atkinson comments, 
in the cases which Laing examined, he recognised how children often came to be 
defined as 'mad'. There is an escalation of interrelated and changing definitions, 
values and actions. This whole sequence of unintended consequences of events may 
end up with the development of situations very far from those with which we started. 
(Atkinson1971 :231) 
The notions of intentionality and the unanticipated consequences of action and 
the co-implication of the one with the other is important. It can be incorporated into 
actions which are either less or more mediated. The terms also indicate the 
problematic nature of contemporary affairs due to the mediateness of action or the 
escalating effects of action. Although there are social theorists who believe that the 
meaning of the term unintended consequences of action is so all encompassing that it 
has become meaningless (Hindess,1988), there are others such as Boudon (1982) who 
find a central place for it. Boudon maintains that those who advocate the notion of 
intentionality within their theorising without implicating the boundedness of action or 
the unforeseen effects of action offer a too optimistic and simplistic approach to 
human affairs. He conceptualises adverse unforeseen effects of action as perverse 
effects. He is arguing against either the notion of effects of action being 
conceptualised under mechanical determined causation or action being considered in 
terms of freedom to act which could sometimes be construed as whims or unbounded 
choices. He is suggesting that the notion of the effects of action must be taken into 
consideration and emphasis placed on the mediated results of one's action as well as 
what conditioned it. I propose that to enact moral conduct one must intentionally 
direct and influence one's action as much as possible to prevent the adverse effects of 
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action. It underwrites the meshing of intentional action with the desired outcome of 
action. This is more likely to occur if there is a knowledgeable agent reflexively 
involved in reproducing or modifying his or her action in the light of informational 
feedback. 
4 Agents and Their Institutional Practices. 
There are further problems when the Giddensian notion of social structures is 
integrated with that of social systems. Giddensian social structures are virtual as they 
·have no existences of their own and they are instantiated only when enacted in social 
practices or social systems. The structural property enters simultaneously into the 
constitution of a single action and "exists" in the generating moment ofthis action. 
This is tantamount to stating that all universal practices are implicated in an 
individual's brief action.l Archer (1986) in her critique of Giddens points out a 
problem stemming from what she terms the "crunching up" of institutional practices 
within a person's individual actions. In Giddens' social theory structures and action do 
not operate on different time scales. Giddens is, therefore, unable to provide in his 
central notion of the duality of structure any theoretical grasp of social practices being 
structured over time and this is an essential proposal for any account of 
psychotherapy. For Archer structirres logically pre-date actions and what she terms 
structural elaboration post-dates those actions. Structural elaboration is the 
consequence of actions, but it also conditions a new set of influences upon actions 
and interactions. This is a cyclic process and should be equivalent to the recursive 
processes involved in Giddens' noti~n of the duality of structure but with the 
inclusion of the dimension of the structuring of time. 
FIGURE 1. 
T1 ______ structure 
T2 T3 action 
------
T 4 structural elaboration. 
-----------------
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All three lines are continuous, the analytical element consists only in breaking up the 
flows into intervals determined by the problem under investigation .(Archer, 1986:72) 
Archer is emphasising a different set of social structures from that required for 
an account of psychotherapy. The social structures which she is considering are 
taxation systems, population variables and wage differentials. Also I suggest the 
converse occurs with regard to Archer 's morphogenic approach. She separates the 
notion of persons from their social structures and she focuses on social structures 
rather than on both agents and their social structures Archer thus polarises the two 
constituents of the duality of structure in her own social theorising. However I 
suggest a different approach to the duality of structure could be O'Gorman's (1986) 
reformulation of the duality of structure as the hylemorphism of agents and social 
structures in which both phenomena are co-relative to each other. 
FIGURE2 
Tl T2 T3 ___ social values including moral sanctions (sexual mores) that pre-
date persons in therapy and their practices 
____________ T4 persons in therapy and their social values 
pertaining to social practices that have been emptied of their "contents". 
T5 social values 
----------------------------------~-------
pertaining to practices that post-date the person's action as the outcome and 
consequences of that action. 
Following Archer (1986), Figure 2 can be expanded into a generalised therapy case-
study. I found certain women students, whose mothers or grandmothers were 
illegitimate often suffered from a depressive syndrome. One of the main 
characteristics of the behaviour of these granddaughters and their mothers was to 
' isolate themselves sodally from everyone except their immediate families. Any 
138 
problematic social or psychological factors pertaining to the granddaughters, such as 
relations with partners or would be partners, especially males, tended to.activate the 
depressive syndrome. Then social isolation became more problematic and the 
psychological factors involved became more complex. There were two aspects to the 
problem. The first was how these granddaughters perceived other persons' perception 
of them, especially males. Such perceptions made them psychologically vulnerable to 
the nuances of any relationship. The second aspect of the problem was the 
reproduction of their grandmothers' pattern of isolation in which the s~igma attached 
to the conduct, the contents of which - as Manicas would term it - had been emptied 
out. (Manicas, 1987) The therapist had to indicate to the persons in therapy the way 
the stigma of illegitimacy was being unnecessary reproduced over generations. There 
' ) 
was a discrepancy between their own conduct and what conditioned it. At the same 
time the granddaughters had to challenge contemporary demeaning social values or 
other problems would simply be recycled through the generations. These 
granddaughters had to be aware ofthe unanticipated consequences of their actions, 
and by not reproducing the adverse effects of isolation, they would as Archer (1986) 
has indicated be influencing a different set of conditions. The psychotherapeutic 
problem could not always be resolved by suggesting in Giddensian terms that rule-
borne social constraints are implicated in the action when the sanctions were no 
longer being upheld. The carrying over of the same pattern of conduct of one 
generation to another when the contents of the conduct have been emptied qut is 
much more common in psychotherapeutic difficulties than this one example of 
illegitimacy suggests. 
However I believe that rather than rules as structures pre-dating persons (as Archer 
accords in FIGURE 1) the notion of values should replace that of rules. I do not 
believe that the notion of rules - whether they be transformative or not- can indicate 
or solve the problematic nature of society. Whereas values pertaining to social 
practices embody the problems of society and their examination must initiate the 
means to alter the problems occurring in society (There may be social rules involved 
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but social values would pre-empt and determine the rules ). There is one final 
· problem with Giddens' social theory in relation to social structures and social 
systems. Rules are drawn upon in the production of action, so they must pre-date that 
action (social structures) but the consequences of action must post-date that action 
(social systems). There is a difficulty within Giddens' social theory concerning social 
structures being implicated in social systems. Pre-dated rules _in action (social 
structures) cannot theoretically be extended to encompass the unintended 
consequences of action (social systems). The problem is that Giddens is operating 
within two different theoretical paradigms. His notion of social structures is derived 
to a certain extent from structuralism, (Giddens, 1979) and his notion of the 
unintended consequences of action is based on a modified version of functionalism 
.(Giddens, 1979) Moreover the notion of agency refers to one perspective namely -the 
duality of structure but not to the other- social systems. When rules, however, as 
social structures are implicated in social systems or social practices then the notion of 
agency becomes subsumed under the rules produced in action. The notion of agency 
is made residual in one perspective of his social theory to do with social structures 
and only implicit in the other perspective dealing with social sytems (as intentions 
rather than agents with intentions). 
I propose a different format for an account of psychotherapy as social critique. 
In this format there are: 
(a) values which pre-date action (social mores past and present) 
(b) agents who draw upon such values in their actions 
(c) values which post-date the actionwhich have consequences for others as well as 
these agents.' 
· The agent-as an evaluator (with prior stocks of knowledge) regarding values inust 
evaluate values (b) and incorporate such assessed values within their present and 
future social practices. In a hylemorphic approach the evaluator co-implies the 
evaluation of social practices. 
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5 Individuals and Their Social Practices 
So far I have concentrated upon general attributes of agency such as knowledge-
ability, intention and general powers or capacities. These are general competencies. 
Bhaskar (1987), Harre and Secord (1972) have pointed out, though, that as well as 
general competencies and capabilities and powers, there are particuhirities regarding 
competencies. Persons have certain individual competencies of their own. Persons, 
also, have a range of altering particularities that give them their singularity or haeccity 
e.g. one's childhood being differs in some respects from one's adult being and adult 
being differs from one's being in old-age. Their thisness is thus not a cluster of 
personality traits for thisness or haeccity is incorporated within their social history. 
Their thisness is altered to some extent through that autobiographical history and 
contributes to the alteration of that particular history. However I have indicated that 
the person is not so much just "in history" but that the social autobiography involves 
persons in ongoing relation to their institutional practices. 
Apart _from a few behaviouristic therapy programmes, persons in therapy 
interviews spend much time talking about themselves and also like everyone else they 
perpetually "defend" themselves through their thisness. Establishing thisness or a 
person's particularity is important and fundamental to the psychotherapeutic 
discourse. Smail (1984) has stated that persons hide behind their particularity (or the 
more idiosyncratic features of their particularity) and are fearful of revealing such 
particularities even in the safe havens of therapy interviews. Part of the therapy 
procedures has to be confirmation of this thisness; sometimes with some of its 
defences more or less intact. Thisness or haeccity, though, should direct rather than 
limit one's approach to one's social practices and should help moreso to confront 
some of the constraints in social practices. In the case-studies discussed in Chapter 4, 
the psychotherapeutic problems of Colin and Bess can be understood by their thisness 
or haeccity in relation to their social practices. 
Mackay (1975) stipulates that among the behavioural therapists there are those 
who believe that the individual should be the object of study in his or her own right. 
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-Frank (1983) comments that the history of the individual case is of crucial importance 
for the'work of the psychotherapist and in psychoanalysis the unique history of the 
patient is of the greatest importance. "Meyroff (1962) also maintains that 
psychoanalysis only works so far as the reconstruction of the history of the individual 
is considered. The dilemma for Allport (1940), Frank (1983), and Meyeroff (1962) is 
whether to privilege explanations based on the ideographic particularity of the 
individual or to privilege explanations based on the general laws of behaviour in 
which the individual's behaviour is an instantiation of such a law. Bhaskar (1987) 
indicates, also, that the.agent plays a special role in the verification of his or account 
of conduct. But knowledge is never epistemically self-certifying. I suggest rather that 
the problem should be diverted and considered in the terms of person's thisness or 
haeccity in hylemorphic relation to social existence. 
I propose that the notion of thisnesss or haeccity has five significant qualities 
,which distinguish it from ideas of personality traits that are constant over a variety of 
circumstances. These qualities include as follows: 
(a) both the Harrean form of personhood and selfhood. In the case ofthisness or 
haeccity the emphasis is on the individual self who controls his or her action and has 
points of view inc hiding a "world view" arising out of his or her belief system, stocks 
of knowledge and the memory "traces" ofhis or her autobiographical history. Guattari 
( 1972) considers such a notion as the very fabric of a person's most intimate existence 
made up: of events of contemporary history, at least those that have marked him or her 
m variOus ways. 
(b) persons having not only generalised species-specific attributes such as 
knowledge-ability and generalised competencies (which include intentions) but have 
individualised renderings of these attributes. (Bhaskar 1987 and Harre 1983) 
(c) personal autobiographies such as that of the "Barmitzvah boy" and the ritual 
practices of the Barmitzvah celebration. 
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(d) selfhood established by the Harrean notion of self with the indexicals of the 
pronouns "I" and "me" and the selfs embodiment in the indexicals "over here" or 
"over there". 
· These four qualities of the individual have already been discussed in my account of 
psychotherapy but they are drawn together by the notion of thisness or haeccity. 
Along with a fifth quality they form the constituents of the person's thisness or 
haeccity. 
(e) The fifth quality involves the personalisation of language. I establish this idea 
via Rorty's (1989) social philosophy but I do not base it on his notion of selfhood. 
Rorty suggests that selves are not universal beings defined by their universal 
essences. Selves are created when persons begin to individualise language, or in his 
terminology, selves come into being by being redescribed in language. The 
individualising of language occurs mainly through the personalisation of metaphors. 
The latter for Rorty offers ways of diversification and change in human existence. 
Such a notion is important in the procedures of psychotherapy and can be illustrated 
in terms of four examples. The first is furnished by persons who use metaphors as a 
defence mechanism. A common example of this is students who tum the terminology 
of psychoanalysis back on itself when such students consider their psychological 
problems in terms of classical Freudian metaphors such as male aggressive instincts. 
The second example concerns the lay stereotypical metaphor which is interpreted by 
Rorty as a platitude. The third example is where the metaphor is again stereotypical 
but is used by the person to crystallise their psychological problem (very often 
underlining common human predicaments). The final example is illustrative of 
Rorty's "original" or innovative metaphor. In this latter case the person is using 
language to probe, sum up and describe his or her psychological difficulty. This 
individualised use of language is more often than not complemented by a greater 
degree of bodily relaxation: a differential colour change in the face, especially above 
and below the lips and a greater lightness of tone in the voice. 
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In more general terms Rorty can point to a different focus in which to consider 
the idea of language. A focus which suggests, that we are not simply in language or 
that we cannot escape language, or that we can be defined as language users;nor yet 
that language as conversations is organised as the principle by which explanations of 
social existences can be elucidated. What Rorty's conceptUalisation of language 
suggests that as well as having indexical features such as "I" and "me" that there is 
also an indexical use of language which makes it mine and contributes to the notion 
of my thisness. I have found persons in psychotherapy, who simply subscribe to 
stereotypical contemporary icons such as a "psychotherapy of feeling ", deny the 
process of exploration of their own and any one else's social adversities. Such 
processes of exploration are the essence of psychotherapeutic practices and 
betterment The difference between Rorty's proposals and mine though is that persons' 
particularity including their use of language arises out of their sociolinguistical 
practices and contexts. (Harre, 1983) This compares with Rorty's separation of social 
being and individual being in which social being is purely an aggregated form of 
. individual being. 
Having indicated a different approach to the concept of self ,the notion of 
thisness must also co-imply the notion of social practices. 
In the 1980's, second and third generation Asian immigrant women came into 
higher education and chose colleges offering their preferred academic subject area. 
They did this rather than living in the parental home and going to local colleges which 
may not have provided for that particular subject of study. Their Asianness was being 
further filtered through Western education and other Western institutions such as 
U.K. halls of residence but their social identity was still Asian. Because of that 
filtering process, however, there was more of a diversity as to how they related to 
their Asian institutions and part of that filtering process for some involved leaving 
home and having a career compared to the previous immigrant generations. When the 
students talked about their personal difficulties they were often talking about 
themselves and their own agental power, or lack of it, in relation to Asian institutional 
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social practices. The point I want to make is that they had their own singular or 
haeccity relation to their Asian institutional practices in which their haeccity was 
important to them. To one person who embraced traditional Indian values, I suggested 
that she seemed to be the incarnation of Mother India and she said that was her 
nickname (this is how the therapist can open up the discussion regarding metaphors). 
This person could not hide behind traditional agrarian community values of a past era 
in India. Nor did she herself want to. But she wanted to retain the Hindu religious and 
social practices and the values inherent in them that counteracted forms of Western 
individualism. She wanted to be part of an extended family in which she and other 
women could take up careers and raise their own family within it but contribute time 
and money to the family networ~. Another person wanted to be more politically 
motivated and wanted to be part of the U.K. political culture. It was important for her 
. to obtain a career in bro~dcasting or journalism through which she, rightly or wrongly 
believed, allowed for a political voice. Another wanted to radicalise her Asianness in 
terms of altering practices in Indian culture. Another person wanted to come out as a 
gay person and another wanted to be a gay Asian which incorporated and emphasised 
their Indian culture. I am not referring just to groups or ~ggregates of individuals. 
Each person in therapy had a particularity in terms of their Asianness and that their 
thisness was linked to the social practices as they were interacting with them. Others 
had to deal, each in different ways, with the cultural sanctions imposed on them by 
their parents or sanctions, in respect of their behaviour, placed upon their parents by 
the elders ofthe community. 
Having indicated a different approach to the notion of self ,the notion of 
thisness must also co-imply the notion of social practices. Some persons have greater 
difficulties than others with regard to either the values which are institutionalised in 
their culture or to the changing contexts of their cultural values. There were some 
who suffered more than others from the dislocation process of the latter. Such 
dislocation effects is the essence of De leuze and Guattari's notion of the schizophrenic 
which is characterised by them as the nomadic subject. The nomadic subject has no 
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fixed identity, no fixed location and no fixed function. He has become 
deterritorialised and refuses to be categorised by or succumb to social codes or 
conventions. The nomadic subject is representative ofHanifKureishi's particular 
characterisation of his hero in the "Buddha of Suburbia" (B.B.C.2 film). The hero is 
representative of the deterritorialisation of the nomadic subject or the dislocating 
· cultural effects pertaining to immigrants in a new and different culture. 
Hanifs play the "Buddha of Suburbia" captures the qualities of the thisness of 
a young immigrant third generation Indian in relation to his shifting institutional 
contexts. He was literally searching through Asian institutions, some more 
westemised than others, to find some form of enlightened collective affordances that 
enabled him and others to be 'able to recognise and articulate what was happening to 
Asians in the dislocation processes of their society. There were parallels in his search 
. to the "lines of flight" ofDeleuze and Guattari's schizophrenic in which "he was not 
seeking liberty or escape, simply a means of movement, a way of transforming the 
situation." What the "contemporary Buddha of Surbubia " found were Asian music 
cliques or art or other social cliques; some were seemingly radical and some not, but 
all were cut off from the information or knowledge that could lead to, or go some way 
towards their collective political and moral enlightenment and solidarity. They were 
cut off, in addition, from the contribution each could make to that enlightenment. The 
cliques seemed to be overtly self-conscious and self-reflective social aggregates or if 
not that, bounded by a form of social simulacra or pretence rather than any true 
questioning of values pertaining to contingent social practices and to what was 
happening all around them. The "Buddha " was not left simply feeling personally 
alienated within the existence of a single being but his haeccity was incorporated into 
one line of flight after another searching for contact with what Guattari (1972) terms 
the groupe-subjet (the group-subject) as distinct from the group-assujetti (the 
subjected group). The latter group has exclusive membership, is hierarchically 
organised, operates within received codes and conventions (reterritorialisation) and is 
determined by other groups. The former groupe-sujet calls "into question its goals, 
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and attempts to articulate new significationsand form new modes of 
interaction."allowing for new possibilites to be dealt with. (Bogue 1989:86) Such 
groups are more likely to force obfuscated powers into the open (which are hidden in 
instrumental procedures of decision-making and policy making) and allow for greater 
political and civic participation. 
Finally, Hanifin an interview given in Desert Island Discs (B.B.C. Radio 4 
programme, May 1996) stated that at some time recently he had visited Pakistan for 
the first time. Like the nomadic subject he had become socially deterritorialised. His 
Pakistani Indian relatives paradoxically stipulated that he, Hanifwas a Paki but 
alternatively that they themselves were Pakistanis. Hanif concluded the interview by 
indicating that although he had a British mother he was not a Western British person 
or a westernised British person - nor as he now realised was he a Pakistani - but that 
his cultural identity was incorporated in what would be equivalent. to my notion of 
thisness or haeccity. I believe, though, that what gives people their ethical security is 
this notion ofthisness or haeccity in relation to their social practices and activities 
with others. I consider it to be an important feature of an account of psychotherapy, 
especially the therapist role of recognising, confirming and encouraging the 
significant aspects of the person in therapy's thisness while discouraging its redundant 
or destructive aspects. 
6 Micro- and Macro- Conduct 
An account of psychotherapy, especially in terms of social critique has to recognise 
both micro- and macro-conduct and also the manner in which they are related or not 
related. For there are institutional constraints of macro-conduct that are directly 
implicated in persons in therapy's micro-conduct. An example of the macro-
institutional practices of economics and poverty directly and indirectly affected the 
father's relation and conduct to his daughter as discussed in the case-study above. But 
also one has to recognise that micro-conduct can be uncoupled from macro-conduct 
as Habermas (1975) and Giddens (1991) have drawn attention to. This uncoupling, 
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for both Giddens and Habermas is a contemporary phenomenon. Habermas has 
sought to identify the problem of the uncoupling of macro-conduct from micro-
conduct and to offer the means to prevent its occurrence, if possible. Giddens has not 
. offered solutions but gives an explanation of its happenings and consequences. 
Collins (1981), Archer (1986), and Giddens (1984) enter the debate over the 
relationship between micro- and macro-conduct and put forward various arguments 
with regard to the relation between them as well as questioning and offering various 
interpretation of each other's terms and methods of analyses. The debate is centred on 
whether aggregates of persons at the micro-level are to be the models for analysis or 
whether analysis, as Archer (1986), indicates, has to be conducted at the level of 
macro-practices. If neither of these have to be privileged there follows the question of 
scope as to where one places the level of analysis in the continuum of the processes of 
face-to-face interaction through to large-scale institutional practices. Harre (i979) 
considers that it is impossible analytically to achieve a unified mode of analysis that 
· incorporates both micro and macro-practices. He has preferred to integrate 
overlapping commonalties from both social psychology and micro-sociology into 
micro-conduct and to explain institutional organisations by hypothetico-deductive 
methods. (Harre, 1979) Social phenomena do not always have observable features and 
are difficult to measure- for example rules or patterns of society that exhibit large 
scale regularities. Hypothetico-deductive methods are based on the idea of a theory 
consisting of a set of statements which involve logical rules that would allow for 
universal generalisations on the nature of society. Others like Shetter (1983) have 
maintained that these disciplines such as sociology and psychology have their own 
region or boundaries that have to be examined in terms of their own adequacy, 
constraints and modes of analysis. 
\ 
The debate surrounding micro- and macro-conduct and their interrelation has 
been conducted mainly in terms of social integration (micro-conduct) and system · 
integration (macro-conduct). The former is defined in terms of the reciprocity of co-
present action or communication ,by most social theorists. System integration has to 
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do with long term enduring institutional practices either in terms of organisations 
such as the state or in global terms of international companies. Archer ( 1986) suggests 
that there are problems with regard to Giddens' approach to the relation of macro - to 
micro-conduct. Archer COI11Illents on Giddens social theorising, 
Thus the crunching up of ... transformation and recursiveness (equally salient and 
eternally operative) and of moment and totality (no sequence only simultaneity), is 
now joined in his 'dimensional approach' by a compacting of the micro- and the 
macro-, which are not teased out in scale and time. (Archer1986:76.77) 
Archer comments further, 
Once again the duality notion has produced two unreconciled images :the one 
presents the 'principles' as governing the 'modalities' (the macro-dominating the 
micro-), the other portrays the 'modalities' as cyclically transforming the 'principles 
'(the micro-directing the macro-). The attempt to interrelate them fails on logical 
grounds, the attempt to identify the principal components also fails on practical 
grounds. (Archer,1986:79) 
Habermas (1975) has provided a fuller explanation of this uncoupling process. 
But also a greater degree of uncoupling has occurred since his original discussion of 
it. He has brought together 4 terms to cover system integration and social integration, 
namely the family; official economy (family economy), state, and public opinion. 
One axis runs between private fainily economy and private life world and the other 
runs between the state as public system (state organisation/administration), and 
public-opinion making. They interconnect through the two axes but the themes that 
are important for an account of psychotherapy as critique is the politicising and 
splintering offamily, or life world of public opinion from the political machinery. 
There is a general uncoupling of the state from family life except at the level of the 
consumer or at the level ofthe recipient of welfare (now itself being uncoupled). 
In the early 1980's, the mining and shipyard industries were in decline and by 
the late 1980s there appeared a new group of student - the economically redundant 
male student. These students indicated that they were seriously involved in their 
courses. Most produced competent essays and those who took a social science course 
involving counselling options and other social science subjects could debate various 
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academic issues in relation to counselling theories and other social theories. However 
in quite a few cases they could not sustain the demands of the course on personal 
grounds and they opted out of the academic system. Many of them had early 
educational and social constraints which had placed them in secondary modem 
schools. Thereafter there were family pressures to go into mining or the shipyards. 
There seemed-to be family network pressure, especially on "sensitive boys" to go into 
the shipyards or the mines and the common theme was "it will make a man of you". 
Many of them had detested the sexual and physical apprenticeship rituals. They had 
joined heavy industries in order to get a steady wage and a job for life but most of 
them disliked the working atmosphere. For the camaraderie which provided the 
cohesion of the work force could also tum against its members, with various degrees 
of cruelty if they did not uphold the integrated norms of the socialising processes at 
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work. The retraining courses which were being offered to them were in job areas in 
which there was already an over-capacity and they would have been in competition 
with fully apprenticed and experienced workers. They had a cynical attitude to the 
notion of suitable government retraining schemes. Neither had they been over-willing 
to re-enter education as mature students. But there were no other economic or welfare 
prospects. In addition they had a cynical attitude to the fact that they often had to 
academically comment on Lemert's (1967) notion of the "underdog" while as they 
believed it, they were also one of them in real life. It is an ironic example of the 
participant-observer role demanded by much of modem social science. 
However what was happening to them was that they firstly, as noted above, 
had to endure the constraining influences of their early environment i.e. academically 
bright children who did not have the "educational nous" to bypass the secondary 
modem school system. They were pressurised to go into heavy industry and there 
were no alternative careers available. But secondly, in re-entering education, the life-
world at home was being split or uncoupled from the higher-educational institutional 
practices. This had not occurred when they attended their secondary-modem school. 
In the latter case, relatives, friends and work-mates had been to the same school and 
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were part of an integrated symbolic life-world. When they proceeded to use the 
educational resources, the second time round, to obtain different opportunities, this 
macro-world was splintered off from their micro-world. They suffered on both 
counts: one was the macro- and micro-world of early constraining influences without 
any career or educationally stimulating opportunities and the other was the 
disembedding features of the micro-world uncoupled from the macro-world in both 
its educational and work aspects. On the first count as Fuhrman(1986) indicates 
modem societies do not always function or maintain themselves in the present but on 
the second count they do. In the case of these mature students societies are operating 
on two different temporal zones. He further comments that modem societies do not 
exhibit the coherence that some social theorists puts forward - rather such societies 
are non-synchronous as they are 'multi-layered' in time and space.Often according to 
Fuhrman spatial differences such as class-divisions are mediated ,complemented and 
contradicted by such temporal zones. (Fuhrman,1986:78) 
Finally it could be said that Habermas (1975) was guilty of gender blindness 
or gender insensitivity. He had either placed women in the private domestic symbolic 
role or ignored their part in the family economy and public opinion making process. 
There are though greater escalating processes in the dissolutional aspects of society 
compared to what he has put forward. During and after the miner's strike, women had 
begun to be involved in the organisation of family welfare groups and from there, join 
womens' groups and from there, came into higher education. One of their reasons for 
coming into the psychotherapeutic milieu was that they wanted to work in counselling 
at the end of the course. But they had started to understand counselling in terms of a 
reflexive notion of the self. They embraced, as discussed, above a form of self-
therapy grounded in self-observations and (what they would believe) as a 
" 
reconstruction of a new self out of contemporary notions of womanhood "we are not 
what we are but what we make ourselves " What was happening also was that these 
miners' wives were contributing to the splintering of the micro- from the macro-
worlds as they implemented their day to day actions. They no longer were interested 
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in the demise of the mines and its mining culture. Also, by endorsing the principles of 
individualistic counselling they were severing themselves from references to both 
macro and micro-environments. 
What had happened, in fact, was that some of the women were leaving their 
long term partners and going to live with other men, and some of the women with 
other women. Others wanted independent lives. Husbands came back home in the 
evening to find that both wives and furniture had gone and gone for good, even when 
the wives were pressed to come back. Secretively, the women had taken off and 
entered a self-contained and morally neutral existence. They were also using their 
bodies, and the withdrawal of them within the sphere of distal power. In broader 
terms they were acting out society's forces without having knowledge of what really 
was happening to them. In the process of doing so they were contributing to the 
dissolution of their social structures and practices. What was happening though 
compared to the men, was that the women were beginning to realise new 
competencies and possibilities in education and other life-chances, whereas the 
options of the men's social existence were being narrowed down. The men were 
victims of their economic social constraints; plus their previous masculjne North-East 
role was being eroded by the new power-role of the women. Manicas (1987) suggests 
that one cannot simply describe the world or achieve consensual meanings one must 
first ask whether its members have an adequate understanding of their world. In some 
ways the men had an understanding of or knowledge-ability of their previous 
economic situation, its values and its boundeness but such knowledge is now 
decontextualised and redundant for them. Along with this they no longer had an 
understanding of their masculine identity which was previously defined in terms of 
their then sociai relations to women in addition to other men. Such knowledge was 
being decontextualised as .well. Fuhrman (1986) in Morality, Self and Society: The 
Loss and Recapture of the Moral Selfin his explanation of modem societies states 
that they exhibit spatial and temporal uneveness and dysjunctures so that their so~ial 
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structures do not hang together very well . The moral cracks and crevices of such 
structures are exactly what the actor has to negociate. (Fuhrman, 1986) 
7 Conclusion 
It is doubtful whether there can be a compelling argument made for an individualistic 
account of psychotherapy. What needs to be considered is what type of social and 
moral account with its political implications is truly adequate. The account has to 
consider the processes of contemporary society and the personal trials they give rise 
to. Conversely psychotherapeutic provision must be made for such personal trials and 
the contexts that gave rise to them. 
In order to have an adequate account of psychotherapy, provision must be 
made for the modalities of micro-conduct, macro-conduct and agency and the 
influences and dysfunctions occurring among them. Psychotherapy theory and 
practice must be considered as a practical intervention in society and it has thus a role 
as a critique of society and a critical force in altering society. Nagel (1979) considers 
that ethics must be focussed within hierarchical organisations and institutional 
practices due to their impersonal qualities and the mediateness of the consequences of 
persons' actions in large scale organisations. 
In this chapter I have continued outlining my proposals concerning values for 
the centring of an account of psychotherapy. I have backgrounded my account by 
considering Giddens' (1979) notion of personal and social existence in his 
conceptualisation of the duality of structure. I have had to extend my version beyond 
his proposals for persons in relation to their institutional practices. I have managed to 
reformulate the notion ofthe duality of structure through O'Gorman's (1986) notion of 
hylemorphism in which persons and their practices are co-related. I have allowed for 
different time-scales for agents and their social practices by bringing in the terms pre-
dated institutionalised values (supplied in stocks of knowledge and memory traces) 
and post-dated values pertaining to persons' actions (practices) and their 
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consequences. I argue for a social theory that is organised around the principle of 
social and moral values rather than the Giddensian one of rules. 
Althoqgh the notion of agency has species-specific attributes they by I , 
themselves will not occasion psychotherapeutic betterment. The therapist has to 
appeal to the person in therapy's own intentions, knowledge and capabilities. The 
monitoring of these involves the practical skills of the therapist. But over and above 
this the therapist has to confirm the person's particularity within his or her life 
contexts but suggesting that some contexts be altered while some be retained. The 
altering of the contexts conditions a different mode of conduct for the person in 
therapy. 
I have continued the theme of ongoing autobiographies. It is only very 
simplistic forms ofbehavioural stimulus and response programmes that do not 
seriously consider the encompassing autobiographical data given by the person in 
therapy. If one does not consider the notion of personal and social autobiographies 
. within a psychotherapeutic theory, how do psychotherapists commit themselves to the 
belief that the future of persons in therapy (i.e. in terms of their psychological 
betterment) will be different from their pasts?. I have used the notion of 
autobiography in different terms from other social theorists who consider 
autobiography as narrative or story telling in which language is primary. 
(Barthes, 1985) Autobiography as I understand it requires to have a trajectory of self 
as past, present and future but conceptualised in terms of a developing being in 
relation to their social practices (a developing being which presupposes persons 
having a growing grasp of capabilities and potentials and knowledge in order to alter 
such practices as they developmentally interact with them). 
There is one final point which is important for the way I have conceptualised 
the notion of autobiography and countered the notion of autobiography as narrative or 
as a chronicle of episodes or narrative conceived as a story telling function which 
would have analogies with fiction. Barthes (1967,1985) and Selman (1989) indicate 
that there is an increasing movement towards social theories being expressed iri terms 
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of the discourse of literature. This is occurring through the privileging of 
structuralism or semiotics as social theory. Barthes suggests that, 
The world of the literary work is a total one, in which all knowledge, social, 
psychological or historical, has a place, with the result that for us literature has that 
great cosmogonic unity which the ancient Greeks enjoyed but which are denied today 
by the fragmented state of our sciences.(Barthes, 1967:41 0) · 
\ 
Barthes continues 
That is to say that structuralism, itself developed from a linguistic model, fmds in 
literature, which is the work of language, an object that has much more than an 
affinity with it; the two are homogeneous ..... We can understand then why 
structuralism should ... be ... a linguistics of discourse, whose object is the ' language' 
ofliterary forms ... (Barthes 1967,412:413.) 
For me the individual's personal trials and their embodiment in physical 
suffering of high levels of anxiety such as panic attacks, loss of moral viability and 
heightened adverse social factors such as unemployment cannot be incorporated into 
literary forms, which are essentially fictional works which have no encompassing 
reference to any Hying person. 
The reason I have had to draw on fictional representations like the "Buddha of 
Suburbia" is because of the dearth of examples of moral conduct or moral 
collectivities in any of the approaches to psychotherapy. As Rorty notes, 
Fiction ... gives us the details about kinds of suffering being endured by people to 
whom we had previously not attended. That is why the novel, the movie, and the 
T.V. program have, gradually but steadily, replaced the sermon and the treatise as the 
principal vehicles of moral change and progress. (Rorty,1989: xvi) 
Persons' psychological problems in reality cannot be grounded though within fictional 
discourses. Psychotherapeutic modes of reality dealing with the shifting contingencies 
and contexts of persons social existence at particular spans in their life cannot be 
reduced to pre-structured fictional forms. What is required is a theory of 
psychotherapy that allows for the person in therapy to be considered within his or her 
social and moral contexts, and explanations of his or her psychological disaffections 
to arise out of the relation of such persons and their social environments. But the last 
words must be with Baier (1985) and Smail (1987). Baier stipulates that, 
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Moral agents also need theories, or rather the reliable facts good theories produce -
facts about the way people react, about the costs and consequences of particular ways 
of life, on those who adopt them and on their fellow persons. We need psychological 
theories and social theories, and, if we are intent on political change, theories about 
political power and its working, and about economics ..... moral reflection is 
empirically informed, that is to say informed by psychological political and historic 
knowledge, and it is also practical, a reflective version of real motives in real-world 
situations. (Baier, 1985:233,238) 
Smail maintains from the perspective of the person in therapy, 
In order to change things for the better - in order, that is, to be able to act morally -
the individual must have the moral space in which to do so. This is not something 
which people can create for themselves as private individuals, but something which is 
socially created and maintained through the proper use of concerted (political ) power. 
(Smail ,1987:161) 
Notes 
1. Ritzer (1983) indicates that term structural-functionalism can be used as one 
term or two terms. Giddens (1979) firstly separates the terms but thereafter 
attempts to make them interdependent at certain points in his theory e.g. the 
structure of any organisation is determined by the function (the systernness) it 
has in society. 
2. The other references to structures by Giddens (1979,1984)are one, the 
structural principles which are implicated in societal totalities. These are 
standardised practices which have the greatest time-space extension such as 
the enduring govermental practices of nation- states. The second reference has 
to do with structural properties involved in the processes of structuration. The 
latter are considered as the systernness of social relations across space and 
time, in virtue of the duality of structure. 
3. Structures: rules structure actions; structures are virtual, they have no 
existence of their own. They exhibit properties and are organised as properties 
of spcial systems. 
4. One of the implications of "the structural" in structuralism is its synchronic 
characterisation in which language is made present or instantiated in speech. 
The backgrounding to this idea is that in the processes of instantiation ofthe 
spoken word a universal grammatical order of language (syntax and 
semantics) is brought into being with its presence manifested in speech. The 
analogy of action with language brings in problems, however. Action is a 
much more open indeterminate process and cannot be defined within the more 
closed system of grammatical utterances. 
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1 Introduction 
My account of psychotherapy is a moral account (with political implications), 
involving persons and their micro- and macro- practices. None of these three 
modalities can be excluded from an adequate account of psychotherapy. Persons are 
social beings interacting with others and are embedded in enduring institutional 
practices. The focus of my account is the political and moral features of contemporary 
practices and the means available in relation to the practices of social psychotherapy 
for their analysis. These social features have influenced and/or socially constrained 
those persons who come to psychotherapy. As Giddens argues no one can opt out of 
the problems of modernity with its disembedding features. Bauman (1990) Habermas 
(1986) and Giddens (1991) indicate that the problems ofmodemity make people seek 
out psychotherapy. Smail ( 1993) has reversed the traditional notion of the case-study 
in psychotherapy and entitled one of his chapters "A Case-Study: the 1980s". What 
needs problematising is the sort of world we live in with its business, professional, 
political and moral practices which, in the main, form the origins of persons' 
psychological disaffections. One cannot, thus, have an account of psychotherapy 
devoid of a critique of society in which there is· no intent to question society and its 
practices. Moreover in the proce~ses of assessments of the values pertaining to social 
practices some alternatives must be found and attempts made to make social matters 
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other than they are. The person in therapy has a central role to play in this. Habermas 
comments, 
I cannot imagine any seriously critical social theory without an internal link to 
something like an emancipatory interest. That is such a big name! But what I mean is 
an attitude which is formed in the experience of suffering from something man made, 
which can be abolished and should be abolished. This is not just a contingent value-
postulate: that people want to get rid of certain sufferings. No, it is something so 
profoundly ingrained in the structure of human societies _ the calling into question, 
and deep seated wish to throw off, relations which repress you without necessity 
_so intimately built into the reproduction of human life that I don't think it can be 
regarded as just a subjective attitude which may or may not guide this or that piece of 
scientific research.(Habermas, 1986: 198) . 
2 Accounts of Psychotherapy 
In order to establish an account ofp.sychotherapy, I firstly had to find out if traditional 
modes of psychotherapy were adequate for grounding my account of psychotherapy. I 
have contested the adequacy of individualistic mainstream accounts on a number of 
grounds: their views of human nature, their concepts, procedures and claims of 
validation. None has been empirically substantiated over time (Smail 1978, 1993). 
The two most important cognitive and behavioural psychotherapies have operated out 
of the Cartesian schism of inner mind and extended physical body (observed 
· behaviour). As a result these are two rival and incompatible accounts. Where there 
have been attempts to integrate accounts of psychotherapy to include both cognition's 
and behaviour they have often been conceptualised as a two-step process rather than 
an integrated theoretical approach (as exemplified in Meichenbaum's ,1977, and 
Bandura's ,1977, two-step mind and behaviour approaches to psychotherapy). A 
similar problem resides in attribution theory where the inferred causes of behaviour 
have been attributed to either situations (an external cause )as suggested by Nisbett 
(1975) or attributed to persons (an internal cause) as suggested by Kelley, (1973). 
There have been doubts as to whether persons and their situations can be effectively 
integrated within an attributional approach Burke (1962 ).Howarth (1989) in a review 
of theories of, and approaches to psychotherapy demands greater scientific 
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substantiation based on research findings. He indicates that there is now· a greater 
consensus within theories of psychotherapy and such consensus should be the focus 
of research. But I argue that what he is assessing are not integrated theories. For the 
main two theories have irreconcilable views on human nature, irreconcilable 
perspectives of psychotherapy and incompatible grounds for theorising.! 
There are other worrying problems with regard to approaches to 
psychotherapy. One ofthe problems is the removal of any social implications from 
the notion of self-theories. In Rogers' (1973) theory of psychotherapy, the notion of 
the self-concept was obtained from socialising processes involving what he termed 
significant others. In Winnicott's (1965) case he underlined his approach to 
psychotherapy with the necessity of the early bonding of mother and baby. There is 
reference to a social dimension in psychotherapy in both cases although it tends to be 
offset by the conceptualisation of the organismic self (Rogers, 1973) or the true and 
false self. (Winnicott, 1958) 
However, there seems to be a greater dissociation of the notion of self from 
forms of sociality. This is inherent in Rainwater's(1989) proposals for self-therapy 
where the self is intrinsically self-referential. Giddens endorses her notion of the 
reflexive self. Such a notion requires what Giddens has termed the continual 
reorganisation of the self due to the collapse of the enduring traditional institutional 
practices which gave persons their continuity of social identity. Giddens' statements 
point up the way in which an emphasis on individualism is being retained or 
reintroduced in accounts of psychotherapy (exactly the opposite of what is happening 
in psychology where ideas regarding cognition are being socially contextualised as 
Reed, 1991, indicates). This desocialising of the self in psychotherapy also indicates 
something much more questionable occurring within Giddens' own writings. His 
initial commitment was to ·a theory which recognised the social domain at the level of 
institutional organisations and their structures of domination. (Giddens 1979,1984) 
However modernity which is marked out by a greater number of social transitions is 
less emphasised by him at the level of society and he refers moreso to the problems of 
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the self-in-modernity. For he stipulates that "such transitions are drawn into and 
surmounted by means of the reflexively mobilised trajectory of self-actualisation." 
The reflexive project of the self involves a process whereby self-identity is constituted 
by the reflexive ordering of self. (Giddens ,1991) It is as if one polarity ofGiddens' 
central concept in his social theory has been made residual. In the process of the 
analysis of society he has tended to reconstitute society's dysfunctions within his own 
theorising rather than identifying limits to and critiques of these dysfunctions. O'Neill 
(1986) critically refers to the excision of society from social theory as sociological 
nemesis and Lash and Urry (1986) refer to it as "the dissolution of the social." 
There is an equally worrying problem in the social theorising of Handy 
(1987), Holland (1977) and Newman (1991). They endorse one "vocabulary" which is 
realised in critical social theory in terms of the institutional constraints of macro-
practices but they refer to a totally different "vocabulary", that of micro-conduct in 
which to ground and establish their social theories. Each of these authors is writing 
from a different perspective but each of them wishes to establish an adequate account 
of psychotherapy which takes cognisance of the institutional conditions and 
constraints influencing persons in therapy. However, all contain their social theorising 
within an interactionist approach. Missing from their accounts is the notion of agency 
within social contexts and the nature of such contexts and the means of eradicating 
their socially demeaning effects through the auspices of capable and knowledgeable 
beings. Paradoxically, these radical critical theorists request that theorising in 
psychology and specifically clinical psychology should consider the interplay 
between social structures and individual subjectivity while at the same time 
dispensing with it within their own theoretical interactionist approach. This is 
exemplified in Handy's statement. 
Radical critics of psychology, are in essence, condemning the discipline's 
propensity for focusing on the psychological aspects of social reality without 
grappling with the problem of how objective and ideological features of society 
influence the psyche. One of the most common themes they raise is the discipline's 
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failure to deal with the political and historical contexts of human behaviour. 
(Handy,1987: 161) 
What is required and provided for in psychotherapy as social critique are the three 
modalities of persons, their micro and macro-practices. Firstly it is necessary to 
include both macro- and micro- practices. For persons inhabit the world in joint 
activities with their siblings and intimates and these activities are conditioned by the 
cultures, institutional practices and economies - in other words by the social 
environment which surrounds them. Secondly the relation between the micro- and 
macro- practices must also be considered both in terms oftheinfluences of traditional 
macro-practices upon micro-conduct and also the contemporary uncoupling of macro-
practices from micro-practices. I have illustrated in one of the general case-studies 
that persons in traditional cultures can suffer the effects of both the social and 
economic constraints of a low- wage or unemployed industrial background along with 
the uncoupling of the locale of work (macro-conduct) from the locale of leisure 
(micro-conduct). The effects tend to deny males both their male identity and 
economic identity along with their overlapping features. (Fryer and Ullah, 1987) 
I have organised my account of psychotherapy around two dualities. One 
duality has expressed the relation between persons and their social existence, in terms 
ofmicro-conduct..The other duality has expressed the relation between persons in 
therapy and their social existence in relation to their macro-practices. The person in 
therapy with his or her agental features is the common factor between the two 
dualities. There has to be an active being intentionally responding to and interacting 
with the social practices of the social environment and what it offers. This involves a 
developing feedback process between the two which is constraining but directive and 
which allows the person to actively modify his or her social environment. 2 
' 
I have provided for the necessary agental features of the person in therapy 
within the species - specific attributes of powers, intentionality and knowledge-ability 
with a recognition that such attributes can also be particularised. The important point 
is that each of the attributes are defined by a relational approach to personal and social 
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existence in which the one co-implies the other. Also each of the attributes forms an 
overlapping cluster with the other attributes so that they complement each other. The 
notion of intentionality is the key to the alteration of social practices by the person in 
therapy. This notion of intentionality also requires social and personal powers which 
allow both for the capacities to act and for the powers of control to make things 
different. (Giddens, 1984, Harre 1983) Th~ third notion, that of knowledge-ability is 
also a key concept in my account of psychotherapy. According to Harre (1978) social 
knowledge is drawn upon by persons to formulate intentions in order to perform 
appropriate acts. Social knowledge or rather knowledge-ability involves stocks of 
knowledge as personal and collective memory traces upon which persons draw for 
their discursive and action orientated activities. The central notion of psychotherapy 
as critique has to do with practical knowledge founded on skill or practice. With 
regard to knowledge as practice I have argued, like Giddens, that knowledge in 
certain aspects is "available" and I suggest also that the social environment "yields" 
knowledge. (Giddens, 1984:91,375) For example, the "outdoor monumental" sculptor 
obtains knowledge from the social environment from which he will compose his 
sculpture which will fit into a particular social and physical landscape. He does not 
create or invent such knowledge. The architect, similarly has to carry out much the 
same task with regard to public buildings. The social environment thus yields 
knowledge which has to be considered within the conceptual, symbolic and structural 
forms of the sculpture or building. Such practical knowledge is a two-way process 
involving the practitioner practising his or her skill in relation to the information 
offered by the social environment. 
In the case of psychotherapy as critique such knowledge involves ethical 
knowhow which links together the motifs for an account of psychotherapy as critique. 
There is not just a relation between personal and social existence but a relation which 
specifies both as a skill-based propensity. I have provided for this skilled 
phenomenon in terms of the notion of an evaluator and values, which pertain to social 
practices by drawing on Gibson (1966) and Manicas (1990). The 
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evaluator/practitioner discriminates and intentionally selects from the values 
pertaining to relevant social practices. This discriminative process is not just a 
comparative process but is one which allows for the selection of alternatives from "in 
situ" social practices. I achieve the moral account of psychotherapy through the 
notion of ethical knowhow but in addition I supply the concept of moral exemplars. 
The notion of moral exemplars sets my account against other moral accounts of 
psychotherapy and the way they have been conceptualised. But the term exemplars 
also integrates psychotherapy as critique by means of the way I have conceptualised 
it. I have defined the notion of exemplars as samples which like any particular sample 
has to go through a process of assessment. The assessment proposed for a 
psychotherapy as critique is that which is advocated by Deleuze and Guattari (1990) 
and by Foucault (1980) as "experimentation" and problematisation" as a continuous 
enquiry into values whose effects can be assessed and other action taken on the basis 
of that assessment. The form of assessment is not an adjudication process which is an 
end in itself, but is one which diachronically leads to change or offers other 
possibilities, albeit with successes and failures on the way. (May,1993) 
Such assessment processes, moreover, include an enquiry into what upholds 
values rather than values being regarded as solely given, presupposed or intuited. 
Such an enquiry is theoretically central to my account and is the basis for the 
procedures of psychotherapy. Further, with regard to the notion of values or 
exemplars I have proposed a dual account of values for the discourse of 
psychotherapy based on Crook's ( 1991) notion of a dual relation for values . In my 
account, I have proposed that values pertaining to social practices are available as 
information. But they have to be queried as to what upholds and what obfuscates 
them and in terms of who makes the judgement and on behalf of whom. The 
important point is that the mediated form of information or knowledge comes out of 
the non-mediated form. For example, the values associated with assertive. 
psychotherapy are underwritten by certain economic values immanent in society. One 
would examine and assess the values pertaining to the psychotherapy and its practices 
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and relate them to and assess them within the broader features of, econo.mic and 
political individualism. Bogue comments, "An evaluation of values must start ·with 
the differential origin of values, with a determination of the way of life that creates 
those values." (Bogue, 1989: 17) 
My proposals for psychotherapy have set my account against individualistic 
. accounts of psychotherapy as well as against, other moral and social accounts. In 
addition such proposals have set my account against the critical social theories of 
Bhaskar (1989), Baudrillard (1983), Habermas (1972), Deleuze and Guattari (1990)-
they have either used a paradigm of psychotherapy modelled on Freud and Marx or in 
the case of Deleuze,Guattari and Baudrillard obtain their model for social theory 
through counterpointing a Freudian/Marxist account. 
I have introduced the notion of a relational and developmental account with 
persons either being in contact with others through certain activities or persons being 
in contact with their more enduring institutionalised practices as macro-conduct. With 
regard to micro-conduct, I have drawn on Still and Good's (1992) notion of persons 
setting the social context for others in a dynamic and dialectic process of 
development. The unit of analysis is focussed on goal-directed activities and the 
contribution each person makes to the activities (each person specifying the further 
contexts for the other and producing the continuity of development). In like manner 
the therapist discuss_es with the person in therapy the social contexts to be set for 
future activities with intimates and colleagues. A key to the nature ofpsychotherapy 
as social critique, however, is that the person in therapy is involved in two sets of 
activities with other persons. One set of activities has to do with the psychotherapist 
and the other has to do with their own social activities outside of the 
psychotherapeutic situation. I have named this the "two worlds" of the person in 
therapy. Radical accounts of psychotherapy have tended to ignore the mediating role 
of the therapist; and traditional accounts have ignored the values immanent in society 
which affect the person in therapy. I hilVe related these two worlds through the 
interventions that the therapist makes via the details given in the autobiographical 
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history of the person in therapy and dealt with in the discursive processes of 
psychotherapy. I have termed these interventions "transformation points" and they 
mark the intersection between the psychotherapeutic discourse and the discourse of 
critical social theory which involves a critical review of society's practices and values. 
3 The Recentring of the "Social" 
I have found the conceptualisation of the relation of persons and their institutional 
practices problematic for various reasons. Giddens has been generally commended 
(Heft,1989, Shotter,1983) for the central tenet of his social theory, namely the concept 
of the duality of structure incorporating a relation between persons and their 
institutionalised practices. The practices refer in the main to rules instantiated and 
expressed in social practices (social systems). But there are several theoretical 
problems with Giddens' notion of the duality of social structure as indicated by 
Archer ( 1986) and Kilminster ( 1991 ). In order to bypass such problems I have 
substituted the notion of values for that of rules. I have then allowed values in 
institutional practices to both pre-date and post-date persons and their practices. The 
agent has access to pre-dating values within present stocks of kllowledge as value 
resources akin to Harre's (1983) knowledge resources. Values also post-date the 
person since acts of persons, with their concomitant values, have consequences which 
effect their own and others' institutional practices. The common factor in the pre-
dating and post-dating features of social existence is agency. The notion of agency is 
not simply a trajectory of self with a past, present and future in time for agents have 
changing social histories; in part occurring through agents acting upon the social 
environment and thereby altering that particular relation between their social contexts 
and themselves as agents. 
I have argued against Baudrillard 's social theorising (1983) which indicates 
that the bipolarities of concepts such as agency and social structures are no longer 
tenable. His argument relates to "':hat has been termed the "end of the social" and the 
querying of the necessity and rationale for social theory itself. There are two 
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important issues with regard to what is regarded as '.'the end of the social". Firstly, 
society • its institutional practices and its politics ·can no longer be investigated or 
questioned or evaluated. Moreover if social theories do not exist there can be no 
critical "seeing through" of society based on empirical enquiry and research. Further 
there can be no new theories making positive scientific advancement on the old. 
Secondly there can be no introduction of a social theory involving social practices 
into the discourse of psychotherapy. Accounts of psychotherapy will then be 
encapsulated within theories of the mind or self and the latter two are for some social 
theorists debatable issues also. It means further that the tradition of enquiry and 
research into social factors and their relation to the dysfunctioning (in terms of 
anxiety and depression) of the person in therapy cannot be upheld or further 
developed if one is working outside of social theories and social research. Belle(1982 
),Brown and Harris (1978),Goldberg and Huxley (1980,1992) have all examined 
specific social circumstances related to specific types of psychological disorder.In the 
latter's 1980 study, and their review of other studies considering the relation of social 
factors to psychological _djfficulties, Goldberg and Huxley found that there was a 
predicable outcome at six months, for persons who were psychologically ill and who 
were attending psychiatric clinics and who had adverse material and social 
circumstances. Jarman (1983, 1984) has constructed a numerical score consisting of 
eight categories of underprivileged groupings of the population which bears a positive 
correlation (+.87) with psychiatric admissions to hospital. The categories are positive 
indicators ofthe relation of social deprivation to psycholo~ical illness. Five ofthese 
categories are; one parent families; unskilled workers; unemployed people; 
overcrowded homes; and ethnic minorities. These are not independent variables, as 
effecting causes. of mental illness but they are more generally what Huxley and 
Goldberg term as "proxy" variables. More research studies are required with regard to 
persons in therapy and the influences of adverse social circumstances and institutional 
constraints upon their psychological health. Many other variables need to be taken 
into account and Goldberg and Huxley indicate that a multivariate model is required 
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in order for hypotheses to be tested regarding the way social and environmental 
variables might relate to psychological ones. A multi-dimensional model will give 
information about the common factors of such psychological illnesses. Additional 
variables required are population variables (information of how psychological illness 
is distributed across the population); dimensions and levels of morbidity; diagnostic 
categori~s; vulnerability and predisposition factors; and types of external stressors. 
Goldberg and Huxley indicate that there is a possibility that there are specific links 
between types of social disorders and psychological illnesses. The problem as they 
state seems to be a very real one demanding the attention of social science. These 
suppositions should have a theoretical rationale linking persons in therapy with their 
social institutional practices and circumstances. Such studies indicate that accounts of 
psychotherapy have to consider the social implications ofpersons' psychological 
difficulties. It is a matter of co~cem if the discourse of psychotherapy is solely 
considered in individualistic terms without recourse to the social circumstances of, 
and the social constraints placed upon the person in therapy. 
Other problems of social theories emerge in connection with another issue. 
Baudrillard (1983), Deleuze and Guattari (1990) and Rorty (1989) argue that there 
can be no universal referent such as the unconscious or the self. There are only 
contingent selves. Their philosophies and theories are representative of what is termed 
discontinuist theories which involves a break or discontinuity from the theories of the 
past.(Khun, 1970) In fact, I have opposed such a discontinuist role for theories of 
psychotherapy. I have proposed a continuist role for social theory but with certain 
reservations. I achieve what I want for my account of psychotherapy by centring it on 
Harre's (1983) reformulation oftraditional notions of selves which can organise 
experiences and have their own point of view (albeit drawn from sociolinguistic 
practices). What I advocate is the idea of humans having both personal and social 
characteristics, with autobiographical personal and social histories and who alter their 
social practices as they interact with them, thereby altering their social histories. 
Paradoxically I make use of the theories from the discontinuists such as De leuze and 
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Guattari.I supply the notion of persons having characteristics and they supply the 
notion of these characteristics having continuity over time but a continuity which in 
certain respects can alter over time. Tdle extension of traditional theories into more 
-
contemporary contexts prevents the disclaiming of what is still important in social 
theories but allows for more innovative approaches to emerge. 
4 Approaches to Psychotherapy 
The case-studies illustrate the principles and practices of psychotherapy as social 
critique ,and the parameters of psychological difficulties. The psychological 
difficulties are not resolved by appealing to notions such as mental predicates but by 
looking at contemporary social factors and how to countermand them. The focus is on 
what could be termed the de-ethicalisation of human relations either in the form of 
the Giddensian "pure" relation or Bauman's notion of "mismeetings". Giddens' notion 
of the pure relation is a central feature of contemporary psychological difficulties 
emerging from contemporary modes of the ways persons relate to each other. The 
pure relationship operates only so far as persons are fully autonomous beings within 
the relationship. That is why self-knowledge and self reliance, according to Giddens, 
are so important. For it makes one's dependency on the other person less necessary -or 
the need for the other person or partner to give one, one's identity since external 
referents (or criteria) are unobtainable within or outside of the relationship. The pure 
relation exists and lasts only in so far as persons can obtain rewards or psychic returns 
for themselves. Bauman's notion of mismeetings is in part an extension of the pure 
relation in which there are only morally neutral and "dis-interested" intercourses 
between persons. Such notions of social encounters form part of the larger sphere of 
moral abuses that contextualise the psychological difficulties which persons bring to 
psychotherapy. Most personnel in the psychotherapeutic profession would agree that 
persons in psychotherapy have been victims of forms of moral abuse (some with 
political and economic implications and some involving de-ethicalised relations and 
sometimes the two together). However few psychotherapists and commentators on 
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psychotherapy would consider that alleviating and countering moral abuses would be 
the most obvious response to, and direct means out of psychological difficulties. 
It is inconceivable, though, that psychotherapy as social critique could be 
universally prescribed to cover all psychotherapeutic problems and their solutions. No 
single theory of psychotherapy can be the panacea for all psychological problems. 
Certain behavioural programmes including relaxation exercises in systematic 
desensitisation programmes have a part to play with persons with anxiety syndromes~ 
(Wolpe,1958) There are also those persons in therapy who, either through their own 
desires or by virtue of their problems require a more structured behavioural approach 
to therapy procedures such as might be involved in alcohol dependency counselling. I 
would offer the rider, however, that an enquiry into ways ofliving -and their related 
long term and short term goals - has to be part of the features of such psychotherapy. 
For these will have conditioned the problem in the first place. There always has to be 
some relationship between what conditioned the psychotherapeutic problem, the 
modes of access to it and the psychotherapeutic recovery within the person's own 
social contexts. Psychotherapy as social critique will, moreover, have little relevance 
for short term counselling support such as envisaged for types of crisis counselling. 
Although psychotherapeutic approaches involving assertive training encourage 
persons to take stands in relation to issues concerning other's behaviour, such 
"assertive" psychotherapy is contained within Western traditions of self where might 
is logically entailed within right. Such a view is central to persons acquiring 
assertiveness in their behaviour as envisaged in Alberti and Emmons Your Perfect 
Right (1974) and Stand Up, Spea_k Out, Talk Back! (1975). In every walk oflife the 
ideas stemming from assertiveness has had a reductive effect. Macintyre (1992) 
rightly comments that the division between non-manipulative and manipulative social 
relations have been obliterated. Macintyre's comments underwrite most of Argyle's 
(1975) notion of social encounters with specific references to communicative 
controls. 
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I would hesitate in certain circumstances to impose a moral psychotherapy on 
persons who thought that morality had no part to play in their lives. Examples of the 
latter might be no-hope teenagers or persons who had committed certain crimes 
against persons. I would consider, however, where and how morality could perhaps 
be part of these person's lives without necessarily wanting them to accept a set of 
rights and duties within a benign moral order or within terms of that order which 
seeks simply to suppress violence. There are other aspects of social existence where a 
moral psychotherapy should not b~ automatically offered without qualification. There 
are those who use moral conduct as a form of compliance with others and who in fact 
hide behind an apolitical moral order where moral issues are riot debated or moral 
stands taken up (including the manner in which other persons behave towards them). 
There are other persons who are already on the moral high ground but who have been 
victims of again skewed relations along with generally demeaning ways of life. They 
lack the impetus to engage themselves with the world and in their own words and 
terms do not lead fully satisfying lives. Such a view is representative often of left-
wing students with high political and social ideals, who can sometimes retreat behind 
their own form of idealism. However there are those already on the moral high 
ground for whom social reality is not obfuscated. They however cannot advance any 
way to enhance their lives socially or economically and no further probing into their 
past will be enlightening either for themselves or their therapist. Psychotherapy, 
especially moral therapy in such cases seldom reveals the ways and means of 
psychotherapeutic betterment. 
5 Some Limitations to My Account of Psychotherapy and Some Further 
Possibilities to Extend It. 
I obviously have not solved any of the traditional philosophical problems with regard 
to the concepts of intentionality or knowledge. In both cases, though, the problems 
can be slanted differently in ways which are more conducive to my central tenets of 
personal and social existence. The concept of intentionality has both subjective and 
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objective features. The subjective features have to be active and exploratory with 
respect to altering the objective features of social existence. In the case of 
epistemological factors concerning the subjective and objective features of knowledge 
the key lies in the conceptualisation of knowledge as practical knowledge which 
persons both draw on and use for further exploration. This is what I have termed as 
the knowledge-ability of the connoisseur. It is a skill that requires constant feedback 
between its objective and subjective features. In terms of my account of social 
psychotherapy I have termed it ethical knowhow. 
A more general approach to ideas pertaining to the notion of objective 
knowledge needs to be directed towards the Giddensian notion of "available" 
knowledge (Giddens,1984) and the Gibsonian notion ofthe environment "yielding 
knowledge". These terms need further addressing, defining and elaboration. It is 
through the probing of these concepts and reformulating them within a social context 
that a more appropriate social theory for psychotherapy can be achieved. Gibson 
(1986) himself indicates that knowledge is an extension of perception and this is a 
crucial factor in developing my account of psychotherapy. I believe that the lines of 
development and means to achieve a more general account of knowledge must begin 
from Gibson's (1986) central postulate that (wo )man and his or her social 
environment co-imply each other. For me the notion of the active nature of cognitive 
beings exploring their social environment as they interact with it is one of the most 
democratic principles in psychology. By extension persons are critically engaging 
with the world by means of an active co-relation to it, in which they are critically 
aware of the world and their place (or identity-positioning ) within that world. As 
stated above persons have discriminatory and evaluating propensities by which they 
can judge social and political affairs. 
Gibson's postulate in addition must override Harre's (1983) and Jensen's 
(1990) social theorising in which social existence and personal existence are 
disconnected terms because of a lack of a connecting principle between the two. Th~ 
use of terms such as realisation and appropriation are not connecting principles. It is 
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only if one starts with the Gibsonian notion of personal existence co-implying social 
existence that one can avoid such Kantian splits. This Gibsonian notion also avoids 
the converse of personal existence being subsumed under the linguistic features of 
social existence. Furtherlines of development could consider different aspects of 
Harre's (1972,1990) social theorising in which he endorses Gibson's social theory of 
perception. The important dimensions of perception are those that specify the 
environment and persons relation to the environment. Harre indicates that this 
approach must be taken into account in experimental work in which person's 
capacities to behave in certain ways may be centred or abrogated by the laboratory 
situation. However this endorsement of Gibson's theorising runs counter to his 
proposals for social psychology in which people are viewed as moral beings and 
embedded in normative orders. Harre thus adopts both a Shotterian hermeneutic and a 
Gibsonian realist perspective. There is a possibility that these two perspectives could 
be reconciled. In its classical form scientific realism must consider reality as being 
independent of human thought, beliefs or social knowledge or the product of social 
practices. Harre himself does not subscribe to such a classical mode of realism. 
Following a perspective of Gibson's own theorising he maintains that science is a set 
of techniques (both cognitive and practical) about what is invariant in the world but 
not independent of it. However this does not solve the problem that arises from his 
request that social psychology has to be centred also in a normative discourse. There 
are two ways out of the dilemma. One is to consider morality in the empirical terms 
that Baier (1985) does. The other is to offer a different relational form for the 
discourse of psychotherapy. Baier comments, 
The ... moral philosophy Hume practised was a mental geography of our powers of 
reflection, and our reflective practices .... His sort of moral reflection is empirically 
informed, that is to say, informed by psychological, political, and historical 
knowledge .... The psychological theory is ... empirically testable, and so is the political 
theory .... we should be looking for new and better ways both of designing our own 
role, and of conducting our reflection on and examination of the moral practices of 
our time .... the important aspects of the latter are its nonrationalism ,and its version of 
the relation between moral philosophy and the actual practices in which appeals to 
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moral judgements are made and in which morality makes a difference to what is done, 
thought, and felt. (Baier,1985:236,238) · 
What is vahiable in Harre's proposals is the idea of active beings having 
manipulatory and cognitive powers and propensities in relation to their social 
environments. But I propose, however, that the relational model be considered as a 
form of field theory. A field is a relational notion and forms a system of co-existing 
factors which are not mutually exclusive but which are interdependent and influence 
each other. In social psychology, field theory was extensiveley employed in the 
theorising ofLewin (1938). More recently Harre and Madden (1975) have drawn 
upon the notion of field theory in relation to their concept of powers. In the 
psychotherapeutic literature Rogers (J 973) has made passing reference to the term (in 
relation to Combs and Snygg ,1959). There is also Smail's more political contexts of 
fields o~ powers which include embodied personhood and macro- and micro-conduct 
and the social, political and psychological influences of the one upon the other. 
(Smail,1993, Figure 3:74) 
Harre, in fact, offers a conceptualisation of a relational field of powers in his 
use of the idea of fields of potentials. There are thus ways to consider field theory 
apart from Lewin' notion of force fields with positive and negative valences seeking a 
tension reducing equilibrium. Harre(Harre and Madden ,1975:175,179) recognises 
powers or forces in a relational form but equally important for my account is that he 
maintains that "we must ascribe to the field a certain power ofacting" .... "once its 
potentials have been invoked" .... "In short the field has to have something of the 
character of an agent" which in my terms also requires knowledge and intentionality 
if it is to be considered for human contexts. On the one hand such a field of powers 
with their enablements and liabilities can be set against De leuze and Guattari's ( 1990) 
notion of powers and forces. They establish that such powers or forces are relational 
but metastable with no fixed identity or function. They are differentially related to 
each other and only obtain their value from each other. They are, though, subjectless 
and agentless. On the other hand a relational format can gets over the problem of 
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powers as non-changing thing-like entities. For such powers in a field of powers must 
be in relation to something else and can induce change within its sphere of influence. 
In human terms this must refer to persons, micro-practices and macro-practices. It 
could finally link in with Deleuze and Guattari's notion of powers or forces 
representing either a dominating or dominated perspective of powers and Smail's 
concept of the field of powers in which powers are either assimilated (absorbed) or 
transmitted depending on the dominating or the lack of dominating influences of 
powers. 
6 Conclusion 
My account is neither wholly an action based account but one which allows for 
deliberation and debate through the notion of the assessment of social values as moral 
exemplars. Neither can my account be considered as intellectual argumentation for it 
is theorised around social practices (actions or rather conduct) and the enquiry into 
certain of such practices. Although my account cannot be considered as one with 
determinate law-like invariances, I have made the notion of regularities and the 
patterning of such regularities an essential vehicle for psychotherapeutic betterment 
and a necessity for any social theory. I have use the notion of developing skills as the 
regulatory methodological processes of psychotherapy. Skills co-imply 
knowledgeable persons and their practices and skills allow for practices to be 
modified by a feed-back process. The "contents" of the skills are evaluations of social 
values and the skill in this case is ethical knowhow in terms of judging values and 
then drawing upon them in one's conduct. In my moral account of psychotherapy I 
have avoided embedding social values in a normative discourse prescribing what 
persons ought to do or who they ought to be. I have also avoided the idealism of 
utopias about how the world should be. However I have countered a normative 
discourse for another reason. Namely that we are embodied in a material world as 
well as a social world and I have reinforced my account with the views of both Baier 
(1985) and Smail (1993) who advocate that moral and social theories be empirically 
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tested. The indices that Goldberg offers discussed above are representative of material 
deprivation as well as of social deprivation. By not using a normative prescriptive 
account I bridge the logical gap between facts and values and social and natural 
orders. 
The notion of autobiography is extremely important and must always be 
theorised in any accoUnt of psychotherapy. Those who do elide the notion of 
autobiography from their approaches to psychotherapy are not offering adequate 
accounts of persons and their psychological difficulties. For without the notion of 
autobiographies altering historically there can be no concept of psychotherapeutic 
betterment. A key point concerns the way I have conceptualised the notion of 
autobiography. It holds together my notion of persons with identities which alter as a 
result of social and historical factors (this is the concept of identity and difference in 
which persons are the same beings but are beings with evolving social histories which 
in certain senses alter their perspectives of the world). My notion of autobiography as 
the social self-in-activities rather than a narrative self is also very important. It 
distances my account from one in which there narrative-self constructs or invents his 
or her identity in the processes of the evolving narrative. It also distances my accounts 
from those social theories which consider narrative in terms of fictional orders. 
(Barthes 1985) What is required to be established as Smail (1993) indicates is the 
empirical justification for the social practices we enact or inflict upon others. 
This means reconsidering the nature and notions of (wo )man and the nature 
and notions of society that enables better social practices. The way I have 
conceptualised agency or personhood having knowledge, intentions and powers as 
active beings in relation to their social practices - altering them as they interact with 
them - sets my account against other accounts. This particular emphasis on a 
knowledgeable and active agent sets my account against other accounts of social 
theory which can be given the general term of a critique against irrationality. Such a 
critique of irrationality. enters into theories in anthropology, in social psychology and 
in psychotherapy and tends to.in varying degrees to "pathologise" the person. Smail 
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(1984,1993) Illich (1985) Ingleby (1981) and Deleuze and Guattari (1990) speak out 
against the conceptualisation of this in accounts of psychotherapy. The major 
proponent of the pathologising of the person is the psychoanalytic discourse in which 
the explanations of person's irrationality is dependent on the claims (unfounded) of 
rationality manifested in the scientific rigour of psycho- "analysis". The critique of 
the irrational also enters social psychology in that only bizarre, unfamiliar and 
puzzling actions (which paradoxically come under the heading of "ordinary 
explanations") require explanations. (Antaki 1981, Harre 1972 and Shotter 1983) In 
both cases there is a polarisation between rational and irrational explanations that is 
sometimes unnecessarily paralleled by the proposal of the rational scientist versus the 
less than rational layman. Smail (1987), Rorty (1989), and Bauman (1990) from 
opposite perspectives ask for an increasing sensitivity towards what they consider as 
unfamiliar sorts of people (strangers) with unfamiliar practices and for people in 
collectivities to underwrite this sensitivity. 
I have distanced myself from tacit accounts of psychology. One has to look at 
accounts of psychotherapy not in terms of the polarities of tacit versus discursive or 
rational versus irrational forms of knowledge' but in terms of what Foucault (1984) 
indicates as what is knowable and what is sayable and what is the converse of this. as 
what is unknowable and unsayable and involves the suppression ofsocial orders and 
social institutions and discourses and various forms of sociolinguistic supressions. "In 
every historical formation of knowledge configurations of forces dictate the 
conditions of visibility and enunciability of all possible objects of knowledge-." 
(Baugh,1993:63) Another problem is the extent to which psychological problems 
contextualised as individual pathologies have entered the lay world and one has a 
therapeutic society with its expanding influences on the way society is conceived. 
This critique comes from various perspectives Bauman ( 1990) Macintyre ( 1992), 
Smail (1984 ), and Illich ( 1985). Each alerts one to different perspectives of this 
process. It is only Giddens(1989) who in his analysis of modernity considers the 
increasing role of psychotherapy as an inevitable consequence of the disembedding 
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processes of society. He among the others is not condemning the double slippage of 
questionable psychotherapeutic theories into the lay world and their revamping again 
within social theories. The problem also is that the psychotherapeutic theories which 
he endorses have increasing notions of the intrinsically self-referential self, self 
cocooned from the mishaps occurring in society. 
What I have in mind is that persons do not have self-referential selves 
obtained through self-observation. (Rainwater,1989) Nor can persons be considered 
as emotive selves with only choices and preferences and no objective means of moral 
evaluations. Neither can the notion ofpersonshood involve only self-actualising 
processes with their occasional peak sensory experiences . What is required is the 
notion of the ethical security of the person through establishing his or her thisness or 
haeccity in relation to ethical practices. This alwa~s requires deliberation and effort. 
In many ways my account·could thus be considered as promulgating the Western 
individual with the virtues of effort and skill in action complemented by a rational 
belief system. Rather it is a timely warning that if we take away the place of 
knowledgeable and ethical security from people who should be drawing upon it in 
their daily lives then the truly irrational forces will take over. 
"If you do not comprehend the necessity to criticise. society, then indeed you must be 
mad". (A.Hind ,1989, Author of The Dear Green Place). 
Notes 
1. 
2 
Howarth Psychologist B.P.S (1989) 
Giddens (1979,1984) rightly argues for a feedback cycle which can occur only 
through some monitoring process of intentional and knowledgeable beings.He 
thus makes a distinction between his notion of a feedback loop and those 
social theorists who have opted for some form of momentum or drive which 
delivers a feedback.loop between effect and cause. 
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